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A. 
                                                
The Framework of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
* 
It is an established policy in the United States to separate commercial banking 
(the business of taking deposits and making commercial loans) from other commercial 
activities.
1  The separation of banking and commercial activities is achieved by federal and state 
banking laws, which enumerate the powers that banks may exercise, the activities that banks may 
engage in, and the investments that banks may lawfully make,
2 and expressly exclude banks 
from certain activities or relationships.
3  Some of these provisions could be circumvented if a 
nonbank company could carry on banking activities through a banking subsidiary and 
nonbanking activities either itself or through a nonbanking subsidiary.  To prevent such 
 
*  Note on references to Regulation K and Regulation Y. 
On October 16, 2001 the Board promulgated a new version of Regulation K, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,374 (Oct. 26, 
2001).  The accompanying release was published in 66 Fed. Reg. 54,346-98 (Oct. 26, 2001).  The new 
Regulation K will be codified in 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 of 2002.  For ease of reference, this paper already cites 
the revised Regulation K to 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 of 2002, although 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 of 2002 has not been 
published as of the date hereof. 
 
Some of the revisions of Regulation Y promulgated to carry out the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, infra note 4, 
were issued during 2001 and will be codified in 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 of 2002.  The Regulation Y amendments 
that were published in 2001 are the rules on financial holding companies (§§ 225.81–225.94) (Subpart I of 
Regulation Y), the rules on merchant banking activities (§§ 225.170–225.177) (Subpart J of Regulation Y), 
12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d) (final rule) & (e) (interim rule), and the equity investment capital rules (app. A & D 
to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs)).  For ease of reference, this paper already 
cites all Regulation Y provisions to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 of 2002, although 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 of 2002 has not 
been published as of the date hereof.  
 
1   This policy reflects a concern that a bank that controls industrial enterprises would be economically too 
powerful.  There is also a concern that commercial or industrial activities of banks may endanger the safety 
of deposits:  bankers may be bad industrialists; they may extend credit to the bank’s commercial affiliates 
on preferential terms; and, once a commercial affiliate of a bank incurs losses, the bank may be under great 
pressure to extend unsound credit.  The policy of separation also reflects a concern that a bank that engages 
in a commercial activity may not extend credit to its commercial competitors, and a bank that has 
subsidiaries engaged in commercial activities may refuse to extend credit to competitors of its subsidiaries.  
See Gruson, Nonbanking and Financial Activities of Foreign Banks Operating in the United States, Chapter 
10, § 10.01 in MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER (eds.), REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED 
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL, vol. 1 (3d ed. 2000). 
2   See, e.g., § 5136, Revised Statutes (National Bank Act of 1864), 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999) (restricting national banks to “carry[ing] on the business of banking” and prohibiting the ownership 
of securities) and, as an example of a state law, §§ 96 & 97, N.Y. Banking Law (McKinney 2001). 
3   See, e.g., § 20, Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994) (prohibiting banks that are members of the 
Federal Reserve System from affiliating with organizations that are primarily engaged in underwriting or 
dealing in securities).  Section 20 was part of the Glass-Steagall Act and was repealed in 1999.  See infra 
note 12.  An example of similar state law restrictions was § 103(9), N.Y. Banking Law (see McKinney 
2001) (prohibiting affiliations between banks and security corporations), which was repealed by the New 
York State Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 2000 N.Y. Laws ch. 493, § 1. circumvention, the federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
4 [herein BHCA] restricts the 
permissible activities and investments of bank holding companies.  A bank holding company 
[herein BHC]
5 is a company
6 that has direct or indirect control over any bank
7 organized in the 
United States or over another BHC.  A BHC may only own or control banks, other BHCs
8 and 
— with the approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [herein the 
Board] — subsidiaries that are engaged in narrowly defined activities “closely related to 
banking”.
9  BHCs may only acquire up to 5 percent of any class of voting shares of companies 
not engaged in banking activities or activities closely related to banking, and such shareholding 
must represent passive investments.
10 
The BHCA has also the effect of preventing an entity that is not a bank or a BHC 
from acquiring more than 24.9 percent of the equity of, or otherwise acquiring control over,  a 
U.S. bank or a BHC because an entity holding 25 percent of the equity of or otherwise 
controlling a U.S. bank or a BHC, itself becomes a BHC and is subject to all restrictions to 
                                                 
4   Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1850 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  On Nov. 12, 1999, 
the BHCA was substantially amended by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 [herein GLBA], Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 12, 1999), 113 Stat. 1338–1481 (1999).  See H.R. Conference 
Report to accompany S. 900 (Nov. 2, 1999), 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) [herein Conference Report on 
S. 900].  The GLBA was signed into law by President Clinton on Nov. 12, 1999. 
5   BHC is defined in § 2(a)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1994).  See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(c) (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
6   Company is defined in § 2(b), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See also 12 C.F.R. § 
225.2(d) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
7   Bank is defined in § 2(c), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See also 12 C.F.R. § 
225.2(b) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Control is defined in § 2(a)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999).  See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(e) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
8   Section 4(a)(2)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(A) (1994), providing that no BHC shall acquire or 
retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank or a 
BHC.  Section 4(a), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1994), further provides that no BHC shall engage in any 
activities other than banking or managing or controlling banks. 
9   Section 4(a)(2)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(B) (1994), which permits a BHC to acquire and retain 
direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of a company engaged in activities permitted by 
§ 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  Section 4(c)(8), BHCA, as amended by § 102(a), GLBA, 113 Stat. at 1341 (1999), freezes 
the activities that are closely related to banking:  permitted are only those activities that were determined by 
the Board to be permissible as of Nov. 11, 1999, the day before the date of enactment of the GLBA.  No 
new activities can be added. 
10   Section 4(c)(6), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994).  Section 4(c)(6), BHCA permits a domestic or 
foreign BHC to acquire and own not more than 5 percent of any class of the voting shares of any domestic 
or foreign company. For a discussion of § 4(c)(6), BHCA, see Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.09.  Section 4(c), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), contains some other narrowly defined exceptions 
from the general prohibition against investing in equity securities of other companies.  See generally 
Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.07 et seq. 
  2 which BHCs are subject.
11  In particular, such equity owner could no longer be engaged in 
activities other than banking and activities closely related to banking.  Furthermore, the Glass-
Steagall Act excludes U.S. banks and BHCs from the business of underwriting and dealing in 
securities, and under that act a holding group could not have a deposit-taking bank and a 
company engaged in securities underwriting and dealing.
12 
The above rules apply, subject to some exceptions, not only to foreign banks that 
have a U.S. bank subsidiary
13 but also to foreign banks that maintain a branch, agency or 
commercial lending company in the United States.
14 
                                                 
11   Under the U.S. banking law, a subsidiary is a company in which the parent owns or controls 25 percent or 
more of any class of voting securities or in which the parent owns or controls between 5 percent and 24.9 
percent of any class of voting securities and has the power to exercise a controlling influence.  See § 2(a)(2) 
(control) and § 2(d) (subsidiary), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) and (d) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 211.21(i) 
(control) and § 211.21(z) (subsidiary) (2002) (Regulation K); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(e) (control) and § 225.2(o) 
(subsidiary) (2002) (Regulation Y).  An entity owning or controlling less than 5 percent of any class of 
voting shares of a company is presumed not to control such company.  Section 2(a)(3) & (4), BHCA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(3) & (4) (1994).  The terms subsidiary and controlled company have the same meaning.  
For a discussion of control, controlling influence and subsidiary, see Gruson, supra note 1, §§ 10.05 & 
10.06. 
12  Sections 16, 20, 21 and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (seventh), 377, 378 & 
78 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), are known as the Glass-Steagall Act.  The idea behind the separation of 
commercial banking and investment banking is that the deposits of the public should not be exposed to the 
risky securities transactions.  Section 16 prohibits banks from acquiring securities and from engaging in 
underwriting and dealing in securities; § 20 prohibited banks that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System from affiliating with organizations that are primarily engaged in underwriting or dealing in 
securities; § 21 prohibits the receipt of deposits by securities companies; § 32 prohibited management 
interlocks between officers, directors or employees of a bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve 
System and a securities firm.  Sections 20 and 32 were repealed by § 101(b), GLBA, 113 Stat. at 1341 
(1999).  The prohibitions of §§ 16 and 21 remain in effect, because the GLBA permits the conduct of 
banking and securities activities in a holding group but not in one enterprise.  Although the Glass-Steagall 
Act has hurt commercial banks, it has furthered or even made possible the development of strong 
investment banks in the United States.  Section 20 is not completely dead.  See the Board’s release of Mar. 
10, 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,440 (Mar. 17, 2000), accompanying interim rule 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) that imposes two of the eight § 20 operating standards on securities affiliates of FHCs.  The 
Board stated in the release, at 14,441 n.1:  “The operating standards would continue to apply to section 20 
subsidiaries controlled by [BHCs] that do not qualify as [FHCs]”.  See Wells Fargo & Company, 86 FED. 
RES. BULL. 341 (2000), and Banque Nationale de Paris and Paribas, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 118 (2000) 
(applying the rules relating to § 20 subsidiaries that are based on the repealed § 20); Final FHC Release, 
infra note 32, at 405 n.10 (the 25 percent revenue limit applicable to Section 20 subsidiaries of BHCs that 
are not FHCs remains in effect).  See infra note 821 (Regulation Y applies two § 20 operating standards to 
the extension of credit by banks that are part of an FHC group to broker-dealer subsidiaries of such group.) 
13   The BHCA applies directly to such foreign banks. 
14  Section 8(a), International Banking Act of 1978 [herein IBA], 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1994), makes the 
BHCA applicable to foreign banks maintaining a branch or agency or controlling a commercial lending 
company in the United States.  A branch is a place of business of a foreign bank in the United States where 
deposits are received from U.S. citizens or residents.  Section l(b)(3), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3101(3) (1994); 12 
C.F.R. § 211.21(e) (2002) (Regulation K).  An agency is a place of business of a foreign bank in the United 
States where credit balances are maintained or checks are paid or money is lent, but where deposits are not 
accepted from U.S. citizens or residents.  Section l(b)(1), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3101(1) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 
  3 The system that separates banking from other commercial activities created 
significant competitive disadvantages for U.S. banks in the international banking market and in 
the financial services market in general.  Furthermore, the strict separation of banking and 
nonbanking activities has made it impossible for some non-U.S. banks to access the U.S. market.  
In particular a foreign holding group that had banks and insurance company members could 
engage in the United States either in the banking business or in the insurance business.
15 
In adopting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
16 [herein GLBA] it was, of course, not 
the intention of Congress to help foreign banks, but to strengthen the competitive position of 
U.S. banks by permitting a combination in a holding group of banks, insurance companies and 
securities companies.  Enterprises that are not engaged in financial activities are still precluded 
from acquiring directly or indirectly U.S. banks.  Representative Leach, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the House of Representatives, has said that this 
separation between banks and enterprises outside the financial sector was retained because 
Congress was afraid that otherwise all major banks would be taken over, in particular by 
companies in the media and technology sectors, and that such takeovers would not be in the best 
interest of the U.S. economy and the international competitive position of U.S. banks.
17 
The GLBA, which was approved by Congress after 20 years of discussion at the 
end of 1999,
18 brought about major changes in the U.S. financial system but it does not abolish 
the policy of separating banking from commercial activities.
19  The GLBA only modifies the 
separation policy for some BHCs and for some activities.  The GLBA creates a subgroup of 
BHCs, BHCs whose depository institutions are well capitalized and well managed and have 
received a satisfactory rating under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1997.
20  A BHC that 
meets these requirements and files with the Board a declaration of election to be a financial 
                                                                                                                                                             
211.21(b) (2002) (Regulation K) (definition of agency and of credit balance).  A commercial lending 
company is a corporation organized under state law, that maintains credit balances and engages in the 
business of making commercial loans.  Section 1(b)(9), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3101(9) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 
211.21(g) (2002) (Regulation K).  For details, see Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.02. 
15  This had the consequence that some foreign banks had to close their U.S. branches when they were 
acquired by a foreign insurance company or the holding company of a foreign insurance company.  The 
most recent example is BHF-Bank, whose acquiror, ING Groep, is engaged in insurance activities in the 
United States.  See Gruson, supra note 1, Chapter 10, note 628. 
16   See supra note 4. 
17  See statement made by Rep. James A. Leach at the Financial Services Symposium held by the American 
Council of Life Insurers, the American Insurance Association and Northwestern University School of Law, 
in New York City on Mar. 1, 2000.  See also James A. Leach, Modernization of Financial Institutions, 25 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 681, 687 (2000). 
18   See 145 CONG. REC. H11,513–26 and H11,526–51 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999) and 145 CONG. REC. 
S13,871–881 and S13,883–917 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999). 
19   See Leach, supra note 17, at 682 (“While competition should be opened up in finance, the American model 
of separating commerce from banking should be maintained.”), 687. 
20   Section 4(l)(1)(A) and (B) & (2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(A) and (B) & (2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
See infra note 38 for a discussion of the Community Reinvestment Act. 
  4 holding company [herein FHC]
21 may engage in, and may acquire and retain shares of a 
company engaged in, certain activities that are prohibited to BHCs that are not FHCs.  These 
activities must be financial activities or activities that are incidental or complementary to 
financial activities.
22  The most important of the newly authorized financial activities for FHCs 
are securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting and sales, and 
merchant/investment banking equity investments.  The FHC may own besides its banking 
subsidiaries, broker-dealers, other financial service providers and insurance companies, and the 
FHC itself may be a broker-dealer, financial service provider or an insurance company that owns 
a bank — in other words, any company that is either a mere holding company or is engaged in 
financial activities can be an FHC.  Thus, the GLBA provides a framework for the affiliation of 
banks, securities firms, insurance companies and other financial service providers
23 in a holding 
company structure.
24  In addition to the power to invest in companies engaged in financial 
activities, an FHC may, directly or indirectly and subject to certain limitations, in the exercise of 
its merchant banking, underwriting, dealing or insurance activities, invest in securities and other 
assets of companies not engaged in financial activities. 
Except for this expansion of the scope of permitted nonbanking activities, the 
prohibition of nonbanking activities in Section 4(a), BHCA
25 and the exemptions from this 
prohibition in Section 4(c), BHCA,
26 remain in place for FHCs. 
BHCs that do not meet the conditions for an election to become an FHC remain 
subject to the prohibition of Section 4(a), BHCA, and only the exemptions set forth in 
Section 4(c), BHCA (other than those relating to FHCs) are available to them.  A foreign bank 
that maintains a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States and 
therefore is subject to the BHCA can elect to be an FHC
27 and then engage directly or indirectly 
in financial activities.  It is important to note, however, that the GLBA does not abrogate for 
foreign bank FHCs the existing special rules under the BHCA and the IBA in favor of foreign 
banks which permit under certain conditions foreign banks to engage in the United States in 
                                                 
21   Section 4(l)(1)(C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  An FHC is defined in 
§ 2(p), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(p) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), as a BHC that meets the requirements of § 
4(l)(1), BHCA, i.e., that is well capitalized and well managed and has filed a declaration of election with 
the Board.  The condition of a satisfactory Community Reinvestment Act rating is not part of the definition 
of  FHC but a condition for engaging in financial activities.  Section 4(l)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), and § 804(c), Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2903(c) (1994 & Supp. 
V 1999). 
22   Section 4(k)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
23   To accomplish this result, § 101, GLBA, 113 Stat. at 1341 (1999), repealed §§ 20 & 32, Banking Act of 
1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), 12 U.S.C. §§ 377 & 78 (1994).  See supra note 12. 
24  See 145 CONG. REC. S13,889 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999) (Sen. Reed); 145 CONG. REC. S13,904 (daily ed.) 
(Nov. 4, 1999) (Sen. Kerry). 
25   12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1994). 
26   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
27   See § 4(l)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3) (1994  & Supp. V 1999). 
  5 nonbanking activities (that are not classified as financial activities) from which U.S. BHCs are 
excluded.
28 
As of January 11, 2002, 581 U.S. BHCs (including 5 BHCs from Puerto Rico), 4 
holding companies of U.S. banks incorporated outside the United States, but only 23 foreign 
banks (6 BHCs from Canada, 1 BHC from Australia and 16 BHCs from Europe) maintaining a 
branch or agency in the United States have effectively elected to be FHCs.
29 
B. 
1. 
                                                
Election  Procedures  by BHCs to Be FHCs 
Qualification as an FHC – An Overview 
After the enactment of the GLBA amendments to the BHCA, a BHC that meets 
the requirements of, and elects to be, an FHC may engage in, and may acquire and retain shares 
of a company engaged in, certain activities that are prohibited to BHCs that are not FHCs.  The 
GLBA calls activities permitted to be carried out by FHCs financial activities.  Foreign banks 
have the benefit of the new rules if they are or are treated as BHCs under the BHCA.  A foreign 
bank that maintains a branch or agency or owns or controls a commercial lending company in the 
United States is treated as a BHC,
30 and a foreign bank or other company that controls a bank 
subsidiary in the United States is a BHC.
31 
 
28   See §§ 2(h)(2) & 4(c)(9), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(h)(2) & 1843(c)(9) (1994).  See Gruson, supra note 1, 
§§ 10.12–10.14. 
29   See Federal Reserve Board, Financial Holding Companies as of Jan. 11, 2002, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/fhc (last visited Jan. 22, 2002). 
  Australia:  Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited; 
Europe:  Banco Santander Central Hispano, S.A. (Spain); Bank of Scotland (UK); HSBC Holdings PLC 
(UK); Abbey National plc (UK); BNP Paribas (France); Société Générale (France); CERA Stichting VZW 
(Belgium); Dexia S.A. (Belgium); Credit Suisse Group (Switzerland); UBS AG (Switzerland); Den Danske 
Bank Aktieselskab (Denmark); Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Sweden); Deutsche Bank 
Aktiengesellschaft (Germany); Dresdner Bank Aktiengesellschaft (Germany); Rabobank (The 
Netherlands); Stichting Prioriteit ABN AMRO Holding (The Netherlands);  
Holding companies of U.S. banks incorporated outside the United States:  Cayman Investment Company 
Omega (Cayman Islands); Incus Co. Ltd. (Laredo National Bank, South Texas National Bank); Granvalor 
Holding, Ltd. (International Bank of Miami) (BVI); SNBNY Holdings Limited (Safra National Bank) 
(Gibraltar). 
  The 23 foreign bank FHCs represent a small fraction of the 169 foreign banks maintaining a branch or 
agency in the United States.  See Federal Reserve Board, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/iba/current/struca.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2002), Structure Data for 
U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks as of 9/30/2001. 
30  Section 4(l)(1)(C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), refers to the election of a 
BHC to be an FHC.  Section 8(a), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1994), provides that (1) any foreign bank that 
maintains a branch or agency in a state, (2) any foreign bank or foreign company controlling a foreign bank 
that controls a commercial lending company organized under state law, and (3) any company of which any 
foreign bank or company referred to under the first two categories is a subsidiary, is subject to the 
provisions of the BHCA in the same manner and to the same extent that BHCs are subject to such 
provisions, i.e., as if the foreign bank or other company were a BHC.  In other words, such foreign bank or 
  6 A BHC, including a foreign bank, will be or will be treated as an FHC if it meets 
the following requirements:
32 
 all the depository institution subsidiaries
33 of the BHC and, in the case of a 
foreign bank that is treated as a BHC, also the foreign bank itself must be and 
remain well capitalized;
34 
                                                                                                                                                             
other company is treated as a BHC or “as if it were” a BHC.  See Final FHC Release, infra note 32, at 408 
n.17.  Thus, companies covered under § 8(a), IBA are entitled to elect FHC status if they meet the statutory 
requirements.  Section 4(l), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), however, avoids the 
interpretation issues arising under § 8(a), IBA (see Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.02, text accompanying nn. 
41 & 45) and introduces its own concept of foreign bank in § 4(l)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3) (1994 
& Supp. V 1999), as a “foreign bank that operates a branch or agency or owns or controls a commercial 
lending company in the United States”.  12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) equally does not refer 
to companies covered by § 8(a), IBA but provides for the election to be an FHC by a “foreign bank that 
operates a branch or agency or owns or controls a commercial lending company in the United States, and 
any company that owns or controls such a foreign bank”.  Section 225.90, Regulation Y correctly does not 
refer to foreign banking organizations (defined in 12 C.F.R. § 211.21(o) (2002) (Regulation K)) because 
that term includes foreign banks that control a bank in the United States.  Such foreign banks controlling a 
U.S. bank must elect to be FHCs like U.S. BHCs under 12 C.F.R. § 225.82 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See 
infra text accompanying note 48. 
  It appears that one entity that is covered by § 8(a), IBA is not covered by § 4(l), BHCA, namely a foreign 
company that controls a foreign bank (that does not operate a branch, agency or commercial lending 
company subsidiary in the United States) and at the same time controls a commercial lending company.  
See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.02, nn. 41 & 45.  If such entities are treated as BHCs, they must have the 
ability to elect FHC status.  The issue may be moot because § 7(d), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999), as amended in 1991, seems to restrict ownership of commercial lending companies to 
foreign banks engaged directly in the business of banking outside the United States.  See Gruson, supra 
note 1, § 10.02, nn.40 & 73 sub (a)2. 
31   The BHCA applies directly to such foreign banks.  See § 2(a)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (a)(1) (1994). 
U.S. and foreign banks or other companies that control a bank in the United States are sometimes referred 
to herein as U.S. BHCs.  See also infra text accompanying note 48. 
32   The provisions of Regulation Y dealing with the election to be an FHC were issued by the Board on an 
interim basis on Jan. 18, 2000 (Regulation Y, Docket No. R-1057), 65 Fed. Reg. 3791–94 (Jan. 25, 2000), 
as amended on an interim basis by the Board on Mar. 15, 2000 (Regulation Y, Docket No. R-1057), 65 
Fed. Reg. 15,055–57 (Mar. 21, 2000) and issued as a final rule by the Board on Dec. 21, 2000 (Regulation 
Y, Docket Nos. R-1057 and R-1062), 66 Fed. Reg. 414–22 (Jan. 3, 2001).  These rules are codified in 12 
C.F.R. §§ 225.81–225.94 (2002) (Subpart I of Regulation Y).  These rules were accompanied by releases, 
65 Fed. Reg. 3785–94 (Jan. 25, 2000) [herein Interim FHC Release]; 65 Fed. Reg. 15,053–57 (Mar. 21, 
2000) [herein Amended Interim FHC Release]; 66 Fed. Reg. 400–422 (Jan. 3, 2001) [herein Final FHC 
Release]; and the Interim Financial Activities Release, infra note 272.  See Letter, dated Feb. 25, 2000, 
from Michael Gruson, Bradley K. Sabel and Jonathan M. Weld to the Secretary of the Board commenting 
on the interim rules. 
33  Depository institution is defined in § 2(n), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(n) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), by 
reference to § 3, Federal Deposit Insurance Act [herein FDIA], 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
12 C.F.R. § 225.2(t)(2002) (Regulation Y) defines the term depository institution by reference to § 3(c), 
FDIA.  Section 3(c)(1), FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1) (1994), defines depository institution as “any bank 
or savings association”.  Section 3(a)(1), FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(1) (1994), defines bank as “any 
national bank, State bank, and District bank, and any Federal branch [of a foreign bank] and insured branch 
  7  all depository institution subsidiaries of the BHC and, in the case of a foreign 
bank that is treated as a BHC, also the foreign bank itself must be and remain well 
managed;
35 
                                                                                                                                                             
[of a foreign bank]”.  Federal branch is defined in § 3(s)(2), FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(s)(2) (1994), by 
reference to § 1(b)(6), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3101(6) (1994).  Insured branch is defined in § 3(s)(3), FDIA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1813(s)(3) (1994), as any branch (as defined in § 1(b)(3), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3101(3) (1994)) of a 
foreign bank, any deposits of which are insured by the FDIC.  Thus, the term depository institution does not 
cover uninsured state branches. An uninsured federal branch is a depository institution; however, only 
depository institution subsidiaries must be well capitalized and well managed. 
 The  term  depository institution under the FDIA is broader than the term bank under § 2(c), BHCA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  E.g., savings banks, savings associations, industrial banks and 
nonbank trust companies are depository institutions but not banks.  Compare § 2(c)(2)(B), (D) & (J), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(B), (D) & (J) (1994), with § 3(c)(1) & (b), (a)(1) & (g), FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1813(c)(1) & (b), (a)(1) & (g) (1994).  Thus, a foreign bank that is a BHC because it controls a U.S. bank 
must meet the well-capitalized requirements not only with respect to the bank subsidiary but also with 
respect to its U.S. nonbank depository institution subsidiaries.  See, e.g., Met Life, Inc., Order of Feb. 12, 
2001, 87 FED. RES. BULL. 268, at 269 n.6 & 270 n.15 (2001) (stating that a certain limited-purpose trust 
company subsidiary of the applicant Met Life is not a bank for purposes of the BHCA but is a depository 
institution under the FDIA and, therefore, Met Life must certify that the trust company is well capitalized 
and well managed).  A foreign bank to which the BHCA applies because it operates a U.S. branch, agency 
or commercial lending company must meet the well-capitalized requirements not only with respect to itself 
(see infra B.2.c.) but also with respect to any U.S. nonbank depository institution subsidiaries. 
34   Section 4(l)(1)(A) & (3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (A) & (3) (1994  & Supp. V 1999).  These 
Sections are carried out by Regulation Y as follows:  (i) 12 C.F.R. § 225.81(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
(depository institution subsidiaries of U.S. BHCs, including depository institution subsidiaries of foreign 
banks that control a U.S. bank and therefore are U.S. BHCs (the U.S. bank subsidiary would be one of such 
depository institution subsidiaries)); (ii) 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
(depository institution subsidiaries of foreign banks maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending 
company in the United States or of companies controlling such foreign banks; if such depository institution 
subsidiaries are U.S. banks, the foreign bank and the company controlling the foreign bank would be U.S. 
BHCs); and (iii) 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) (foreign banks 
maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States and electing to be 
FHCs; foreign banks maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States 
that are controlled by the foreign bank electing to be an FHC; and foreign banks maintaining a branch, 
agency or commercial lending company in the United States that are controlled by a company controlling a 
foreign bank electing to be an FHC).  See infra B.3. 
35   Section 4(l)(1)(B) & (3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(B) & (3) (1994  & Supp. V 1999).  These Sections 
are carried out by Regulation Y as follows:  (i) 12 C.F.R. § 225.81(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) (depository 
institution subsidiaries of U.S. BHCs, including depository institution subsidiaries of foreign banks that 
control a U.S. bank and therefore are U.S. BHCs (the U.S. bank subsidiary would be one of such depository 
institution subsidiaries)); (ii) 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y) (depository 
institution subsidiaries of foreign banks maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in 
the United States or of companies controlling such foreign banks; if such depository institution subsidiaries 
are U.S. banks, the foreign bank and the company controlling the foreign bank would be U.S. BHCs); and 
(iii) 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(4)(2002) (Regulation Y) (foreign banks maintaining a branch, 
agency or commercial lending company in the United States and electing to be FHCs; foreign banks 
maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States that are controlled by 
the foreign bank electing to be an FHC; and foreign banks maintaining a branch, agency or commercial 
lending company in the United States that are controlled by a company controlling a foreign bank electing 
to be an FHC).  See infra B.4. 
  8  the foreign bank that elects to be an FHC must be subject in its home country to 
comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis;
36 
 the BHC must have filed with the Board a declaration of election to be an FHC 
and a certification that the BHC’s depository institutions and, in the case of a 
foreign bank that is treated as a BHC, also the foreign bank itself meet the 
requirements of being well capitalized and well managed;
37 
 all insured depository institution subsidiaries of the BHC must have achieved a 
rating of at least “satisfactory” under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
38 
in the most recent examination of such institutions;
39 and 
 it is uncertain whether the election by a foreign company that controls a foreign 
bank together with the controlled foreign bank to be treated as FHCs subjects the 
foreign controlling company to the usual consolidated capital requirements 
applicable to BHCs.
40  
                                                 
36   See infra B.5. 
37   Section 4(l)(1)(C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(3) & 
225.82 (2002) (Regulation Y) (U.S. BHCs); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(2), 225.91 & 225.92 (2002) 
(Regulation Y) (foreign banks maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United 
States and companies controlling such foreign bank).  12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(3) & 225.90(a)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) state that the U.S. BHC and the foreign bank together with the company controlling it must 
have made “an effective election”.  See infra B.2. 
The BHC must declare that it elects to be an FHC to engage in activities or acquire and retain shares of a 
company that were not permissible for a BHC to engage in or acquire before the enactment of the GLBA.  
Section 4(l)(1)(C)(i), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(C)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Does this mean that a 
BHC cannot become an FHC solely for the purpose of engaging in activities or acquiring shares of a 
company engaged in activities that were permissible before the enactment of the GLBA, i.e., in activities 
under the now frozen § 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)?  See Gruson, 
supra note 1, § 10.10 C.  A BHC may wish to become an FHC in order to engage in § 4(c)(8), BHCA 
activities without a notice requirement.  Regulation Y does not repeat this apparent statutory limitation 
regarding the intention of a BHC electing to be an FHC. 
Section 4(m)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), seems to anticipate FHCs that 
are only engaged in activities under the authority of § 4(c)(8), BHCA.  See infra note 839. 
38   The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 requires banks to help meeting the credit needs of the low and 
moderate income neighborhoods of the local communities in which such banks are chartered.  A bank’s 
record of meeting community credit needs must be rated annually by the appropriate federal financial 
supervisory agency.  The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 [herein CRA] is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
2901–2908 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
39   Section 804(c)(1), CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(1) (1994  & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.82(c)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) (insured depository institution subsidiaries of U.S. BHCs); 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(c)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) (U.S. insured depository institution subsidiaries of foreign banks maintaining a branch, 
agency or commercial lending company in the United States or of companies controlling such banks, and 
insured U.S. branches of foreign banks).  See infra B.6. 
40   See infra B.7. 
  9 2. 
a. 
                                                
Election to Become an FHC 
Different Rules for U.S. BHCs and for Foreign Banks 
The procedure for the election to be an FHC is set forth in Sections 225.81–
225.94, Regulation Y.
41  If the foreign bank maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending 
company in the United States is controlled within the meaning of the BHCA
42 by another 
company, this holding company itself is a “foreign bank” and is subject to the BHCA
43 and must 
be an FHC, if its foreign bank subsidiary intends to engage in the United States in financial 
activities.
44  The same applies to all holding companies in the case of tiered holding company 
structures.   
Sections 225.81–225.84, Regulation Y
45 deal with U.S. BHCs electing to be 
FHCs, and Sections 225.90–225.94, Regulation Y
46 deal with foreign banks
47 that maintain a 
 
41   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81–225.94 (2002) (Regulation Y).  The language in the BHCA and Regulation Y is 
somewhat inconsistent.  Section 4(l)(1)(C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and 
12 C.F.R. § 225.81 (2002) (Regulation Y) speak about an election to be an FHC; § 4(n)(1), BHCA, 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and 12 C.F.R. § 225.82(a), (c) & (f) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
speak about an election to become an FHC; and 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.91(a) & 225.91(b) speak about an 
election to be treated as an FHC.  These differences in terminology have no legal consequences.  It appears 
that in the terminology of the Board a foreign bank and a company controlling such foreign bank which are 
treated as BHCs, see supra note 30, are also treated as FHCs.  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  A BHC that elects FHC status remains a BHC, it does not change its nature but only 
expands its authority to engage in additional activities and to make additional investments. 
42   See supra note 11. 
43   Section 8(a), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1994), subjects not only foreign banks maintaining a branch, 
agency or commercial lending company in the United States to the BHCA, but also all companies that 
control such banks.  See supra notes 11 (discussing control) & 30 (discussing application of BHCA to 
foreign banks).  See also § 1(b)(7), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3101(7) (1994):  A foreign bank is “any company 
organized under the laws of a foreign country . . . which engages in the business of banking, or any 
subsidiary or affiliate, organized under such laws, of any such company”.  A company that controls a bank 
is an affiliate of such bank and, therefore, a foreign bank.  Section 1(b)(13), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3101(13) 
(1994), in conjunction with § 2(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k) (1994). 
44   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a) & 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) refer not only to a foreign bank maintaining a 
branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States, but also to “any company that owns 
or controls such a foreign bank”.  See supra note 11 for a discussion of control and infra B.2.c. for a 
discussion of which entities in a foreign bank holding group have to file a declaration of election to be an 
FHC. 
45   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81–225.84 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
46   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90–225.94 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
47   It is curious that neither the BHCA nor Regulation Y define the term foreign bank.  The appropriate 
definition would be 12 C.F.R. § 211.21(n) (2002) (Regulation K) because this definition applies to foreign 
banks that are permitted to establish a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States.  
See 12 C.F.R. § 211.24(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation K).  See also in this context the inapplicable definition of 
foreign bank in 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(j) (2002) (Regulation K) that limits the term to organizations that receive 
deposits. 
  10 branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States electing to be FHCs.  If a 
foreign bank has no branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States but 
owns or controls a bank subsidiary in the United States, it is a BHC directly under the BHCA 
(and not by virtue of the IBA) and must make its election to be a BHC pursuant to Sections 
225.81–225.82, Regulation Y.
48  If the foreign bank maintains a U.S. branch, agency or 
commercial lending company and is deemed to be a BHC under the IBA,
49 it must make its FHC 
election pursuant to Sections 225.90–225.92, Regulation Y.
50  If the foreign bank owns a U.S. 
banking subsidiary and operates a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company it must 
comply with the U.S. BHC requirements of Sections 225.81–225.82, Regulation Y, as well as 
with the foreign bank requirements of Sections 225.90–225.92, Regulation Y.
51  The same rule 
applies if a U.S. BHC (i.e., an organization that controls a U.S. bank) owns a foreign bank that 
maintains a branch, agency or controls a commercial lending company in the United States.
52  If 
a foreign bank does not own a U.S. bank but owns a U.S. depository institution that is not a 
bank
53 (such as a thrift or a nonbank trust company) and at the same time operates a U.S. branch, 
agency or commercial lending company, it is not a BHC under the BHCA and an election by 
such bank must be made pursuant to Sections 225.90–225.92, Regulation Y.
54  Under which 
                                                 
48   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81 & 225.82 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Interim FHC Release, supra note 32, at 3,788; 
Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 408. 
49   See supra note 30. 
50   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a), 225.91(a) & 225.92 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
51   12 C.F.R. § 225.81(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The words “a foreign bank that is a [BHC]” in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.81(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) must refer to a BHC under the BHCA (i.e., a U.S. or foreign bank or 
other company that controls a bank in the United States) and not to a BHC by virtue of the IBA (i.e., a 
foreign bank that operates a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States).  See 
supra notes 30 & 31.  The nonbank depository institution subsidiaries of a foreign bank that is a BHC 
under the BHCA and by virtue of the IBA and makes an election under 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81–225.82 and 12 
C.F.R. §§ 225.90–225.92 (2002) (Regulation Y) are covered by both sets of provisions (see infra note 122), 
whereas the U.S. bank depository institution subsidiaries of such foreign bank are only covered by 12 
C.F.R. § 225.82.  After such foreign bank has effectively elected to be an FHC, it will be subject to the 
provisions of 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.83, 225.84, 225.93 & 225.94.  12 C.F.R. § 225.81(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation 
Y). 
52   12 C.F.R. § 225.81(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The term BHC in 225.81(c)(2), Regulation Y must refer 
to a BHC under the BHCA (i.e., a U.S. or foreign bank or other company that controls a bank in the United 
States) and not to a BHC by virtue of the IBA (i.e., a foreign bank that operates a branch, agency or 
commercial lending company in the United States).  See supra notes 30 & 31.  A BHC that owns not only a 
U.S. bank but also a foreign bank maintaining a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company must 
comply with the U.S. BHC requirements of 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81–225.82, as well as with the foreign bank 
requirements of 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90–225.92 (2002) (Regulation Y).  After such BHC has effectively 
elected to be an FHC, it will be subject to the provisions of 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.83, 225.84, 225.93 & 225.94 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.81(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
53   See § 2(c)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra note 33. 
54   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90–225.92 (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Amended FHC Release, supra note 32, at 15,054 
indicates that such foreign bank must make its election to be an FHC under 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90–225.92 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra note 56 (discussing that the Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 401 n.1 
could be read as stating that a foreign bank maintaining a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending 
  11 provision must a foreign bank that owns or controls only a U.S. nonbank depository institution 
and does not operate a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company make its election?  
The answer is that a U.S. or a foreign bank that only owns or controls a nonbank depository 
institution is not a BHC
55 and not subject to the BHCA restrictions on nonbank activities and 
investments and, therefore, does not need to and cannot apply for FHC status.
56  However, if a 
BHC that also controls a nonbank depository institution elects FHC status, such depository 
institution must be well capitalized and well managed.
57   
b. 
                                                                                                                                                            
The Election Process 
The procedure for the election to be treated as an FHC is deceptively simple.  The 
U.S. BHC
58 or the foreign bank maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in 
the United States and the company owning or controlling such foreign bank
59 must file a written 
declaration
60 with the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank
61 stating the election,
62 certifying that 
all the entities that must meet the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements do so,
63 and 
providing certain capital information.
64  A company that is not a BHC and has applied for the 
 
company and controlling a nonbank depository institution must elect to be an FHC under 12 C.F.R. § 
225.81 (2002) (Regulation Y), but that such reading would not be correct). 
55   Section 2(a)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1994). 
56   The Final FHC Release, supra note 32, causes confusion when it states at 401 n.1, that 12 C.F.R. § 225.81 
(2002) (Regulation Y) applies to a foreign bank that controls a depository institution in the United States.  
It follows from the context and from 12 C.F.R. § 225.81(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) that the release means 
bank depository institutions.  12 C.F.R. § 225.81 (2002) (Regulation Y) refers to BHCs, and a foreign bank 
that only controls a U.S. nonbank depository institution and has no branch, agency or commercial lending 
company in the United States is not a BHC (neither under the BHCA nor by virtue of the IBA).  See supra 
note 33 and infra  note 123. 
57   Section 4(l)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(1) & (2), 
225.82(b)(3) & (5), 225.90(a)(1) and 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
58   12 C.F.R. § 225.82(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
59   12 C.F.R. § 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
60   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(a) & 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Such declaration satisfies the requirement of 
§ 5(a), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), with regard to the registration of a U.S. BHC 
(but not any requirements to file an application to acquire a bank).  Section 5(a), BHCA.  See infra D.2.i. 
61   The appropriate Federal Reserve Bank is determined pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 225.3(b) (2002) (Regulation 
Y). 
62   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(b)(1) & 225.91(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
63   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(b)(3), (5) & 225.91(b)(3), (4), (5) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
64   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(b)(4) & 225.91(b)(2), (6) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The procedure to be followed by 
U.S. BHCs and foreign banks and by the Federal Reserve Bank and Board staff in connection with an 
election of FHC status is set forth in the Board’s SR Letter No. 00-1 (SUP) (Feb. 8, 2000).  It must be kept 
in mind that the Supervisory Letter is based on the interim regulations and not on the final version of 
Regulation Y. 
  12 Board’s approval to be a BHC under Section 3(a)(1), BHCA may as part of that application 
submit a request to be an FHC on consummation of that transaction.
65  An election to be an FHC 
is automatically effective on the 31st calendar day after the date that a complete declaration was 
filed with the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank, unless the Board notifies the applicant prior to 
that time that the election is ineffective or that the election is effective prior to such 31st day.
66  
Other than in the case of an election by a U.S. BHC to be an FHC, in the case of an election by a 
foreign bank or a company owning or controlling a foreign bank, the 30-day period may be 
extended by the Board with the consent of such foreign bank or such company.
67  The Board will 
find an election ineffective if any of the entities that must meet the well-capitalized and well-
managed requirements does not meet such requirements
68 or if a U.S.-insured depository 
institution subsidiary of the U.S. BHC, of the electing foreign bank or of the company owning or 
controlling such foreign bank or any U.S. insured branch of the electing foreign bank
69 has not 
achieved at least a rating of “satisfactory” under the CRA.
70  In the case of an election to be an 
FHC filed by a foreign bank or a company owning or controlling such foreign bank, the Board 
may also find the election ineffective if the Board does not have sufficient information to 
determine whether the foreign bank or company making the election meets the well-capitalized 
and well-managed requirements.
71 
                                                 
65   12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) (1994).  The procedure for this combined request is set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 
225.82(f) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
66   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(e) and 225.92(a)(1) & (b) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The difference in language in 12 
C.F.R. § 225.82(e) (“after the date that a complete declaration was filed”) and 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(a) (“after 
the date that an election was received”) is curious but without legal consequences.  12 C.F.R. § 225.82(e) is 
correct because 12 C.F.R. § 225.82(a) as well as § 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) require the filing of a 
declaration that makes an election, and declaration must mean a complete declaration.. 
Section 4(l)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), does not expressly give the Board 
the power to review and confirm or even to reject a filed declaration of election to be an FHC.  However, if 
an FHC is not in compliance with the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements, the Board may 
request the BHC to undertake corrective actions and failing correction may require divestiture.  See § 4(m), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See infra H.  It is not surprising that the Board takes 
the position that it follows from this power that it also has the power to verify the certification of a BHC 
and to ascertain whether the BHC meets the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements.  Note that 
the Board must find that the certification of the applicant is not effective rather than that it is effective. 
67   12 C.F.R. § 225.92(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
68   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(c)(2) & 225.92(c)(1), (3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
69   For a discussion of the FDIC insurance of U.S. branches of foreign banks, see John C. Dugan, Peter L. 
Flanagan & E. Jason Albert, FDIC Insurance and Regulation of U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks, Chapter 6 
in MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER (eds.), REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED STATES AND 
INTERNATIONAL, vol. 1 (3d ed. 2000). 
70   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(c)(1) & 225.92(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra B.6.  Special rules apply to the 
consideration of the CRA performance of recently acquired insured depository institutions.  12 C.F.R. 
§§ 225.82(d) & 225.92(d) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
71   12 C.F.R. § 225.92(c)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
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Election by Foreign Bank Holding Groups 
In the case of a U.S. BHC group, the ultimate holding company and all 
intermediary holding companies must make the election to be FHCs, and as a consequence of 
such election, all depositary institutions directly or indirectly controlled by the electing BHC 
must be well capitalized and well managed.
72   
More difficult issues arise in connection with FHC election by foreign bank 
holding groups.  Although Sections 225.90(a) and 225.91(a), Regulation Y do not plainly so 
state,
73 they intend to say that in the case of a foreign bank maintaining a branch, agency or 
commercial lending company in the United States that is controlled (directly or indirectly) by 
one or more tiers of companies, the bank and all controlling companies must at the same time 
elect to be FHCs.  If the foreign bank engages in financial activities in the United States, the 
controlling companies will be indirectly engaged in such activities.  Presumably, all entities 
would join in one election.  Obviously, the company controlling a foreign bank maintaining a 
U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company could itself be a foreign bank maintaining a 
U.S. branch, agency or commercial  lending company. 
A foreign bank maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in 
the United States may be controlled by a foreign industrial or commercial company that is not 
subject to bank regulatory supervision in its home country.  If these entities elect FHC status, the 
Board may require from the foreign industrial or commercial company a commitment as part of 
the election process to the effect that only the controlled foreign bank and its direct and indirect 
subsidiaries will engage in the United States in activities permissible for an FHC.  The Board is 
concerned about nonregulated foreign entities engaging in financial activities in the United 
States. 
Section 225.91(a), Regulation Y does not require that each foreign bank 
maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States that is part of 
a foreign bank holding group must elect FHC status.  In other words, if the holding company 
controls two foreign banks, each with a branch in the United States, the holding company and 
one of the banks may elect FHC status, whereas the other bank may choose not to do so.  The 
same applies to a foreign bank maintaining a branch in the United States that controls a second 
foreign bank also maintaining a U.S. branch.  When the controlling bank elects FHC status, the 
controlled bank may also elect FHC status, but may choose not to do so.
74  However, in both 
 
72   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81 & 225.82 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
73   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a) & 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Board reads the words in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y), “[a] foreign bank that operates a branch or agency or owns or controls a 
commercial lending company in the United States, or a company that owns or controls such a foreign bank, 
may elect to be treated as [an FHC]” as if and were substituted for or. 
74  12 C.F.R. § 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) provides that “[a] foreign bank that operates a branch or 
agency or owns or controls a commercial lending company in the United States, or [and] a company that 
owns or controls such a foreign bank” may make an election to be FHCs.  The Section does not read:  “A 
company that owns or controls one or more foreign banks (that operate branches or agencies or owns or 
controls commercial lending companies in the United States) and all such foreign banks may jointly elect to 
be treated as FHCs by filing . . . .”  12 C.F.R. § 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) refers to a foreign bank 
  14 examples the non-electing banks must meet the well-capitalized and well-managed 
requirements.
75  On the other hand, if a foreign bank maintaining a U.S. branch is controlled by 
another foreign bank maintaining a U.S. branch, and the controlled bank elects FHC status, the 
controlling bank must also elect FHC status.
76   
Regulation Y makes it clear that the essential part of the election is the election of 
the foreign bank maintaining a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company.
77  The 
companies controlling such bank must make parallel elections or join the foreign bank’s 
election.
78  All foreign banks maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in 
the United States that are controlled by a foreign bank electing FHC status or are controlled by a 
company owning or controlling such foreign bank electing FHC status must meet the capital and 
management standards comparable to those required of U.S. banks owned by an FHC, even if 
they do not wish to engage in the expanded FHC activities and themselves do not elect to be an 
FHC.
79  The Board imposed this requirement because under the BHCA, as amended by the 
GLBA, all of the depository institution subsidiaries of a BHC must be well capitalized and well 
managed in order for the BHC to qualify for FHC status, regardless of where in the corporate 
structure the expanded activities are to be located.
80  The Board was concerned that permitting a 
foreign bank to evade a similar requirement merely by placing the expanded activities in a 
particular location in its organization could provide foreign banks with a competitive advantage 
over U.S. BHCs.
81   
The following diagram clarifies the above.  If Foreign Bank X and Foreign Bank 
X’s parents, Foreign Companies A and B (together with Bank X) elect FHC status, Foreign Bank 
                                                                                                                                                             
and its parent.  See infra note 75 (12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) and 225.91(b)(3) & (4) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
use different language than 12 C.F.R. § 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) to extend the well-capitalized and 
the well-managed requirements to all controlled foreign banks). 
75   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.91(b)(3) & (4) (2002) (Regulation Y) requiring that the foreign bank referred to in 12 
C.F.R. § 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) and “each foreign bank that maintains a U.S. branch, agency, or 
commercial lending company and is controlled by the foreign bank or company” must meet the standards 
of being well capitalized and well managed.  12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) uses 
substantially identical language to address the question of who must meet the well-capitalized and well-
managed requirements.  This language is not used in 12 C.F.R. § 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) which 
addresses the question of who must file an election to be an FHC.  See also Final FHC Release, supra note 
32, at 411 (emphasizing that each foreign bank that maintains a U.S. branch and is controlled by a foreign 
bank or company electing to be treated as an FHC must meet the capital and management standards, but 
never intimating that such foreign bank must also elect to be treated as an FHC).   
76   See supra note 73 and accompanying and following text.   
77   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
78   This was not clear under the amended interim rule § 225.90(a)(2), 65 Fed. Reg. 15,053, at 15,055 (Mar. 21, 
2000). 
79   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) and 225.91(b)(3) & (4) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra note 75.   
80   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 411.   
81   Id. 
  15 Y need not join the election.  However, the election by Foreign Bank X and Foreign Companies 
A and B has the consequence that not only Foreign Bank X but also Foreign Bank Y must meet 
the well-capitalized and well-managed standards.  Therefore, there is little reason why Foreign 
Bank Y would not join the election to be an FHC.  The same is true for Foreign Bank Z if the 
foreign parents, Foreign Companies A and B, that control Foreign Bank X and Foreign Bank Z, 
each with a branch in the United States, elect (together with Foreign Bank X) to be FHCs, even 
though Foreign Bank Z does not do so:  Foreign Bank Z must meet the well-capitalized and well-
managed requirements and might as well join the election to be an FHC.  It is irrelevant for the 
above analysis whether Foreign Banks Y and Z are located in the same country or in different 
countries than Bank X.  
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lines indicate control 
If Foreign Bank X wishes to elect to be an FHC, Foreign Companies A and B 
must also make such election.  If Foreign Bank Y elects to be an FHC, Foreign Bank X and 
Foreign Companies A and B must also make such election.  If Foreign Bank X and Foreign Bank 
X’s parents, Foreign Companies A and B (together with Foreign Bank X) elect FHC status, the 
U.S. nonbank depository institution subsidiaries of all electing entities, i.e., of Foreign Bank X, 
and of Foreign Companies A and B, must meet the well-capitalized and well-managed 
requirements.
82  As stated above, if Foreign Banks Y and Z do not elect FHC status together with 
                                                 
82   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  16 their respective parents, they still must meet the well-capitalized and well-managed 
requirements.  However, the same rule does not apply to the U.S. nonbank depository institution 
subsidiaries of nonelecting Foreign Banks Y and Z:  under the language of Regulation Y they do 
not have to comply with the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements.
83   
The broad concept of control
84 and the broad definition of foreign bank
85 can lead 
to surprising results in the application of the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements to 
minority-owned banks.  For instance, a Foreign Bank D from country D with a branch in the 
United States owns 25 percent or more but less than 50 percent of the voting shares of a Bank K 
in a third country K that also has a branch in the United States.  If Foreign Bank D elects to be an 
FHC, Bank K must meet the requirements of being well capitalized and well managed.  The 
foreign bank electing FHC status may not have the corporate ability to direct the other foreign 
bank to improve its capital and management in order to meet the FHC standards or to close or 
divest its U.S. offices (to debank).  The electing foreign bank would be required to either divest 
its interest in the other foreign bank or forgo the election to be an FHC.
86  The Board addressed 
this issue in the Final FHC Release
87 and stated that in limited situations involving strategic 
minority investments some relief may be justified and a foreign bank seeking FHC status that has 
a strategic minority investment of 25 percent or more of voting shares in a non-U.S. bank that 
does not meet the FHC requirements may utilize the pre-clearance process
88 to request a 
determination that it should not be held accountable for another bank with U.S. offices that does 
                                                 
83   This result follows from 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.90(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) only refers to “any U.S. depository institution subsidiary that is 
owned or controlled by the foreign bank [i.e., the foreign bank electing to be an FHC] or company [the 
company owning or controlling the electing foreign bank].”  12 C.F.R. § 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation 
Y) uses nearly identical language.  These sections do not refer to a U.S. depository institution owned or 
controlled by “any other foreign bank” [i.e., a foreign bank that is owned or controlled by the electing 
foreign bank or a company owning or controlling such electing foreign bank].  The Final FHC Release, 
supra note 32, at 411 refers only to the capital of a U.S. depository institution subsidiary “of the foreign 
bank or company certificant”.  It is questionable whether this result is justified by § 4(l)(1)(A) & (3), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(A) & (3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), because the U.S. depository institution 
subsidiaries of Banks Y and Z are indirectly depository institution subsidiaries of Foreign Bank X (in the 
case of the subsidiaries of Foreign Bank Y) and of Foreign Companies A and B (in the case of the 
subsidiaries of Foreign Banks Y and Z).  See infra B.3.a. (diagrams 3(b) & (c)).  The carefully worded 
language of 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y) appears to exclude under a 
plain language reading (12 U.S.C. § 4809 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) the argument that a depository 
institution subsidiary of non-electing Foreign Bank Y or Foreign Bank Z is covered by the well-capitalized 
requirement as an indirect subsidiary of Foreign Bank X and Foreign Companies A and B, respectively. 
84   See supra note 11.  It must be kept in mind that control is presumed in the case of ownership of 25 percent 
of the voting securities of a bank and control may be found depending on the circumstances in case of 
ownership of between 5 and 24.9 percent of the voting securities.  See Gruson, supra note 1, §§ 10.05 & 
10.06. 
85   See supra note 43. 
86   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 411. 
87   Id. 
88   12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra B.2.d.  
  17 not meet the capital and management standards.
89  The Board warned, however, that it 
anticipates that relief would be granted only under limited circumstances where the foreign bank 
“can clearly demonstrate that it has no ability to control the other foreign bank”.
90 
If a foreign bank that does not maintain a branch, agency or commercial lending 
company in the United States but has a U.S. bank subsidiary and the company, if any, that 
controls such foreign bank elect to be FHCs, the U.S. bank and all nonbank depository institution 
subsidiaries of the BHCs/FHCs must meet the well-capitalized, well-managed and CRA 
standards;
91 however, the foreign parent bank need not meet the requirements because it is not 
covered by Sections 225.90 and 225.91, Regulation Y.
92  Difficult issues arise if a foreign bank 
holding group combines branches, agencies and commercial lending companies in the United 
States with U.S. bank subsidiaries as shown by the following diagram. 
                                                 
89   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 411. 
90   Id.  It is unclear what the Board means when it requires a demonstration that the foreign bank (Bank D in 
the above example) “has no ability to control the other foreign bank” (Bank K in the above example).  Id.  
The issue only arises if Bank D controls Bank K in the meaning of the BHCA.  See Gruson, supra note 1, 
§§ 10.05 & 10.06.  Thus, the demonstration cannot relate to control in the meaning of the BHCA.  If 
control refers to control in a corporate sense, it should be fairly easy to demonstrate that ownership of 25 
percent of the shares of a corporation does not give corporate control over such corporation.  In particular, 
if Bank K refuses to comply with the well-capitalized requirements in spite of urgent requests by Bank D, 
Bank D’s lack of control is obvious.  It is likely that the Board meant that the foreign bank that owns shares 
in another foreign bank must demonstrate that it has no other indices of control, such as seats on the board 
of the other foreign bank, agreements, etc. 
91   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b) and 225.82 (b) & (c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(1), (2) & 
225.82(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) clearly refer to “all” and “each” depository institutions controlled by 
the BHC and clearly include directly and indirectly controlled depository institutions. 
92   See 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a) & 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  18 Diagram 2 
 
838262/NYDOCS01.ppt
Foreign Company A
Foreign Company B
Foreign Bank X  Foreign Bank Z 
Foreign Bank Y
U.S. 
Border
FHC Election by a Foreign BHC Group
U.S. Branch 
U.S. Bank A U.S. Bank B 
          Lines indicate control
 
Foreign Bank X is a U.S. BHC that also operates a U.S. branch.  If it wishes to be 
an FHC, it must, pursuant to Section 225.81(c), Regulation Y,
93 comply with the FHC election 
requirements for branches and for bank subsidiaries.
94  Foreign Companies A and B are BHCs 
because they indirectly control two U.S. banks.  Section 225.82(a), Regulation Y
95 does not 
expressly require Foreign Companies A and B to elect FHC status; however, if Foreign Bank X 
engages in financial activities in the United States, Foreign Companies A and B are indirectly 
engaged in such activities and must be FHCs to be permitted to do so.  Furthermore, pursuant to 
Section 225.90, Regulation Y,
96 they are required to elect FHC status by virtue of their 
controlling Foreign Bank X that maintains a U.S. branch and elects FHC status. 
If Foreign Bank Z elects FHC status, it must do so pursuant to Sections  
225.81–225.82, Regulation Y.
97  That Section does not require an election by foreign controlling 
                                                 
93   12 C.F.R. § 225.81(c) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
94   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81–225.82 (subsidiaries), 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90–225.92 (branches) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
95   12 C.F.R. § 225.82(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
96   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
97   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81–225.82 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  19 shareholders of the U.S. BHC; however, such shareholders are BHCs by virtue of their indirect 
control of a U.S. bank, and the financial activities of Foreign Bank Z and U.S. Bank B are their 
indirect activities.  Thus, Foreign Companies A and B must, together with Foreign Bank Z, elect 
FHC status.  If Foreign Companies A and B are FHCs, their indirect U.S. bank subsidiaries, U.S. 
Bank A and U.S. Bank B, must be well capitalized and well managed.   
If Foreign Companies A and B and Foreign Bank Z elect FHC status, it is unclear 
how this affects the capital requirements of Foreign Bank X.  Section 225.81(c), Regulation K
98 
which deals with a foreign bank with a U.S. branch and a U.S. bank subsidiary does not apply 
because neither Foreign Company A nor Foreign Company B is “a foreign bank that is a [BHC] 
and that operates a branch . . . in the United States” as required by Section 225.81(c), Regulation 
Y.  By way of analogy, one has to conclude that Foreign Bank X must be well capitalized and 
well managed if Foreign Companies A and B elect, together with Foreign Bank Z, FHC status.
99  
It is less clear whether Foreign Bank X must join the FHC election.
100 
It is a different issue that Foreign Companies A and B could be U.S. BHCs only if 
the Board found that they are subject to comprehensive supervision or regulation on a 
consolidated basis in their home country,
101 and this is unlikely if they are industrial or 
commercial companies.  Even if Foreign Companies A and B were able to overcome the hurdle 
of comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis when they acquired U.S. Bank A and U.S. 
Bank B, the Board may not wish Foreign Companies A and B to engage in financial activities in 
the United States if they are not banks in their home country.  In some cases, the Board has 
required a commitment from foreign nonbank holding companies of a foreign bank with a U.S. 
branch that these nonbank holding companies will engage in financial activities in the United 
States only through the foreign bank.
102  The same approach might be applied where the foreign 
bank has a U.S. bank subsidiary.   
                                                 
98   12 C.F.R. § 225.81(c) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
99   12 C.F.R. § 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) provides that a company (Foreign Companies A and B) that 
owns or controls a foreign bank with a U.S. branch (Foreign Bank X) will be treated as an FHC only if the 
controlled foreign bank is well capitalized and well managed.  This language addresses the case where the 
foreign bank (Foreign Bank X) (together with the company controlling it) elects FHC status under 12 
C.F.R. § 225.92(a) (2002) (Regulation Y); it is not intended to cover the hypothetical case under 
consideration (Foreign Companies A and B electing FHC status as U.S. BHCs together with Foreign Bank 
Z pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 225.82 (2002) (Regulation Y)).  However, it makes sense to apply that Section by 
way of analogy to foreign companies electing FHC status under 12 C.F.R. § 225.82 (2002) (Regulation Y) 
rather than under 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  One could also apply 12 C.F.R. § 
225.81(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) by way of analogy to BHCs controlling (i) a foreign bank that controls a 
U.S. bank and (ii) a foreign bank that operates a U.S. branch. 
100   See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
101   12 C.F.R. § 225.13(a)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
102   See supra B.2.c. (second paragraph). 
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The  Pre-Clearance  Process 
Because of the difficult issues relating to the well-capitalized and well-managed 
requirements that a foreign bank’s election to be an FHC may raise, a foreign bank or its 
controlling company, before filing an election to be treated as an FHC, may file a request for a 
pre-clearance review of its qualifications to be treated as an FHC (well capitalized and well 
managed).
103  Regulation Y specifies two cases in which a pre-clearance process must be 
initiated.  In addition, a foreign bank or a company controlling a foreign bank may on its own 
initiate the pre-clearance process to have the Board review the qualifications that it has to meet 
for an effective election to be an FHC. 
 A foreign bank whose home country has not adopted risk-based capital standards 
consistent with the Basel Capital Standards
104 must obtain a determination from 
the Board in the pre-clearance process that the foreign bank’s capital is 
comparable to the capital that would be required of a U.S. bank owned by an 
FHC.
105 
 A foreign bank that has not been found, and that is chartered in a country where 
no bank from that country has been found, by the Board to be subject to 
comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis by its home 
country supervisor must use the pre-clearance process for a determination of its 
comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis.
106 
 A foreign bank whose home country has adopted risk-based capital standards 
consistent with the Basel Capital Standards but that does not meet the capital 
 
103   12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Board will endeavor to make a determination on such 
request within 30 days of receipt.  Id.  The pre-clearance procedure was originally proposed by 
Representative Leach, 145 CONG. REC. H11,529 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999) (assessment of a foreign bank’s 
compliance with comparable capital and management standards could be accomplished through a “pre-
clearance evaluation” conducted in connection with the foreign bank’s certification as an FHC). 
104   Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices [now:  Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision], International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988, as 
amended), Introduction, no. 7 [herein Basel Capital Standards].  The members of the European Union have 
adopted the Basel Capital Standards as they were implemented by the Council Directive of 17 Apr. 1989 on 
the Own Funds of Credit Institutions, 89/299/EEC, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L. 124/16 (1989), as restated in 
Title V, Chapter 2, Section 1 of the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 Mar. 2000 
relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 2000/12/EC, O.J. Eur. Comm. 
No. L. 126/1 (2000) [herein the Banking Directive]; and by the Council Directive of 18 Dec. 1989 on a 
Solvency Ratio for Credit Institutions, 89/647/EEC, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L. 386/14 (1989), as restated in 
Title V, Chapter 2, Section 2 of the Banking Directive.  12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(1)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
requires that the home country supervisor (as defined in 12 C.F.R. § 211.21(q) (2002) (Regulation K)) of 
the foreign bank must have adopted risk-based capital standards consistent with the Basel Capital 
Standards. 
105   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra B.3.  The factors that have to be taken into 
account in the capital comparability analysis are listed in 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
106   12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra B.5 for an analysis of this requirement. 
  21 standards that would be required of a U.S. bank owned by an FHC (either because 
it falls short of the required capital adequacy ratios under the Basel Capital 
Standards
107 or because there is a question about the comparability of the foreign 
bank’s capital to the capital that would be required of a U.S. bank owned by an 
FHC)
108 may obtain a determination from the Board in the pre-clearance process 
that the foreign bank’s capital is otherwise comparable to the capital that would 
be required of a U.S. bank owned by an FHC.
109   
 The pre-clearance process may be used by a foreign bank or company controlling 
a foreign bank to request the Board to review any other of the qualifications that 
must be met to make an effective election of the FHC status.
110  In particular, the 
question of whether the foreign bank is well managed could be subject of the pre-
clearance process.  For instance, the pre-clearance process may be used by a 
foreign bank that wishes to obtain FHC status but has not been assigned a 
combined U.S. banking assessment as part of the regular examination cycle and, 
thus, cannot determine whether it is well managed.
111 
The pre-clearance process helps the Board to comply with the rule that FHC 
elections become effective on the 31st day after receipt of the election and avoids the need to 
extend the period with the consent of the electing foreign bank and the company controlling the 
foreign bank.
112  The pre-clearance process may be advantageous for a foreign bank because the 
Board does not make a public announcement of the filing of a request for a pre-clearance review, 
and the records of the Board relating to the pre-clearance process may be accorded confidential 
treatment.
113  
                                                 
107   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(1)(ii).  See infra B.3.b. and note 144. 
108   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(1)(iii) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
109   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra note 144. 
110   12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
111   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 409.  See infra note 164.   
112   12 C.F.R. § 225.92(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra B.2.b. 
113   The Board’s staff takes the position that information relating to a pre-clearance process is a matter 
contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports prepared by or for the use of an 
agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions and that therefore such 
information need not be made available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2000).  Section 552(b), Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 261.14(a)(8) 
(2002).  It may still be advisable for the foreign bank to request confidential treatment of its submissions in 
connection with a pre-clearance process pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 261.15 (2002). 
  22 3. 
a. 
                                                
The Well-Capitalized Requirement 
Entities that Must Be Well Capitalized 
As noted above, a BHC may elect to be an FHC only if (i) in the case of a U.S. BHC, each of its 
depository institution subsidiaries,
114 and (ii) in the case of a foreign bank maintaining a U.S. 
branch, agency or commercial lending company, the electing foreign bank itself,
115 each other 
foreign bank maintaining a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company that is 
controlled by the electing foreign bank or under common control with the electing foreign 
bank,
116 and each nonbank depository institution subsidiary of the electing foreign bank or of a 
company that owns or controls the electing foreign bank
117 is well capitalized.  Neither the 
BHCA nor Regulation Y limits the well-capitalized requirements to foreign banks that are 
deposit-taking entities in their home country.
118  Diagram 3 shows which entities in a bank 
holding group of a foreign bank maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company 
must be well capitalized.
119 
 
114   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(1) & 225.82(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra text accompanying notes 33, 
34, 72 & 91. 
115   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
116   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra text accompanying notes 74 & 
75. 
117   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Nonbank depository institution 
subsidiaries of the nonelecting “other foreign bank”, i.e., a foreign bank that is controlled by the electing 
foreign bank or is under common control with the electing foreign bank, need not meet the well-capitalized 
requirement.  See supra note 83 and accompanying text and diagrams 3(b) & (c). 
If the nonelecting other foreign bank, that is controlled by the electing foreign bank or is under common 
control with such electing foreign bank, controls a depository institution in the United States that is a bank, 
the foreign holding company of the electing and of the nonelecting foreign banks is a U.S. BHC, if such 
U.S. BHC elects to be an FHC, all of its direct or indirect depository institution subsidiaries must be well 
capitalized and well managed pursuant to 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(1), (2) & 225.82(b)(3) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  (Diagram 4(d)).  See supra note 91. 
118   Since § 4(l)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), imposes the well-capitalized 
requirement on U.S. depository institutions, it is arguably in violation of the principles of national treatment 
and equality of competitive opportunity postulated in § 4(l)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999), for the Board to impose that requirement in the case of foreign banks also on banks that are 
not deposit-taking entities. 
119  See supra B. 2. c., discussing the FHC election by foreign bank holding groups.  The question of which 
entity in a holding group of a foreign bank should join the election is closely related to the capital 
consequences of the election and therefore the question of which entities in a bank holding group of a 
foreign bank must be well capitalized has been discussed under B.2.  Diagram 3 deals with BHCs that are 
such by virtue of the IBA.  See supra note 30. 
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If a foreign bank and a company controlling such foreign bank electing FHC 
status control a U.S. bank or nonbank depository institution, the capital requirements are as 
follows:   
 A foreign bank that does not operate a branch, agency or commercial lending 
company in the United States but owns or controls only bank subsidiaries in the 
United States is not a foreign bank within the meaning of the IBA and Regulation 
Y but is a U.S. BHC.
120  Therefore, the well-capitalized requirement does not 
apply to such foreign bank but only, separately and on an individual basis, to the 
U.S. bank subsidiary and any nonbank depository institution subsidiaries.
121  
(Diagram 4(a).) 
 If a foreign bank that operates a branch, agency or commercial lending company 
in the United States also has a bank subsidiary in the United States, it is a U.S. 
BHC and a foreign bank in the meaning of the IBA and Regulation Y, and the 
                                                 
120   See supra notes 30, 31, 43, 47 & 48 and accompanying text; 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
121   Section § 4(l)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(1) 
& 225.82(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  24 BHCA and Regulation Y apply the well-capitalized requirement, separately and 
on an individual basis, to the foreign bank and each of its U.S. depository 
institution subsidiaries, including the bank subsidiary.
122  (Diagram 4(b).) 
 A foreign bank is not a BHC if it has in the United States only depository 
institution subsidiaries that are not banks within the meaning of the BHCA, for 
instance a thrift or a nonbank trust company,
123 and the well-capitalized 
requirements apply neither to the nonbank depository institution nor to the foreign 
bank.  (Diagram 4(c).) 
 If a foreign bank that operates a branch or agency or owns or controls a 
commercial lending company in the United States also controls a nonbank 
depository institution subsidiary in the United States, such as thrift or a nonbank 
trust company, each such nonbank depository institution subsidiary must also be 
well capitalized separately and on an individual basis.
124  (Diagram 3(a) and 
diagram 4(b).) 
 If a foreign company that controls a foreign bank maintaining a branch, agency or 
commercial lending company in the United States also controls a nonbank 
depository institution in the United States, such nonbank depository institution 
subsidiary of such company must be well capitalized.
125  (Diagram 3(d).) 
 If a foreign bank that elects FHC status controls another foreign bank, or is under 
common control with another foreign bank, that does not elect FHC status, and 
the other foreign bank in turn controls a nonbank depository institution, such 
                                                 
122   Section 4(l)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), in connection with 12 
C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b) & 225.82 (2002) (Regulation Y), applies to the U.S. bank, whereas § 4(l)(3), BHCA, 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), in connection with 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a), 225.91 & 
225.92 (2002) (Regulation Y) applies to the foreign bank.  12 C.F.R. § 225.81(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  
A nonbank depository institution subsidiary of the foreign bank controlling a U.S. bank and maintaining a 
U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company is covered by both provisions.  See 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 225.81(b)(1) & 225.82(b)(3) and 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1), 225.91(b)(5), (6) & 225.92(c)(3) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  The well-capitalized and well-managed requirements under both sets of provisions are 
identical.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
123   As pointed out, supra note 33, depository institution is defined in the FDIA more broadly than bank is 
defined in the BHCA.  Thus, a foreign bank may own or control nonbank depository institution subsidiaries 
without being a BHC.  See supra text accompanying notes 55 & 56.   
124   See 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) and 225.91(b)(5) & (6) (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a)(1) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) refers to “any U.S. depository institution subsidiary that is owned or controlled by 
the foreign bank or company [that owns or controls such a foreign bank]”.  Although 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) is not as clear as it could have been, the Amended FHC Release, supra note 32, at 
15,054, makes it clear that 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) applies only to nonbank depository 
institution subsidiaries of foreign banks that maintain a branch, agency or commercial lending company in 
the United States.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.81(c) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
125   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) & 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  25 nonbank depository institution need not meet the well-capitalized requirement.
126  
(Diagrams 3(b) & (c)).  If the other foreign bank elects FHC status, its depository 
institution subsidiary must be well capitalized.   
 If a foreign company that controls Foreign Bank X maintaining a branch, agency 
or commercial lending company in the United States also controls (through 
Foreign Bank Y) a U.S. bank, and Foreign Bank X (together with the foreign 
company FHC) elects FHC status, the foreign company is a company controlling 
a foreign bank and a U.S. BHC, and Foreign Bank X as well as the direct and 
indirect U.S. bank subsidiary and all other direct and indirect depository 
institution subsidiaries of the foreign company BHC/FHC must be well 
capitalized.
127  (Diagram 4(d).) 
 If Foreign Bank Y (together with the foreign company BHC) elects FHC status, 
the foreign company BHC is not a company controlling a foreign bank in the 
meaning of Section 225.90(a), Regulation Y.
128 It is, however, a U.S. BHC, and 
all direct and indirect U.S. bank subsidiaries as well as all other direct and indirect 
depository institution subsidiaries of the foreign company BHC/FHC must be well 
capitalized.
129 Although not clearly stated in Regulation Y, one has to conclude by 
way of analogy that Foreign Bank X must also be well capitalized if the company 
controlling it elects FHC status as a U.S. BHC. 
130  (Diagram 4(e).) 
                                                 
126   See supra notes 83 & 117.   
127   Section 4(l)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1) 
and 225.91(b)(3) & (5) (2002) (Regulation Y); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(1) & 225.82(b)(3) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  See supra notes 91 & 117. 
128   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  That Section assumes an FHC election by the foreign bank 
maintaining a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company. 
129   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(1) & 225.82(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra notes 91 and 117. 
130   See supra note 99 for a discussion of this analogy. 
  26 Diagram 4 illustrates the above discussion. 
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A company that controls a foreign bank that operates a branch or agency or 
controls a commercial lending company in the United States is treated like a U.S. BHC in that it 
  27 does not have to meet the well-capitalized requirement in order to become an FHC (if the other 
conditions are met).
131  On the other hand, if a foreign bank that operates a branch or agency or 
controls a commercial lending company in the United States meets the well-capitalized and well-
managed requirements, any company that owns or controls such a foreign bank is entitled to be 
treated as an FHC (if it meets the other requirements for an effective election and makes such 
election).
132 
Diagram 5
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131   See infra B.7.  This follows from a comparison of § 4(l), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999) (requiring that the depository institution subsidiary of a BHC (and in extension of that concept, a 
foreign bank) is well capitalized) with § 4(j), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) 
(requiring that the BHC and certain of its depository institution subsidiaries are well capitalized).  See infra 
note 154. 
132   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  This Section correctly refers to foreign banks that operate a 
branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States and to “any company that owns or 
controls such a foreign bank”.  Such company is a company covered by § 8(a), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) 
(1994), and the BHCA is applicable to such company.  See supra notes 30 & 43.  See Gruson, supra note 1, 
§ 10.02.  As discussed supra B.2.c., a company controlling a foreign bank must also elect to be an FHC if 
the controlled foreign bank makes such election. 
  28 The Board has had a longstanding practice of applying its capital adequacy 
standards to the top tier U.S. BHC owned by a foreign banking organization [FBO] that 
indirectly owns through the U.S. BHC a U.S. bank.  The Board has modified this practice for 
foreign bank FHCs that at the same time own through a U.S. BHC a U.S. bank and operate a 
branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States.
133  In cases in which the 
Board has determined that a foreign bank operating a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending 
company is well capitalized and well managed, the presumption will be that the foreign bank has 
sufficient financial strength and resources to support its banking activities in the United States.  
Thus, as a general matter, a U.S. BHC that is owned and controlled by a foreign bank–FHC that 
the Board has determined to be well capitalized and well managed will not be required to comply 
with the Board’s capital adequacy guidelines.
134  Diagram 5 illustrates the Board’s position. 
b. 
                                                
The Standard of Being Well Capitalized 
A depository institution subsidiary of a BHC is well capitalized if it maintains a 
total capital to total risk-based assets ratio of at least 10 percent on a consolidated basis and a 
Tier 1 capital to total risk-based assets ratio of at least 6 percent on a consolidated basis.
135 
Section 4(l)(3), BHCA authorizes the Board to develop capital standards for 
foreign banks maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States 
that are “comparable” to U.S. standards.
136  By authorizing the Board to make exceptions for 
foreign banks, the BHCA implies the otherwise unstated rule, namely, that foreign banks 
maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company are subject to the well-capitalized 
requirement, even though such banks are not depository institutions under U.S. law.
137  
 
133   Board, SR Letter 01-1 (SUP) (Jan. 5, 2001).  Members of the staff of the Board have indicated that this 
Supervisory Letter will be clarified in the near future. 
134   Id.  The Supervisory Letter, supra note 133, however, qualified its policy by stating that relying on the 
capital strength of the consolidated banking organization, as well as requiring all subsidiary banks to meet 
appropriate capital and management standards, is consistent with the Board’s supervisory assessment 
process for domestic BHCs.  The Board, therefore, retains its supervisory authority to require any BHC, 
including a U.S. BHC owned and controlled by a foreign bank that meets the FHC standards, to maintain 
higher capital levels where such levels are appropriate to ensure that its U.S. activities are operated in a safe 
and sound manner.  This authority may be exercised as part of ongoing supervision or through the 
application process.  Id. 
135   Section 2(o)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(o)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); § 38(b)(1)(A), FDIA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1)(A) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y); 12 C.F.R. § 325.103(b)(1) 
(2001) (rules of the FDIC). 
136   Section 4(l)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3) (1994  & Supp. V 1999).  Comparable does not mean 
identical but means adjusted to the special circumstances of the foreign bank.  Representative Leach said 
that the purpose of § 4(l)(3), BHCA is to ensure that foreign banks continue to be provided national 
treatment “receiving neither advantages nor disadvantages as compared with U.S. organizations,” 145 
Cong. Rec. H11,529 (daily ed.) (Nov. 11, 1999). 
137   Section 4(l)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), does not apply to foreign banks 
that are BHCs by virtue of a U.S. bank subsidiary.  Section 4(l)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(A) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), requires well-capitalized status only for all U.S. depository institution subsidiaries 
of a BHC, not for the BHC itself, even if the BHC is a foreign bank and a depository institution under 
foreign law.  Neither § 4(l)(1)(A) nor § 4(l)(3), BHCA imposes capital requirements on a foreign bank that 
  29 Regulation Y provides that the well-capitalized requirement must be met by the foreign bank as 
such, and not in addition by its U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company on an 
individual basis.
138   
Regulation Y provides two methods for determining whether a foreign bank will 
be considered “well capitalized”.
139    
The first method relies on the Basel Capital Standards.  If the home country of the 
foreign bank applies risk-based capital adequacy standards that are consistent with the Basel 
Capital Standards, the foreign bank must maintain a Tier 1 capital-to-total risk-based assets ratio 
of 6 percent and a total capital-to-total risk-based assets ratio of 10 percent, as calculated on the 
basis of the capital adequacy rules of the home country.
140  However, the Board leaves the door 
open for modifications in its discretion by requiring that even if the foreign bank’s capital 
adequacy is computed under the Basel Capital Standards, it must be comparable to the capital 
required for a U.S. bank owned by an FHC.
141  This provision gives the Board wide discretion to 
increase or lower the 6 and 10 percent ratios even for countries that have adopted the Basel 
Capital Standards.
142  Presumably, the Board will analyze the differences between the capital 
adequacy rule of the relevant country with those of the United States and adjust the well-
capitalized requirement for differences.  Section 225.92(e), Regulation Y enumerates some 
factors that the Board may take into account in determining whether a foreign bank is well 
                                                                                                                                                             
owns a U.S. bank (but does not maintain a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United 
States). 
138   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The language of the Amended Interim FHC Release, 
supra note 32, at 15,054, caused some confusion on this point when it said that the well-capitalized 
requirements provided that the foreign bank “and each of its U.S. branches, agencies, and commercial 
lending subsidiaries be well capitalized and well managed”.  See infra note 154 for a discussion of the 
different approach with respect to branches taken by § 4(j), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999). 
139   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
140   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(1)(i) & (ii) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
141   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(1)(iii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The original interim version of that provision required 
that the Board determine comparability of capital in each case (65 Fed. Reg. 3793 (Jan. 25, 2000), 
§ 225.90(b)(1)(iv)).  The deletion of the requirement of a Board determination in the amendment to that 
provision (65 Fed. Reg. 15,055 (Mar. 21, 2000), § 225.90(b)(1)(iv)) is mainly a matter of form.  It follows 
from 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(c)(1) & (4) (2002) (Regulation Y) that the Board still has the power to determine 
whether the foreign bank’s capital is comparable to the capital required for a U.S. bank owned by an FHC, 
12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(1)(iii) (2002) (Regulation Y), when determining whether the election by a foreign 
bank to be an FHC is effective.  For a discussion of the guidelines for converting foreign bank capital data 
into equivalent U.S. standards, see Capital Equivalency Report (June 19, 1992) submitted by the Board and 
the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury to the House and Senate Banking Committees pursuant to 
§ 7(j), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3105(j) (1994) [herein Capital Equivalency Report], at 42–45. 
  12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(1)(iii) (2002) (Regulation Y) is based on § 4(l)(3) BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), requiring the Board to develop “comparable” capital standards for foreign banks 
operating a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States that elect FHC status. 
142   12 C.F.R. § 229.92(e) (2002) (Regulation Y) establishes broad standards for the exercise of this discretion. 
  30 capitalized in accordance with comparable capital standards:  the foreign bank’s composition of 
capital; Tier 1 capital-to-total assets leverage ratio; accounting standards; long-term debt ratings; 
reliance on government support to meet capital requirements; and other factors that may affect 
analysis of capital.
143  It remains to be seen under what circumstances the Board will ex officio 
embark on such difficult investigations in cases where the home country of the foreign bank 
follows the Basel Capital Standards.  Initial experience shows that in the case of banks from 
some countries, the Board’s staff has asked searching questions about the capital structure and 
the capital adequacy computation. The staff’s approach will depend on its familiarity with and 
confidence in the regulatory structure and accounting rules of a particular country. 
In a determination in the pre-clearance process that the capital of a major 
European bank was comparable to that required of a U.S. bank owned by an FHC and that the 
European bank was well capitalized for purposes of qualifying to be treated as an FHC, the 
Board relied in particular on the following factors:  the European bank’s compliance with the 
6 percent Tier 1 and 10 percent total risk-based capital ratios; its strong external debt ratings 
(within the two highest investment grade rating categories); and the Board’s strong supervisory 
assessment of its operations.  The European bank was required to provide notice to the Board 
should the risk-based capital ratios fall below these levels, its external debt ratings weaken, or its 
leverage ratio fall below the level on a specified prior date.   
The second method permits (1) a foreign bank whose home country has not 
adopted risk-based capital standards consistent with the Basel Capital Standards and (2) a foreign 
bank whose home country has adopted the Basel Capital Standards but which does not meet or 
conceivably does not meet the two standards required under the first method (6 percent/10 
percent capital adequacy ratios and comparability of the foreign bank’s capital to the capital that 
would be required of a U.S. bank owned by an FHC),
144 to obtain from the Board a 
determination that their capital is “otherwise comparable” to the capital that would be required of 
a U.S. bank owned by an FHC.
145  This Board determination will be made in a pre-clearance 
process.
 146  Before filing an election to be treated as an FHC, a foreign bank whose home 
                                                 
143   12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e) (2002) (Regulation Y).  For a discussion of the so-called leverage ratio, see infra text 
accompanying notes 148–152. 
144   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b) (2002) (Regulation Y) gives the foreign bank a choice between relying on the Basel 
Capital Standards of its home country or using the pre-clearance process.  A foreign bank whose home 
country has adopted risk-based capital standards consistent with the Basel Capital Standards might opt for 
the pre-clearance process if (1) the bank falls short of the required capital adequacy ratios (6 percent/10 
percent) of 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(1)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y) as computed under the Basel Capital 
Standards but wishes to argue that its capital still is comparable to the capital that would be required of a 
U.S. bank owned by an FHC (see 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y)), or (2) the bank meets 
the required capital adequacy ratios of 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(1)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y) as computed 
under the Basel Capital Standards but there is a question about the comparability of the foreign bank’s 
capital to the capital that would be required of a U.S. bank owned by an FHC (12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(2) 
(2002) (Regulation Y)). 
145   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Presumably the factors to determine comparability of 
capital set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e) (2002) (Regulation Y) apply to this determination. 
146   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(b)(2) & 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra B.2.d. for a discussion of the 
pre-clearance process. 
  31 country has not adopted risk-based capital standards consistent with the Basel Capital Standards 
or a company owning or controlling such foreign bank must file a request for a determination in 
the pre-clearance process that the foreign bank’s capital is comparable to the capital that would 
be required of a U.S. bank owned by an FHC.
147  If the home country of the foreign bank has 
adopted the Basel Capital Standards, it is in the discretion of the foreign bank to request a review 
of its capital qualification in the pre-clearance process.   
The well-capitalized standard as contained in Regulation Y omits the requirement 
of the interim rules that a foreign bank operating a branch, agency or commercial lending 
company in the United States and electing to be an FHC must meet a leverage ratio of Tier 1 
capital to total (non-risk weighted) assets of at least 3 percent in addition to the 6 and 10 percent 
risk based ratios.
148  A foreign bank’s leverage ratio, however, will continue to be considered by 
the Board as one of the factors that can be taken into account for purposes of the comparability 
review under Section 225.92(e), Regulation Y
149 which mentions the leverage ratio as one of the 
factors to be considered.  Under this approach, the Board may consider whether the level of a 
foreign bank’s leverage ratio is such that it indicates that additional analysis should be 
undertaken in assessing comparability.
150  The Board has stated that it will retain any benefits 
associated with reviewing the leverage ratio as one of the relevant factors to assess the overall 
capital strength of the foreign bank, but the foreign bank’s qualification for FHC status would 
not depend upon it.
151  Instead, qualification would depend on the overall capital strength of the 
foreign bank.
152 
By requiring foreign banks maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending 
company to be well capitalized and well managed, Congress in effect modified Section 8(a), 
                                                 
147   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(b)(2) & 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
148   See interim rule, § 225.90(b)(1)(iii), 65 Fed. Reg. 3793 (Jan. 25, 2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 15,055 (Mar. 21, 
2000).  U.S. depository institutions are always required to meet a leverage ratio of 5 percent, and U.S. 
BHCs are required to meet a leverage ratio of 4 percent or 3 percent.  See the discussion of the leverage 
ratio in the Interim FHC Release, supra note 32, at 3,789.  The leverage ratio for BHCs is set forth in app. 
D to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2002) (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs) and app. B to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 
(2002) (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs and State Member Banks) and for insured banks in 12 
C.F.R. § 325.3 (2002). 
149   12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 408. 
150   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 408.  The Final FHC Release states that the financial information 
necessary for the Board’s staff to compute a foreign bank’s leverage ratio will be required as part of the 
certification process and ongoing reporting required of foreign FHCs.  Id. at n.18.  In a determination in the 
pre-clearance process that the capital of a major European bank was comparable to that required of a U.S. 
bank owned by an FHC and that the European bank was well capitalized for purposes of qualifying as an 
FHC, the Board did not rely on the bank’s leverage ratio as a factor underlying its decision but required the 
bank to provide notice to the Board if the leverage ratio falls below the level on a specified prior date 
(which was then below 3 percent).  The Board indicated to the bank that only a truly material change in the 
leverage ratio would cause it supervisory concern.  The bank had informed the Board that it does not 
manage its leverage ratio. 
151   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 408. 
152   Id. 
  32 IBA,
153 which provides that a company covered by Section 8(a) “shall be subject to the 
provisions of the [BHCA] . . . in the same manner and to the same extent that [BHCs] are subject 
to such provisions”. 
The concept of the well-capitalized requirement for FHCs differs from the well-
capitalized requirement used in Section 4(j), BHCA.
154  In Section 4(j), BHCA the level of 
                                                 
153   12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1994). 
154   Compare the different structures of § 4(l), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and § 4(j), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Section 4(j)(3), (4)(A) & (5), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(j)(3), (4)(A) & (5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.22(a), 225.23(a) & 225.23(c)(1) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) provide for a waiver of notice or an expedited notice procedure for activities or 
acquisitions under § 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), for BHCs that are 
well capitalized (and well managed) in accordance with § 2(o)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(o)(1)(B) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Section 4(j)(4)(A), BHCA requires 
that (1) the acquiring BHC is well capitalized, (2) the lead insured depository institution of such BHC is 
well capitalized, (3) well capitalized insured depository institutions control at least 80 percent of the 
aggregate total risk-weighted assets of insured depository institutions controlled by such BHC, and (4) no 
insured depository institution controlled by such BHC is under-capitalized. 
 
The well-capitalized requirement of § 4(l)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999), on the other hand, refers to all depository institution subsidiaries of the FHC, whether or not insured 
by the FDIC, not only to lead insured depository institutions and insured depository institutions controlling 
80 percent of risk-weighted assets.  Furthermore, § 4(l)(1)(A), BHCA does not apply the well-capitalized 
requirement to the BHC itself. 
 
For foreign banks, § 4(l), BHCA and § 4(j), BHCA have the same result, because the foreign banking 
organization that wishes to engage in an activity or make an acquisition under § 4(c)(8), BHCA without 
notice or on the basis of the expedited notice procedure must meet the well-capitalized requirement on the 
level of the foreign bank (12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y)), and a foreign bank that elects to 
be an FHC must also meet the well-capitalized requirement on the level of the foreign bank (12 C.F.R. § 
225.90(a)(1) & (b) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
 
Section 4 (j)(4)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), requires not only that the 
acquiring BHC must be well capitalized but, in addition, requires that the BHC’s lead depository institution 
must be well capitalized to make the waiver of notice or the expedited notice procedure available to such 
BHC.  The term lead insured depository institution is defined in § 2(o)(8)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1841(o)(8)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and in 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(h) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The term 
insured depository institution is defined in § 2(n), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(n) (1994), and in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.2(g) (2002) (Regulation Y) by reference to § 3, FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
Section 3(c)(2), FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2) (1994), defines insured depository institution as any insured 
bank and savings association.  Section 3(h), FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1994), defines insured bank as 
any bank (including a foreign bank having an insured branch) the deposits of which are insured by the 
FDIC.  Section 2(o)(8)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(o)(8)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), adds that in the case 
of foreign banks the term insured depository institution includes any (insured or uninsured) branch or 
agency operated in the United States by a foreign bank.  This seems to indicate that the capitalization of the 
branch or agency on a stand-alone basis is relevant.  Regulation Y, however, shortcuts the branches and 
agencies by providing that for purposes of determining whether a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank 
is well capitalized, the branch or agency is deemed to have the same capital ratios as the foreign banking 
organization.  12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r)(3)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Foreign banking organization is defined 
in 12 C.F.R. § 211.21(o) (2002) (Regulation K).  For a discussion of the term foreign banking organization, 
see Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.02.   
 
  33 capitalization is a threshold requirement.  It must be present at the time of the acquisition or at 
the time an activity is commenced in order to make the waiver of notice or expedited notice 
procedure available.
155  There is no requirement that the BHC maintain the higher level of 
capitalization in the future.  The higher level of capitalization of an FHC, however, must be 
maintained during the existence of the FHC, and an FHC that fails to continue to meet the 
required capitalization level loses its FHC status.
156  Thus, the well-capitalized requirement of 
FHCs is a maintenance requirement. 
4. 
                                                                                                                                                            
The Well-Managed Requirement 
All institutions that must be well capitalized must also be well managed.
157  The 
discussion about and the diagrams showing the entities in a foreign bank group that must meet 
the well-capitalized requirements equally applies to the well-managed requirement.
158  A 
company that controls a foreign bank that operates a branch or agency or owns or controls a 
commercial lending company in the United States is treated like a U.S. BHC in that it does not 
have to meet the well-managed requirements in order to become an FHC (if it meets the other 
requirements for an effective election and makes such election).
159 
 
Section 4(l), BHCA does not refer to insured depository institution (see supra note 33) but to depository 
institutions generally.   
155   See § 4(j)(4)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“Both before and immediately 
after the proposed transaction — (i) the acquiring [BHC] is well capitalized”). 
156   See infra H. 
157   Section 4(l)(1)(B) & (3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(B) & (3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  12 C.F.R. §§ 
225.81(b)(2) & 225.82(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y) (depository institutions controlled by a U.S. BHC); 
12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90(a)(1), 225.91(b)(4) & 225.91(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y) (foreign bank electing FHC 
status; foreign bank that maintains a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company and is controlled 
by the electing foreign bank or is under common control with the electing foreign bank; and U.S. nonbank 
depository institution subsidiary, such as a thrift or a nonbank trust company, owned or controlled by the 
electing foreign bank or by a company owning or controlling the electing foreign bank).  See supra B.3.a. 
  Compare the different approach of § 4(j)(3), (4)(B) & (5), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(3), (4)(B) & (5) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), and 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.22(a), 225.23(a) & 225.23(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
dealing with the waiver of notice or expedited notice procedure for activities or acquisitions under 
§ 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), for BHCs that are (well capitalized) and 
well managed in accordance with § 2(o)(9), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(o)(9) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), 12 
C.F.R. §§ 225.2(s), 225.14(c)(2) & 225.23(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Under 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s)(3) 
(2002) (RegulationY) the Board looks only to the U.S. operations of a foreign bank on a stand-alone basis 
in determining the well-managed requirements.  See supra note 154.  Whereas § 4(j), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), requires that (1) the acquiring BHC, (2) its lead insured depository 
institution and (3) insured depository institutions that control at least 80 percent of the total risk weighted 
assets of insured depository institutions controlled by the BHC are well managed and have received at least 
a satisfactory rating for compliance, § 4(l), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)  (1994 & Supp. V 1999), requires 
that the depository institution subsidiary of a BHC (and in extension of that concept, a foreign bank) is well 
managed. 
158   See supra B.3.a. 
159   See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
  34 Well managed is generally defined in Section 2(o)(9), BHCA
160 by reference to 
the examination by federal or state banking agencies,
161 and in case of companies or depository 
institutions that have not received an examination rating, the term well managed means that “the 
Board has determined, after a review of the managerial and other resources . . . that the company 
or institution is well managed”.
162  A foreign bank operating a branch, agency or commercial 
lending company in the United States is subject to different well-managed requirements for FHC 
purposes.  Such foreign bank must meet “comparable” management standards to be developed 
by the Board.
163  Pursuant to Regulation Y, such foreign bank will be considered well managed if 
it meets the following test:
164 
(1)  the foreign bank has received at least a satisfactory composite rating at its 
most recent assessment of its U.S. branch, agency and commercial lending 
company operations; 
(2)  the home country supervisor of the foreign bank consents to the foreign 
bank expanding its activities in the United States to include activities 
permissible for an FHC; and 
(3)  the management of the foreign bank meets standards comparable to those 
required of a U.S. bank owned by an FHC. 
Regulation Y provides for an evaluation of a foreign bank for FHC purposes on the basis of a 
composite rating of all of its direct U.S. branches, agencies and commercial lending company 
subsidiaries.  The Federal Reserve’s foreign bank examination process has been amended to 
include assignment of a combined assessment of an FBO’s U.S. branch, agency and commercial 
                                                 
160   12 U.S.C. § 1841(o)(9) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final 
FHC Release, supra note 32, at 401 (discussing the definitions of well capitalized and well managed). 
161   12 U.S.C. § 1841(o)(9)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s)(1)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
162   12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s)(1)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(o)(9)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
163   Section 4(l)(3) BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
164   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The definition of the well-managed requirement for foreign 
banking organizations in 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) applies only “except as otherwise 
provided”.  12 C.F.R. § 225.90(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) contains such other provision.  The original 
interim version of that provision required that the Board determine comparability of management standards 
in each case (65 Fed. Reg. 3793 (Jan. 25, 2000), § 225.90(c)(3)).  The deletion of the reference to a Board 
determination in the amendment to that provision (65 Fed. Reg. 15,055 (Mar. 21, 2000), § 225.90(c)(3)) is 
mainly a matter of form.  It follows from 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(c)(1) & (4) (2002) (Regulation Y) that the 
Board still has the power to determine whether the foreign bank meets standards comparable to those 
required of a U.S. bank owned by an FHC, 12 C.F.R. § 225.90(c)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y), when 
determining whether the election to be an FHC is effective.  See supra note 141. 
 
12 C.F.R. § 225.90(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) is based on § 4(l)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C.§ 1843(l)(3) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999), requiring the Board to develop “comparable” management standards for foreign banks 
operating a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States. 
  35 lending company operations through the regular examination cycle.
165  If a foreign banking 
group contains more than one foreign bank with U.S. banking offices, each such foreign bank in 
the group must have a satisfactory combined U.S. banking assessment in order for the foreign 
banking group or any of its subsidiaries to obtain FHC status.
166  Each U.S. depository institution 
subsidiary of a foreign bank or company owning or controlling such foreign bank is required to 
meet the well-managed standard separately on an individual basis for the foreign bank or 
company to obtain FHC status in the same manner as required for U.S. BHCs.
167   
The interim rules required as a condition for FHC status of a foreign bank that the 
home country supervisor of the foreign bank considered the overall operations of the foreign 
bank to be satisfactory or better.
 168  The Board dropped this requirement, and Regulation Y now 
provides that the home country supervisor must consent to the proposed expansion of the foreign 
bank’s U.S. operations to include activities permissible for FHCs.
169  This formulation is based 
on suggestions of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
170  The consent could be 
obtained in a formal consent process if such process is available in the home country of the 
foreign bank or by way of consultation between the Board and the home country supervisor.
171 
It is unclear how the Board will judge whether a foreign bank meets management 
standards “comparable” to those required of a U.S. bank owned by an FHC.
172  How can the 
                                                 
165   See Board, SR Letter No. 00-14 (SUP) (Oct. 23, 2000).  See also Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 409, 
and id. at n.19.  If a foreign bank that wishes to obtain FHC status has not been assigned a combined U.S. 
banking assessment as part of the regular examination cycle, the foreign bank should contact its responsible 
Federal Reserve Bank or utilize the pre-clearance process.  12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  A 
combined U.S. banking assessment may be assigned to a foreign bank as part of the FHC pre-clearance 
process.  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 409.  See supra text accompanying note 111. 
166   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 409. 
167   Id. at 409 n.20.  The definition for well managed applicable for the determination whether a BHC or a 
depository institution is well managed, is set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
168   See interim rule § 225.90(c)(2), 65 Fed. Reg. 3793 (Jan. 25, 2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 15,055 (Mar. 21, 2000). 
169   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
170   See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, at 41–43 
(1997); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International 
Banking Groups and their Cross-Border Establishments, § II.2 (1992).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 
32, at 409 (discussing the position of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision). 
171   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 409.  The purpose of the consultation is that the Board can assure 
itself that the home country supervisor considers the consolidated capital and management of the bank to 
satisfy its home country standards and that the supervisor has no objections to the expansion.  Id. 
172   12 C.F.R. § 225.90(c)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Board’s justification in the Final FHC Release, supra 
note 32, at 408–10, of the retention of the requirement of a comparability finding in Regulation Y does not 
address the issue how the Board will judge comparability of management.  The reference to the 
comparability factors in 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e) (2002) (Regulation Y) is not very helpful because those 
factors deal with capital and supervision, not with management.  See Final FHC Release, supra, at 410.  
The discussion of the management comparability test in the Final FHC Release, supra, at 410 and the 
comparability factors in 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e) convey the sense that the Board does not really mean 
  36 Board reach this conclusion for a foreign bank without examining the foreign bank?  How will 
the Board sensibly review the managerial resources of a foreign bank that operates under a 
different legal and economic system?  The pre-clearance process is also available to a foreign 
bank that wishes a Board review of its well-managed qualification.
173 
5. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Comprehensive  Supervision  on a Consolidated Basis 
Whether a foreign bank that elects the status of an FHC is subject to 
comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis by its home country supervisor 
is one of the factors that the Board may take into account when determining whether a foreign 
bank is well capitalized and well managed in accordance with comparable U.S. capital and 
management standards.
174  Regulation Y adopts the position that, as a general matter, a foreign 
bank may not be considered to be well capitalized and well managed if the foreign bank is not 
subject to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis.
175  The GLBA does not require 
that foreign banks electing FHC status must be subject to comprehensive supervision on a 
consolidated basis.  The comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis standard has been 
mandated by Congress only in connection with applications by foreign banks to expand their 
U.S. banking operations,
176 and there is no indication that Congress intended to require foreign 
banks to meet this standard before being permitted to expand their U.S. nonbanking activities as 
FHCs.  Nevertheless, the Board makes it clear that this factor ranks high in its view.
177 
The Board stated that as a general rule, the top tier foreign bank in a foreign 
banking group should be subject to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis by its 
home country supervisor in order for the foreign bank group to obtain FHC status.
178  If a top tier 
 
management quality in the sense of the ability of the management of the foreign bank but supervision of the 
foreign bank by the home country supervisor. 
173   12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra B.2.d. 
174   12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e)(1) & (2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, A By-
Product of the Globalization Process:  The Rise of Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitions – The 
U.S. Regulatory Framework, 56 BUS. LAW. 591, 604–09 (2001) for a discussion of the comprehensive and 
consolidated supervision standard. 
175   12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
176   See § 7(d)(2)(A), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(2)(A) (1994) and 12 C.F.R. § 211.24(c)(1)(i)(A) (2002) 
(Regulation K) (requiring that a foreign bank that wishes to establish an office in the United States and any 
foreign parent bank of such bank must be subject to comprehensive supervision or regulation on a 
consolidated basis by its home country supervisor); § 3(c)(3)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(3)(B) (1994) 
and 12 C.F.R. § 225.13(a)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y) (same requirement for foreign banks applying to 
become BHCs). 
177   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 410.  The Board justifies this additional requirement that must be 
satisfied before a foreign bank can effectively elect FHC status with the observation that only if a foreign 
bank is subject to comprehensive and consolidated supervision, the Board can have a high level of 
confidence that the capital and management information being submitted by the applicant is accurate and 
reliable.  Id. 
178   Id. 
  37 foreign bank in a foreign banking group is determined to be subject to comprehensive and 
consolidated supervision, subsidiary foreign banks of the group should be incorporated into the 
supervisory framework of the home country supervisor of the top tier foreign bank and, thus, 
should be subject to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis even if the subsidiary 
foreign bank is not subject to comprehensive consolidated supervision by its own home country 
supervisor.
179 
A foreign bank that has not been previously determined by the Board to be subject 
to comprehensive and consolidated supervision and that is chartered in a country where no other 
bank from that country has been determined by the Board to be subject to comprehensive and 
consolidated supervision is required (not merely encouraged) to use the pre-clearance process, 
even if it otherwise meets the objective FHC criteria.
180  The Board will make a determination 
about the comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis in the pre-clearance process.
181 
There may be limited situations in which an exceptionally strong bank from a 
country that has not yet fully implemented comprehensive and consolidated supervision should 
be able to be considered for FHC status.
182  Regulation Y provides that the Board may grant after 
the pre-clearance process FHC status to a foreign bank that is not yet fully subject to 
comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis if the home country supervisor has made 
significant progress in adopting and implementing arrangements for the comprehensive and 
consolidated supervision of its banks, and if the foreign bank demonstrates significant financial 
strength, such as through levels of capital that significantly exceed the minimum levels required 
                                                 
179   Id. at 410 n.23. 
180   12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 410.  The 
formulation of 12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) is curious.  This provision refers to a foreign 
bank that previously has not been determined to be subject to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated 
basis or that is chartered in a country where no bank has been found to be subject to comprehensive 
supervision on a consolidated basis.  If the electing bank is from such country, surely it cannot have been 
determined to be subject to such supervision.  The narrower test (the electing bank has not been found to be 
subject to comprehensive and consolidated supervision) is included in the wider test (no bank in the home 
country of the electing bank has been found to be subject to comprehensive and consolidated supervision) 
and adds nothing.  The amended interim rule, § 225.91(c), 65 Fed. Reg. 15,056 (Mar. 21, 2000), made 
more sense:  it encouraged the pre-clearing process for banks chartered in a country where no other bank 
has been reviewed by the Board for comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis.  (The amended 
interim rule should have deleted the word “other”).  12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) probably 
contains a drafting error in that the or should be read as and.  See Final FHC Release, supra, at 410, which 
uses and instead of or when summarizing 12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) to connect the 
absence of an individual finding of comprehensive and consolidated supervision of the electing bank and 
the absence of such finding for any other bank from the country of charter of the electing bank.  This 
reading makes sense, because requesting the pre-clearing process for an electing bank from a country 
where numerous other banks previously have been found to be subject to comprehensive consolidated 
supervision seems to be unnecessary.   
181   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 410–11.  For a discussion of the pre-clearance process, see supra 
B.2.d. 
182   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 411. 
  38 for a well-capitalized determination or through exceptional asset quality.
183  A foreign bank that 
is not subject to comprehensive and consolidated supervision may use the pre-clearance process 
to explain to the Board why it still should be granted FHC status.
184  The Board anticipates 
granting FHC status to foreign banks that are not subject to comprehensive and consolidated 
supervision only in rare instances.
185 
6. 
                                                
Community Reinvestment Act Rating 
It is not part of the declaration of the FHC election by a U.S. BHC, a foreign bank 
or a company controlling the electing foreign bank or of the certification required in connection 
with the election
186 that the insured depository institution subsidiaries of such electing U.S. BHC, 
foreign bank or company controlling such foreign bank, or any insured U.S. branch of such 
foreign bank, meet a certain rating requirement under the Community Reinvestment Act of 
1977.
187  However, an election to be an FHC will not be effective unless the Board finds that 
each insured depository institution controlled by the electing U.S. BHC, foreign bank or 
company controlling such foreign bank and each insured U.S. branch of the electing foreign bank 
has achieved at least a rating of “satisfactory record of meeting community credit needs”
188 at its 
most recent examination under the CRA.
189  The Board must use the 30-day period beginning on 
the date the complete declaration of election to be an FHC is filed
190 to determine whether the 
CRA rating requirement is met.
191  If any of a U.S. BHC’s, foreign bank’s or controlling 
company’s insured depository institutions or any of the foreign bank’s insured branches has not 
received in its most recent examination under the CRA at least a rating of “satisfactory”, the 
 
183   12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 411.  Cf. 12 
C.F.R. § 211.24(c)(1)(iii) (2002) (Regulation K) (it may be sufficient for the approval of an application for 
the opening of a U.S. office of a foreign bank to show that the home country is actively working to 
establish arrangements for the consolidated supervision of such bank). 
If the election by a foreign bank from country X to be an FHC has been approved because the home 
country supervisor in country X has made significant progress in establishing arrangements for 
comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis, 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e)(2)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y), 
another bank from country X thereafter electing FHC status must still use the pre-clearance process, 
because no foreign bank from country X has been determined by the Board to be subject to comprehensive 
and consolidated supervision, 12 C.F.R. § 225.91(c) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
184   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 411. 
185   Id. 
186   See supra B.2.b. 
187   See § 4(l)(1), BHC, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and the definition of FHC in § 2(p), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(p) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
188   Section 807(b)(2)(B), CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2)(B) (1994). 
189   Section 804(c)(1), CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(c)(1) & 
225.92(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
190   See supra text accompanying note 66. 
191   See § 804(c)(1)(B), CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  39 election to be an FHC cannot become effective.
192  The CRA rating requirement is relevant for 
foreign banks or companies controlling such foreign banks electing to be FHCs only if the 
foreign bank or controlling company maintains an insured depository institution subsidiary or the 
foreign bank maintains an insured branch in the United States.
193 
7. 
a. 
                                                
Capitalization of the FHC 
No Requirement to Be Well Capitalized 
The well-capitalized requirement must be met by the depository institution 
subsidiaries of an FHC and, in the case of a foreign bank FHC operating a branch, agency or 
commercial lending company in the United States, by such foreign bank FHC and by other 
foreign banks operating a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States 
that are controlled by or under common control with the foreign bank FHC.
194  Other than 
Section 4(j), BHCA,
195 Section 4(l), BHCA does not establish a well-capitalized requirement for 
BHCs, except in the case of foreign banks that are BHCs by virtue of the IBA because they 
operate a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States.
196  Furthermore, 
the Board is not authorized to prescribe capital or capital adequacy requirements for any 
functionally regulated subsidiary of a BHC that is not a depository institution and that is in 
compliance with its own applicable capital requirements imposed by another federal regulatory 
authority, e.g., the capital standards applied by the SEC to broker-dealers or by a state insurance  
 
192   Section 804(c)(1), CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(c)(1) & 
225.92(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The CRA contains a limited exception for insured depository 
institutions that were acquired by the BHC in the year prior to the filing of a declaration to be an FHC, if an 
affirmative plan to achieve at least a satisfactory CRA rating at the next examination of the institution is 
submitted to and accepted by the appropriate federal financial supervisory agency (defined in § 803(1), 
CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1) (1994)).  Section 804(c)(2), CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(d) & 225.92(d) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
193   Section 804(a), CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (1994), § 803(2), CRA, 12 U.S.C. § 2902(2) (1994), § 3(a)(1) & 
(c)(2), FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(1) & (c)(2) (1994) (insured depository institution covered by CRA).  See 
12 C.F.R. § 225.92(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Only U.S. insured depository institutions and insured 
branches of foreign banks are subject to the CRA.  Because the GLBA does not instruct the Board to 
develop comparable standards for foreign banks, the CRA rating requirement does not raise the same issues 
for foreign banks as does § 4(l)(1) & (3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) & (3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
194   See supra B.2.c. & B.3. 
195   12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra note 154 for a discussion of § 4(j), BHCA. 
196   Section 4(l), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(l) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), does not apply capital requirements to 
a company controlling a bank maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United 
States.  See supra notes 131 & 154 and accompanying text. 
  40 authority to U.S. insurance companies.
197   
b. 
                                                
General Capital Requirements for BHCs/FHCs 
The Board, however, has the authority, based on its general supervisory power 
over BHCs, to impose capital and capital adequacy requirements on BHCs.  This authority does 
not diminish once the BHC has effectively elected FHC status.
198  Regulation Y imposes on 
BHCs a minimum ratio of total capital-to-total risk-based assets of at least 8 percent on a 
consolidated basis and a ratio of Tier 1 capital-to-total risk-based assets of at least 4 percent on a 
consolidated basis.
199  The risk-based guidelines are used “in the inspection and supervision 
process as well as in the analysis of applications acted upon by the Federal Reserve”.
200  
Although Regulation Y does not contain any specific requirement that, as a condition to the 
effective election of FHC status, a U.S. BHC must meet the capital requirements applicable to all 
BHCs, there is little doubt that the Board under its general supervisory power over BHCs could 
deny a BHC from effectively making an FHC election if it is in violation of applicable laws and 
regulations, including the rules on capital adequacy.  The Board may impose capital 
requirements on a BHC/FHC, not only if it is a mere holding company without its own business 
activities, but, according to the BHCA, even if the BHC/FHC is a broker-dealer, insurance 
company, insurance agent or investment company.
201  It is not clear, however, how the 
 
197   Section 5(c)(3)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Furthermore, the Board 
may not prescribe capital or capital adequacy requirements for (1) investment advisers registered under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), or with any state 
or (2) insurance agents licensed with a state insurance authority.  Id.  See Conference Report on S. 900, 
supra note 4, at 158.  The Board, however, may impose capital or capital adequacy requirements on non-
investment advisory activities (and activities incidental thereto) of a registered investment adviser and non-
insurance agency activities (and activities incidental thereto) of a licensed insurance agent.  Section 
5(c)(3)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
 
In developing capital adequacy rules for BHCs and in determining the capital adequacy of a BHC, the 
Board may not take into account the activities, operations or investments of an affiliated investment 
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999), unless such investment company itself is a BHC or 25 percent or more of the shares of the 
investment company are owned by a BHC (and the shares owned by the BHC have a market value of at 
least $1 million).  Section 5(c)(3)(C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(3)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
198   12 C.F.R. § 225.82(g) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra B.8. 
199   A U.S. BHC is subject to the capital requirements set forth in app. A (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for 
BHCs:  Risk-Based Measure) (see attachment VI), app. B (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs and 
State Member Banks:  Leverage Measure), app. D (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs:  Tier 1 
Leverage Measure) and app. E (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs:  Market Risk Measure) to 12 
C.F.R. pt. 225 (2002).  The capital requirements applicable to BHCs obviously continue to apply after a 
BHC has effectively elected to be an FHC.  See D.2.m for a discussion of capital requirements for equity 
investments in nonfinancial companies. 
200   App. A (I Overview) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2002) (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHC’s). 
201   This follows from § 5(c)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), which prohibits the 
Board from prescribing capital requirements on functionally regulated subsidiaries of a BHC (not:  
functionally regulated BHCs). 
  41 capitalization of a company engaged in financial activities other than banking, e.g., a broker-
dealer or an insurance company, can be computed in accordance to the Basel Capital 
Standards.
202  On the other hand, the Board may not impose on FHCs the requirement of being 
well-capitalized (except that, as stated above, in the case of a foreign bank–FHC maintaining a 
branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States, the well-capitalized 
requirement applies to the FHC
203). 
In several orders approving the acquisition by a securities company of a bank 
under Section 3, BHCA
204 and the election of the new BHC to be an FHC,
205 the Board has 
stated that the new BHC would be well capitalized on a pro forma basis on consummation of the 
acquisition of the bank.
206 These orders apparently do not require the securities companies that 
acquired a depository institution to be well capitalized but simply stated as a fact that the new 
FHC will be well capitalized.  In an order approving the acquisition of a depository institution by 
Met Life, the Board did not address the capitalization of the acquiring company but found that 
“all the subsidiaries of Met Life that are subject to regulatory capital requirements currently 
exceed those relevant minimum regulatory capital requirements”.
207 
c. 
                                                
Capital Requirements for Foreign BHCs/FHCs 
A more difficult question is whether the Board may impose capital requirements 
on a foreign company that owns or controls a foreign bank maintaining a branch, agency or 
commercial lending company in the United States, if the foreign company and the foreign bank 
elect to be FHCs.  Section 7(d)(3)(B), IBA
208 provides that in acting upon an application of a 
foreign bank to establish a branch or an agency or to acquire control or ownership of a 
commercial lending company, the Board may take into consideration, among other factors, the 
financial resources of the foreign bank.  Section 7, IBA,
209 however, does not refer to the capital 
resources of a company controlling the applicant foreign bank.  The provisions of Regulation K 
 
202   See supra note 104. 
203   See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
204   12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
205   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.82(f) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
206   See The Charles Schwab Corporation, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 494 (2000) (“Schwab also would be well 
capitalized on a pro forma basis on consummation of the proposal”.  Id. at 495); Friedmann, Billings, 
Ramsey Group, Inc., Order of Mar. 13, 2001, 87 FED. RES. BULL. 346 (2001).  The Board did not explain 
how and on what basis it reached those conclusions.  Pursuant to § 3(c)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) 
(1994), and 12 C.F.R. § 225.13(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) the Board in deciding an application under § 3, 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), may consider the financial condition and prospects, 
including current and projected capital positions, of the applicant. 
207   See Met Life, Inc., Order of Feb. 12, 2001, 87 FED. RES. BULL. 268 (2001).  See also The Charles Schwab 
Corporation, supra note 206, at 495 (“[A]ll subsidiaries of . . . Schwab that are subject to regulatory capital 
requirements currently exceed the relevant requirements.”). 
208   12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3)(B) (1994). 
209   12 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  42 dealing with such applications
210 refer as a standard for approval to the financial resources, 
including capital position, only of the applicant foreign bank and not of companies controlling 
the applicant foreign bank.
211 
It can be argued that because a company controlling a bank establishing a branch, 
agency or commercial lending company is not subject to specific capital requirements, there is 
no basis for the imposition of capital requirements on the controlling company if the foreign 
bank (together with the controlling company) elects to be an FHC.  On the other hand, the Board 
might take the position that a controlling company that is a foreign bank and is subject in its 
home country to risk-based capital standards consistent with the Basel Capital Standards must 
comply with such standards, and that a nonbank controlling company that is subject to specific 
capital rules in its home country as, e.g., a foreign insurance company or a foreign securities 
company, must comply with those requirements.  It must be emphasized, however, that the 
requirements and procedures in Regulation Y dealing with the election by foreign banks to be 
treated as FHCs
212 do not establish any capital or capital adequacy requirements regarding the 
companies controlling the electing foreign bank.   
In cases where a foreign bank acquired control of a U.S. bank, the Board, in its 
orders under Section 3, BHCA
213 approving the acquisition, has emphasized that not only the 
direct foreign BHC but also foreign companies controlling such BHC (indirect BHCs) met the 
foreign capital adequacy requirements based on the Basel Capital Standards.
214  This is justified 
                                                 
210   12 C.F.R. § 211.24 (2002) (Regulation K). 
211   12 C.F.R. § 211.24(c)(2)(ii) (2002) (Regulation K).  Note that in contrast to this Section, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 211.24(c)(2)(iii) (2002) (Regulation K) refers to the managerial resources of the principal shareholders of 
the foreign bank.  The Capital Equivalency Report, supra note 141, does not at all mention capital 
requirements for companies controlling foreign banks seeking to establish branches or agencies in the 
United States.  See also Report by the Board to the Senate Banking Committee submitted to the Chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Alfonse M. D’Amato under a cover 
letter, dated Jan. 20, 1995, entitled Report on Applications Under the Foreign Bank Supervision 
Enhancement Act.  The Board has not applied the source of strength doctrine, infra text accompanying 
notes 748-751, to foreign companies controlling foreign banks operating branches, agencies or commercial 
lending companies in the United States.  Obviously, there is nothing in 12 C.F.R. § 211.24 (2002) 
(Regulation K) that prevents the Board from making the capital of a company controlling the applicant 
foreign bank an issue in the application procedure. 
212   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.90 & 225.91 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
213   12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
214   See, e.g., Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 412 (2000).  Banco Espírito Santo, 
Portugal, had applied under § 3, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), to the Board to acquire 
all of the voting shares of Espírito Santo Bank, Miami, Fla.  Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole 
(“CNCA”) controlled more than 25 percent of the voting shares of Banco Espírito Santo and was also 
required to seek Board approval under § 3, BHCA to own indirectly the shares of Espírito Santo Bank.  The 
Board approving the CNCA application stated “CNCA’s capital levels exceed the levels required under 
French capital guidelines. The capital levels of CNCA also exceed the capital levels under the Basel Capital 
Accord, and are considered equivalent to the capital levels that would be required of a U.S. banking 
organization under similar circumstances”.  Id. at 413.  Note that the Board used the same language in the 
order approving the application of Banco Espírito Santo, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 418, at 419 (2000), 
substituting “Portuguese” for “French”.  See also HSBC Holdings Plc, HSBC Finance Netherlands, HSBC 
  43 because Regulation Y expressly makes the financial condition and the capital of the applicant 
factors in deciding on an application under Section 3, BHCA,
215 and companies that would 
become indirect BHCs of the target U.S. bank are necessarily applicants under Section 3, BHCA.  
It can be expected that the Board will take a similar approach if a foreign company applies for 
the acquisition of a U.S. bank and simultaneously elects to be an FHC.
216 
d. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Structure of FHC Group 
Because the Board may impose capital requirements only on FHCs but not on any 
functionally regulated subsidiary of the FHC, it can be expected that in the United States 
operating nonbank companies, such as insurance companies and securities companies, will not 
be direct or indirect owners of banks.  All U.S. FHCs will be mere holding companies without 
their own business activities which hold their bank, their insurance company, or their securities 
company as direct subsidiaries or as indirect subsidiaries through intermediary holding 
companies without their own business activities.  Such structure prevents the securities company 
and the insurance company from becoming BHCs and FHCs; they become functionally regulated 
subsidiaries of an FHC.
217 
If a foreign bank that operates a branch, agency or commercial lending company 
in the United States is controlled by a foreign operating nonbank company, e.g., an insurance 
company, it also might be advantageous to restructure this relationship and to subordinate both 
the bank and the insurance company to a holding company without its own business activities as 
subsidiaries on the same level.  This will avoid the treatment of the insurance company as a 
BHC.  The insurance company would no longer have to join the FHC election of the bank and 
would not be subject to whatever capital requirements the Board may impose on foreign BHCs.  
The creation of a non-operating holding company above an insurance company controlling a 
bank is of no particular advantage from a BHCA point of view because the insurance company 
and the new holding company would be companies controlling the bank, would have to join the 
election to become FHCs and would be subject to whatever capital requirement the Board may 
impose on foreign BHCs. 
 
Holdings BV, Republic New York Corporation and Republic National Bank of New York, 86 FED. RES. 
BULL. 140 (2000) (the Board said, id. at 142, that HSBC Holding’s capital ratios exceeded the minimum 
levels that would be required under the Basel Capital Standards and are considered equivalent to the capital 
that would be required of a U.S. banking organization; that the proposed transaction would not materially 
affect the capital position of HSBC Holding and Republic New York Corporation; and that it was not 
expected to have a significant adverse effect on the financial resources of HSBC Holding); Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce, The CIBC World Markets Corporation, CIBC World Markets Inc. and CIBC 
Delaware Holdings Inc., 85 FED. RES. BULL. 733 (1999).  See also Piraeus Bank S.A., 85 FED. RES. BULL. 
579 (1999) (“Piraeus’s capital levels exceed the levels required under Greek capital guidelines and under 
the Basel Capital Accord, and are considered equivalent to the capital levels that would be required of a 
U.S. banking organization under similar circumstances”.  Id. at 581). 
215   12 C.F.R. § 225.13(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
216   12 C.F.R. § 225.82(f) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
217   See infra G.1.  See also infra D.2.m. for a discussion of capital requirements for equity investments in 
nonfinancial companies, in particular see text accompanying notes 589-591. 
  44 Even in the case of an FHC that is a mere holding company without its own 
business activities, the capital requirements imposed by the Board on BHCs affect indirectly the 
capital requirements of operating subsidiaries of the FHC that are functionally regulated by other 
regulatory authorities.
218  There is a tension between the authority of the Board to impose capital 
requirements on an FHC and the prohibition to impose such requirement on functionally 
regulated subsidiaries of the FHC.  Take, for instance, an FHC that has 50 percent of its (risk 
weighted?) assets in a depository institution subsidiary and 50 percent in a broker-dealer or an 
insurance company:  if the Board imposes the regular 4/8 percent capital adequacy requirement 
on a consolidated basis
219 on the FHC, it indirectly impacts the capital requirements of the 
broker-dealer or insurance subsidiary.  Although Congress was aware of this problem, the GLBA 
does not provide a solution.  The Conference Report on S. 900 states that the Board is expected 
to be flexible in the application of its capital requirements and to be able to harmonize them with 
the capital standards applied by the SEC to the broker-dealer.
220  In the above example the assets 
of the broker-dealer and insurance business should be eliminated from the balance sheet of the 
FHC before the capital adequacy for the FHC is computed. 
8. 
                                                
Limited  FHC  Status 
The Board expressly retains the authority to take supervisory actions against a 
BHC
221 even if that BHC has effectively elected to be an FHC.
222  These supervisory actions 
include, for example, imposing supervisory limitations, restrictions or prohibitions on the 
activities and acquisitions of an FHC.
223  The Final FHC Release states that the Board may take 
appropriate supervisory action against an FHC if the Board believes that the FHC “does not have 
the appropriate financial and managerial resources to commence or conduct an activity, make an 
 
218   See § 5(c)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
219   App. A (attachment VI) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2002) (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs). 
220   The Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 159 states: 
The Conferees intend that the Board be flexible in its application of holding 
company consolidated capital standards for the leverage requirement and the 
timing of the asset calculations to FHCs of which the predominant regulated 
subsidiary is a broker-dealer.  The Conferees intend that, to the extent the Board 
deems feasible and consistent with the overall financial condition and activities 
of the holding company, the capital requirements for such holding companies be 
consistent with the capital standards applied by the SEC to the broker-dealer, 
which accounts for the predominant amount of assets and activities of the 
holding company. 
221   The statutory bases for such supervisory action are § 8, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1847 (1994), and § 8, FDIA, 
12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
222   12 C.F.R. § 225.82(g) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 403 (the GLBA 
“did not limit the general applicability of the Board’s supervisory power over [BHCs] that become 
[FHCs]”). 
223   12 C.F.R. § 225.82(g) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 402–03. 
  45 acquisition, or retain ownership of a company”.
224  This provision seems to give the Board the 
power to grant a U.S. BHC or a foreign bank a status of a limited FHC.  A BHC or foreign bank 
that, as required by the BHCA, at the time of the election is and thereafter remains in compliance 
with the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements, meets the requirements of the BHCA 
and can not be found to “not have the appropriate financial and managerial resources” to engage 
in activities permitted to FHCs.  The BHCA allows an FHC, as long as it meets the legal 
requirements to be an FHC, to engage in all activities permitted to FHCs and gives no discretion 
to the Board to limit these activities.  If an existing FHC fails to comply with the well-capitalized 
and well-managed standards, the BHCA and Regulation Y provide detailed rules as to how the 
Board must deal with this situation.
225  There is no statutory basis for a finding by the Board that 
a well-capitalized and well-managed FHC lacks financial or managerial resources.  The position 
taken by the Board in Regulation Y reflects a very aggressive use of the Board’s general 
supervisory power under the BHCA.
226 
C. 
7. 
                                                
Financial Activities – General 
Authority to Engage in Financial Activities 
Pursuant to Section 4(k)(1), BHCA, a BHC that has effectively elected to be an 
FHC may itself (directly) engage in financial activities and may acquire and retain shares of a 
company engaged in financial activities.
227  This means that an FHC may directly or indirectly 
 
224   Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 403.  The Board’s SR Letter No. 00-1 (SUP) (Feb. 8, 2000) expresses 
a similar concern under the caption “Supervisory Concerns”.  The Supervisory Letter states: 
There may be instances where a U.S. [BHC] or a foreign bank meets 
the statutory requirements to be [an FHC], but its capital strength and 
managerial resources are less than satisfactory on a consolidated basis.  In such a 
situation, the Federal Reserve may have supervisory concerns about the 
consolidated entity although it technically qualifies as [an FHC].  The Federal 
Reserve may, in the exercise of its supervisory authority, restrict or limit the 
conduct of new activities or future acquisitions of [an FHC], or take other 
appropriate action, if the Board finds that the [FHC] does not have the financial 
or managerial resources to conduct the activity or make the acquisition. 
See also the Interim FHC Release, supra note 32, at 3,787, for a discussion of the Board’s concern that 
there may be instances in which a BHC meets the statutory requirements to be an FHC but on a 
consolidated basis is not well capitalized and well managed.  The Board goes beyond its statutory authority 
because the BHCA clearly imposes the well-capitalized and the well-managed requirements only on 
depository institution subsidiaries of a BHC and on foreign banks maintaining a U.S. branch, agency or 
commercial lending company, but does not impose these requirements on a nonbank BHC.  See supra B.3.  
The use of the terms well capitalized and well managed in the Interim Rule Release must be a drafting 
error. 
225   See infra H. 
226   See supra note 221 and infra G.1. 
227   Section 4(k)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Financial activities are the 
activities listed in 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y).  As discussed infra C.3., the Board treats 
financial activities and activities incidental to financial activities synonymously.  Complementary activities 
are not financial activities.  See infra C.7. 
  46 through a subsidiary engage in financial activities or may make minority investments in 
companies engaged in financial activities or make indirectly through a subsidiary such 
investments in a subsidiary or a minority-owned company engaged in financial activities.
228   
The above general statement must be qualified in two respects. 
 (1) Certain financial activities may only be engaged in directly or through a 
subsidiary.  The first qualification to the above general statement is that, in order to 
engage in certain financial activities, i.e., merchant banking activities, underwriting 
activities and insurance company portfolio investments, the FHC must act directly or 
through a subsidiary; it may not make a minority investment in a company engaged in 
such activities.
229  Of course, the FHC may make, directly or indirectly, merchant 
banking investments as such in minority-owned portfolio companies subject to the 
merchant banking conditions,
230 and the FHC may make, directly or indirectly,  
insurance company portfolio investments as such in minority-owned companies,
231 and 
the FHC may underwrite, directly or indirectly, noncontrolling blocks of equity 
securities of issuers.
232 
 
 (2) Exclusivity requirement.  The second qualification to the above general 
statement is that the FHC-controlled or minority-owned company engaged in financial 
activities must be exclusively engaged in financial activities
233 or in activities 
                                                 
228   Section 4(k)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
229   See § 4(k)(4)(H) & (I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) & (I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (permitting an 
FHC to acquire or control “directly or indirectly” shares of another company in the exercise of the 
merchant banking investment authority, underwriting authority or insurance portfolio investment 
authority).  See infra notes 444, 601 & 624 (discussing the directly or indirectly requirement in connection 
with the merchant banking investment authority, the underwriting authority and the insurance company 
portfolio investment authority, respectively). 
230   See § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See infra D.2.  An FHC, 
however, may not make a merchant banking investment in a bank or BHC.  See infra D.2.i. 
231   See § 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 § Supp. V 1999).  See infra D.4. 
232   See § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See infra D.3. 
233   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  For a discussion of financial activities, see infra C.3. & 4.  
No prior notice to or prior approval from the Board is generally required to acquire shares or control of a 
company exclusively engaged in financial activities.  See infra F. for a further discussion of the notice 
requirements. 
It is curious that the rule (that the exclusivity requirement of 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation 
Y) is not violated if the acquired company is also engaged in FHC § 4(c) permissible activities) is only set 
forth in the exception permitting the acquisition of mixed activities companies, 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) and is not repeated in 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) which 
establishes the exclusivity requirement.  A portfolio company engaged in financial activities and in FHC 
§ 4(c) permissible activities is not a mixed activity company but satisfied the exclusivity requirement.  See 
infra note 265. 
  47 “otherwise permissible for the [FHC] under [Section 4(c), BHCA]”
234  [herein FHC 
§ 4(c) permissible activities] or in a combination of financial activities and FHC § 4(c) 
permissible activities.  There are two exceptions to the exclusivity requirement: 
 
 (i) Companies engaged in mixed activities.  If the controlled or minority-
owned company engaged in financial activities is not exclusively but substantially 
engaged in financial activities, the FHC may make the acquisition subject to certain 
conditions.
235  A company that is not exclusively but merely substantially engaged in 
                                                 
234   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
235   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y).  A company is “substantially engaged” in activities 
permissible for an FHC for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(A) (2002) (Regulation Y) if at least 85 
percent of the company’s consolidated total annual gross revenues is derived from, and at least 85 percent 
of the company’s consolidated total assets is attributable to, the conduct of activities that are financial in 
nature, incidental to a financial activity, or FHC § 4(c) permissible activities.  12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(ii) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  As discussed infra C.3., the Board treats financial activities and activities incidental 
to financial activities synonymously.  
Obviously, an FHC may acquire up to 5 percent of any class of voting shares of a company that is not 
substantially engaged in financial activities.  See § 4(c)(6), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994), and 12 
C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y), which clarifies this point.  
If the company in which an FHC invests is a company that is only substantially engaged in financial 
activities, the FHC must comply with the post-transaction notice requirements of 12 C.F.R. § 225.87 (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(B) (2002) (Regulation Y).  It is unclear why this notice 
requirement of 12 C.F.R. 225.87 (2002) (Regulation Y) is repeated in 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(B) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  It is not referred to in 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y), although the post-
transaction notice provisions also apply to the acquisition of companies exclusively engaged in financial 
activities.  (Only prior notice or approval is dispensed with in case of an acquisition of a company 
exclusively engaged in financial activities.)  12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(B) (2002) (Regulation Y) does not 
create a new notice provision; it only refers to the applicable notice provisions.  Although an FHC may 
acquire any percentage of shares or control of a company that is only substantially engaged in financial 
activities, the FHC must give a post-transaction notice under 12 C.F.R. § 225.87 (2002) (Regulation Y) 
only in case such acquisition results in control of the company.  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 
404.   
It is also curious that the dispensation from prior notice to or approval of the Board is only mentioned in 12 
C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1)(2002) (Regulation Y) in connection with the acquisition of a company exclusively 
engaged in financial activities and not repeated in 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(2002) (Regulation Y) in 
connection with the acquisition of a company engaged in limited nonfinancial activities.  Even in the latter 
case, no prior notice to or approval of the Board is necessary, except in the case in which the acquired 
company is engaged in FHC § 4(c) permissible activities and notice is required in connection with the 
§ 4(c), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(1994 & Supp. V 1999) authority.  The absence of an express 
requirement of prior notice in case of the acquisition of a company engaged in limited nonfinancial 
activities and the express reference in 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(B)(2002) (Regulation Y) to post-
transaction notices indicate that no prior notice is required in the case of the acquisition of a company only 
substantially engaged in financial activities.  On the other hand, a § 4(c), BHCA notice may also be 
required if the company is “exclusively” engaged in financial activities pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.85(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) and is also engaged in FHC § 4(c) permissible activities.  See supra 
note 233. 
12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) is not a masterpiece of clear drafting because it tries to cover 
two related but different concepts:  the exclusivity requirement and its exceptions and the exceptions from 
  48 financial activities (a company with mixed activities) must conform, terminate or 
divest within two years of the date of acquisition by the FHC all activities that are not 
financial activities.
236  Thus, an FHC may acquire a company that is engaged in limited 
nonfinancial activities, but the FHC must within two years cause the company to be 
exclusively engaged in financial activities.
237  The same exception applies if the 
controlled or minority-owned company is not exclusively but substantially engaged in 
a combination of financial activities and FHC § 4(c) permissible activities.  The FHC 
must within two years cause the company to be exclusively engaged in financial and in 
FHC § 4(c) permitted activities.
238  Obviously, the FHC need not terminate or divest 
the FHC § 4(c) permitted activities.  The FHC may make the acquisition if the 
company with mixed activities conforms, terminates or divests within two years of the 
date of acquisition by the FHC all activities that are not financial activities or FHC 
§ 4(c) permissible activities.
239  An acquisition of a company engaged in limited 
nonfinancial activities or non-FHC § 4(c) permissible activities would be unauthorized 
if the activities of the company are not conformed to Regulation Y within two years of 
the acquisition.
240  An FHC may not utilize the authority to engage in financial 
activities to make an investment in a company that is less than substantially engaged in 
financial activities or in a combination of financial activities and FHC § 4(c) 
permissible activities.
241 
 
 (ii)  Companies engaged in FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities.  
The FHC may make an investment in a subsidiary or a minority-owned company that 
is not exclusively engaged in financial activities and FHC § 4(c) permissible activities 
if such subsidiary or company is “engaged in activities otherwise permissible for [an 
                                                                                                                                                             
the no-notice requirement.  It would have been clearer if all issues relating to notice had been consolidated 
in 12 C.F.R. § 225.87 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
236   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(C) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
237   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 404–05. 
238   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(A) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Under the definition of substantially engaged in 12 
C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y), FHC § 4(c) permissible activities are counted towards the 
85 percent test.  See supra note 235. 
  The post transaction notice provisions of 12 C.F.R. § 225.87 (2002) (Regulation Y) apply to the acquisition 
of a company exclusively or substantially engaged in FHC § 4(c) permissible activities or a combination of 
financial activities and FHC § 4(c) permissible activities.  See supra note 235.  If an FHC invests in a 
company that is only engaged in FHC § 4(c) permissible activities, e.g., in activities set forth on the laundry 
list of 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2002) (Regulation Y) and makes the acquisition under Section 4(c)(8), BHCA, 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), 12 C.F.R. § 225.85 (2002) (Regulation Y) does not apply.  
The acquired company cannot be engaged in any activities that are not closely related to banking.  See 
Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.10.   
239   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(C) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
240   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 405.  The Final FHC Release, id., states that therefore a 
commitment to terminate impermissible activities is unnecessary. 
241   But see the exception under 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) described below sub (ii). 
  49 FHC] under [Regulation Y]” [herein FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y 
activities] and if such investment is made in accordance with any applicable notice, 
approval or other requirements.
242  Thus, investments in companies engaged in FHC 
otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities are generally permitted; however, any 
notice must be given, any approval must be obtained or any requirement must be met, 
to the extent such notices, approvals and requirements apply. 
Regulation Y does not explain the differences between the categories of financial 
activities, activities that are “otherwise permissible for the [FHC] under section 4(c) [BHCA]”,
243 
i.e., FHC § 4(c) permissible activities, and activities “otherwise permissible for [an FHC] under 
[Regulation Y]”,
244 i.e., FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities.  The three groups of 
activities overlap in their scope and in their legal significance. 
What activities are encompassed by FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y 
activities?  Regulation Y permits BHCs to engage in financial activities,
245 the nonbanking 
activities permitted by Section 4(c), BHCA,
246 complementary activities,
247 and the acquisition 
of banks and BHCs and savings banks.
248  Section 225.85(a)(2), Regulation Y, however, limits 
                                                 
242   12 C.F.R § 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) only 
qualifies 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) and not § 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Thus, the permission of 
12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) to acquire companies that are only substantially engaged in 
financial activities does not apply to companies that are only substantially engaged in FHC otherwise 
permissible Regulation Y activities. 
FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities (other than FHC § 4(c) permissible activities) do not 
contribute to the 85 percent portion of the “substantially engaged” test of 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(ii) 
(2002) (Regulation Y), see supra note 235, for determining whether a company is substantially engaged in 
permissible activities.  It would seem, although 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y) is not 
clear on this point, that FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities that are not FHC § 4(c) 
permissible activities also do not count as part of the 15 percent portion of the “substantially engaged” test, 
see supra note 235.  If applicable notice, approval or other requirements have been met for the acquisition 
of a company engaged in FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities (other than FHC § 4(c) 
permissible activities), the restriction against non-permitted activities does not apply with respect to such 
FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities, and they remain outside the “substantially engaged” 
test.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra text accompanying notes 245–250 for 
a discussion of the scope of FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities. 
243   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
244   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
245   See Subparts I & J of Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2002).  
246  Subpart C of Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2002).  See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
247   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.89 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra C.7.  Such activities are subject to approval.  The 
Board takes the position that a company engaged in complementary activities “generally” could not be 
acquired under 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) using the post-transaction notice procedure, 
because complementary activities are subject to prior approval on a case-by-case basis under § 4(j), BHCA, 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 404 n.9. 
248  See for banks and BHCs Subpart B of Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2002), and for savings banks 12 
C.F.R. § 225.85(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  An FHC may also engage in certain grandfathered activities.  
  50 the range of FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities by stating that they must be “in 
addition to the activities listed in § 225.86”.
249  Thus, it follows that financial activities are not 
included in the category of FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities.  Consequently, 
companies engaged in FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities that may be acquired 
pursuant to Section 225.85(a)(2), Regulation Y are companies engaged in FHC § 4(c) 
permissible activities or complementary activities, and U.S. banks, BHCs and savings banks.
250 
As stated above,
251 the FHC controlled or minority-owned company may be 
engaged, in addition to financial activities, FHC § 4(c) permissible activities and 15% FHC 
non-permissible activities, in FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities in accordance 
with notice, approval or other requirements.  These acquisitions constitute no danger for the FHC 
because the Board is involved in such acquisitions.  Section 225.85(a)(2), Regulation Y
252 does 
not establish an investment authority but simply refers to investment authorities contained in 
other provisions of the BHCA or Regulation Y.  Therefore, the omission from Section 
225.85(a)(2), Regulation Y of a reference to the Regulation K investment
253 authorities is of no 
consequence.  For the same reason, it is consistent that FHC § 4(c) permissible activities are 
covered as a subgroup of FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities by 
Section 225.85(a)(2), Regulation Y.  Section 225.85(a)(2), Regulation Y simply provides that if 
notice under Regulation Y is required before engaging in an FHC § 4(c) permissible activity, 
such notice must be obtained and thereafter an FHC may engage in or acquire shares of a 
company engaged in such activities.  Section 225.85(a)(2), Regulation Y is intended to say that if 
an FHC engages in activities not on the basis of the FHC authority set forth in Section 4(k), 
BHCA
254 but on the basis of authorities that are also available to BHCs that are not FHCs, notice 
and approval provisions relating to such authorities remain in effect.
255  Bluntly stated, Section 
225.85(a)(2), Regulation Y is a superfluous provision. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Section 4(n), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  However, grandfathered activities are 
not covered by Regulation Y and a grandfathered company cannot be acquired by an FHC.  See infra E.2. 
249   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
250   Complementary activities are permitted by § 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), 
and the acquisition of banks and BHCs is governed by § 3, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994 & Supp. V 
1999). 
251   See supra C.1. sub (2)(ii). 
252   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
253   It is curious that investments by BHCs outside the United States, which are covered by 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.8 
& 211.10 (2002) (Regulation K), are not included in the FHC otherwise permissible activities of 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
254   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
255   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) has the function of a cross-reference, but it is an 
incomplete cross-reference.   
  51 What activities are encompassed by FHC § 4(c) permissible activities?  As stated 
above, such activities are all activities permissible for an FHC under Section 4(c), BHCA.
256  
The relationship between the categories of financial activities and FHC § 4(c) permissible 
activities requires further analysis.  The Board has stated that the various sections of the BHCA 
that authorize activities for BHCs and FHCs, most notably Sections 4(c)(8), 4(c)(9), 4(c)(13) and 
4(k), BHCA,
257 remain separate sources of authority under which an FHC may engage in various 
activities.
258  If an FHC gives notice to the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank that it wishes to 
engage in an activity permitted under Section 4(c)(8), BHCA and set forth on the laundry list of 
Section 225.28, Regulation Y,
259 the question arises whether this Section 225.28, Regulation Y 
activity is an “activity listed in § 225.86”
260 (a financial activity) or an FHC § 4(c) permissible 
activity. 
The Section 225.28, Regulation Y activities are referred to in Section 225.86(a), 
Regulation Y.
261  Since the Board thinks in terms of authorities rather than in terms of actual 
activities,
262 it can be expected that the Board will not consider activities that are set forth on the 
laundry list of Section 225.28, Regulation Y and are applied for under the authority of Section 
4(c)(8), BHCA (and not exercised under the authority of Section 4(k), BHCA) as financial 
activities, i.e., “activities listed in § 225.86”,
263 even though such activities are also referred to in 
Section 225.86, Regulation Y.  This interpretation also makes substantive sense, because an FHC 
may engage in Section 225.86, Regulation Y activities without prior notice or approval, but it 
may engage in Section 225.28, Regulation Y activities, at least in most cases, only upon notice
264 
if those activities are exercised under the authority of Section 4(c)(8), BHCA. 
The Section 225.28, Regulation Y activities that are exercised under the authority 
of Section 4(c)(8), BHCA rather than the authority of Section 4(k), BHCA are FHC § 4(c) 
permissible activities and are counted together with financial activities in the determination of 
whether or not a company acquired by an FHC is exclusively or substantially engaged in 
                                                 
256   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Complementary activities and the acquisition of banks and 
BHCs are not permitted by § 4(c), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) and therefore are 
not FHC § 4(c) permissible activities.  Financial activities are permitted by § 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and are not FHC § 4(c) permissible activities. 
257   12 U.S.C. § 1483(c)(8), (c)(9), (c)(13) & (k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
258   See infra C.8. 
259   12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.10 D for a discussion of the 
notice procedures under § 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
260   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) & (2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
261   12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  
262  See  infra  C.8. 
263   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) & (2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
264   See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.10 D. 
  52 financial activities and FHC § 4(c) permissible activities.
265  The Section 225.28, Regulation Y 
activities that are exercised under the authority of Section 4(c)(8), BHCA rather than under the 
authority of Section 4(k), BHCA are also FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities 
because, as stated above, the category FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y activities 
includes FHC § 4(c) permissible activities.  Section 225.28, Regulation Y activities that are 
exercised under the authority of Section 4(c)(8), BHC are permissible under Regulation Y and 
are not “activities listed in § 225.86”.  The admonition of Section 225.85(a)(2), Regulation Y
266 
that such activities can only be exercised in accordance with applicable notice requirements 
applies to such Section 225.28, Regulation Y activities.  
The discussion relating to Section 225.28, Regulation Y activities that are 
exercised under the authority of Section 4(c)(8), BHCA equally applies to Section 211.10, 
Regulation K
267 activities that are exercised by BHCs under the authority of Section 4(c)(13), 
BHCA
268 and not under the authority of Section 4(k), BHCA.
269  Such activities are FHC § 4(c) 
permissible activities.  Shares acquired in satisfaction of debt previously contracted pursuant to 
Section 4(c)(2), BHCA may serve as a further example for an FHC § 4(c) permissible activity.
270   
An FHC may make an investment in a company that is not only engaged in 
financial activities but also in FHC § 4(c) permissible activities without violating the exclusivity 
requirement.
271 
The above discussion is illustrated by the following diagrams: 
                                                 
265   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y).  It is curious that 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a) is drafted as if 
FHC § 4(c) permissible activities can only contribute to a company that is substantially engaged in 
financial activities (12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(A) (2002) (Regulation Y)) but not to a company that is 
exclusively engaged in financial activities (12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y)).  The case of a 
company, all of whose activities are either financial activities or FHC § 4(c) permissible activities, is not 
specifically addressed in 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a) (2002) (Regulation Y), but this does not create problems.  
An FHC may invest in such company if applicable notice requirements have been complied with (12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y)); no divestiture is required (12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(3)(i)(A) & (C) 
(2002) (Regulation Y)).  See supra note 233. 
266   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
267   12 C.F.R. §§ 211.8 & 211.10 (2002) (Regulation K).  A BHC is an investor in the meaning of 12 C.F.R. 
§ 211.8(c) (2002) (Regulation K).  12 C.F.R. § 211.2(o) (2002) (Regulation K).   
268   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13) (1994). 
269   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
270   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
271   See supra note 265. 
  53 Diagram 6 
Categories Used in Section 225.85, Regulation Y 
Financial activities:  FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y 
activities: 
 
FHC § 4(c) permissible activities 
 
Complementary activities  Set forth on the laundry list of 
12 C.F.R. § 225.86 
 
U.S. bank and BHC acquisitions 
and savings bank acquisitions 
 
 
Diagram 7 
Acquisition of Company Exclusively or Substantially Engaged in Financial Activities 
(a)  Companies Exclusively Engaged in Financial Activities 
 
financial activities 
financial activities 
 
FHC § 4(c) permissible activities 
 
(b)  Companies Substantially Engaged in Financial Activities 
 
financial activities 
financial activities 
 
FHC § 4(c) permissible activities 
15% FHC non-permissible 
activities 
 
15% FHC non-permissible 
activities 
 
  54 The rules applicable to FHCs are not limited to activities in the United States.  An 
FHC may conduct any financial activities at any location in the United States or at any location 
outside the United States, subject, of course, to the laws of the jurisdiction in which the activity 
is conducted.
272 
8. 
                                                
Acquiring Banks, Insurance Companies and Securities Firms 
The BHCA permits an FHC to own an insurance company or insurance broker or 
agent subsidiary, a bank, a broker-dealer or an investment adviser.  The BHCA, however, does 
not modify the provisions of various statutes that subject the acquisition of control of such 
companies to regulatory approvals or other requirements.  Thus, the acquisition of a U.S. bank or 
BHC requires Board approval under Section 3, BHCA
273 and the acquisition of a foreign bank 
requires compliance with Sections 211.8 & 211.9, Regulation K.
274   
If an FHC acquires a licensed broker-dealer, the broker-dealer is required to 
obtain approval for the acquisition from the self-regulatory organization that is its designated 
examining authority, for example, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) or the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”).
275  If an FHC acquires an investment adviser, 
 
272   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(b) (2002) (Regulation Y); Board release accompanying interim rules §§ 225.85–225.89, 
65 Fed. Reg. 14,433–40, at 14,434 (Mar. 17, 2000) (Regulation Y, Docket No. R-1062) [herein Interim 
Financial Activities Release].  (The Board release accompanying the final rules 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.85–
225.89 (2002) (Regulation Y) is the Final FHC Release, supra note 32.)  The territorial limitations of 12 
C.F.R. §§ 211.8 & 211.10 (2002) (Regulation K) relating to investments by BHC outside the United States 
do not apply to FHCs.  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 406 n.14.  The territorial restrictions of 12 
C.F.R. § 211.8(a) (2002) (Regulation K), however, continue to apply to BHCs that have not elected to be 
FHCs.  Section 4(k)(4)(G) BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(4)(G) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), is confusing because 
it permits engaging in 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.8 & 211.10 (2002) (Regulation K) (previously 12 C.F.R. § 211.5) 
activities “in the United States”.  None of the other financial activities pre-approved by § 4(k)(4), BHCA, 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), has the “in the United States” reference, and the Board has 
not read it as a limitation.  Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 406 n.14.  The authority to engage in 
insurance activities, § 4(k)(4)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), permits the 
activity “in any state” and the insurance portfolio investment authority, § 4(k)(4)(I)(iii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(I)(iii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), refers to state law.  Again, these references must not be read, 
and the Board did not read such references, as limiting the authority to the United States.  In all the above 
cases, the references to the United States or the states indicated that Congress intended to overcome the 
territorial restrictions of prior law rather than to establish new territorial limitations. 
273   12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra note 250.  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 
405. 
274   12 C.F.R. §§ 211.8 & 211.9 (2002) (Regulation K).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 405.  See 
also infra D.2.i (discussing whether an FHC in the exercise of its merchant banking investment authority 
may invest in a bank or BHC). 
275   See NYSE Manual, Rule 312(e) in connection with Rule 311(b)(2);  NASD Manual, Rule 1017(a).  
Self-regulatory organizations are empowered by § 15, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994), to issue rules within their assigned fields which are subject to SEC approval.  
Section 19,  Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1994). 
  55 the FHC must be registered as investment adviser.  In addition, in connection with the 
acquisition of an investment adviser it is necessary to obtain its customers’ consents.
276 
When entering into the insurance business in a state of the United States, a person 
must comply with the applicable state insurance law.  Any person that desires to engage in the 
business of insurance in a state, whether as principal or agent, must obtain a license and is 
subject to regulation under applicable state law.
 277  Equally, “any proposed acquisition of, or a 
change or continuation of control of, an insurer” domiciled in a state is subject to approval or 
disapproval by the state in which the insurer is domiciled.
278  This approval power also applies to 
affiliations between depository institutions, or any affiliate thereof (which includes an FHC of a 
depository institution), and any insurer.
279  However, in the case of such affiliations the ability of 
the insurance commissioner of the state of domicile to approve or disapprove an acquisition of 
control is limited to a 60-day window preceding the effective date of the acquisition or change or 
continuation of control.
280  During that 60-day period the insurance commissioner of the state of 
domicile of the insurer may require the acquiror to maintain or restore the insurer’s capital up to 
the amount required by the state’s capital regulations.
281 
                                                 
276  Section 203(g), Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(g) (1994), provides that a successor to 
the business of a registered investment adviser must file an application for registration within 30 days of the 
acquisition.  This applies also to the acquisition of a registered investment adviser.  Furthermore, an 
investment adviser may only enter into investment advisory contracts that provide that no assignment of the 
contract may be made by the investment adviser without the consent of the customer.  Section 205(a)(2), 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(2) (1994).  Assignment is defined in Section 
202(a)(1), Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1) (1994), to include the “transfer of a 
controlling block of the assignor’s outstanding voting securities by a security holder of the assignor”. 
277   15 U.S.C. § 6701(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (1994 
& Supp. V 1999), which requires federal deference in most cases to state regulation of insurance activities, 
remains in force.  15 U.S.C. § 6701(a) & (d)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
provides that “no Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by 
any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to 
the business of insurance”.  15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). 
  Generally speaking, an FHC that wishes to acquire an insurance underwriter, known under most state laws 
as an insurance company, will be required to file change in control forms in the state of domicile of the 
target and obtain approval by the superintendent.  See, e.g., § 1506(a), N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney 2000).  A 
party who will sell insurance and receive commissions must obtain an insurance agent’s license.  See, e.g., 
§ 2102, N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney 2000).  Thus, the sale of insurance typically requires corporate licensing 
and individual agent licensing both in the resident state and in all nonresident states.  The GLBA preserves 
state insurance licensing schemes for insurance agents, but includes provisions requiring uniform and 
reciprocal licensing procedures in the states.  15 U.S.C. §§ 6751–6766 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
278   15 U.S.C. § 6701(c)(2)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
279   15 U.S.C. § 6701(c)(2)(A)(1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
280   15 U.S.C. § 6701(c)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Furthermore, the insurance commissioner of any state 
where the insurer is engaged in the business of insurance and regulated as an insurer may collect 
information during the 60-day period.  15 U.S.C. § 6701(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
281   15 U.S.C. § 6701(c)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  56 The state power over licensing and approval of acquisitions of insurance 
companies or insurance agents is limited, in that, generally speaking, a state may not restrict or 
discriminate against a depository institution or an affiliate thereof (which includes an FHC of a 
depository institution).  No state may prevent or restrict a depository institution, or an affiliate 
thereof, from being affiliated, directly or indirectly, or associated with any person, as authorized 
or permitted by the GLBA or any other provision of federal law.
282 
The actions by a state in connection with the approval or disapproval and the 
collection of information in connection with an acquisition of, or change or continuation of 
control of, an insurer must not have the effect of discriminating, intentionally or unintentionally, 
against a depository institution or an affiliate thereof, or against any other person based upon an 
association of any such person with a depository institution.
283  Thus, state anti-affiliation laws 
are federally preempted.  Another provision protects depository institutions and FHCs 
controlling depository institutions against state actions that may prevent or restrict depository 
institutions or their affiliates from engaging, directly or indirectly, either by themselves or in 
conjunction with an affiliate or any other person, in any activity authorized or permitted under 
the GLBA.
284  Finally, a state may not regulate insurance activities authorized by the GLBA or 
other federal law of a depository institution or affiliate thereof in a manner that discriminates 
against the depository institution or affiliate.
285 
                                                 
282   15 U.S.C. § 6701(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The prohibited state action may be a statute, a regulation, 
an order, an interpretation or any other action.  Id.  The term associated as used in 15 U.S.C. § 6701(c)(1) is 
not defined.  In its context the term would seem to cover joint ventures, contractual and other relationships 
between individuals, companies and other persons engaged in financial or other activities allowed under the 
GLBA or other federal law.  See Neal R. Pandozzi, Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts:  Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
and the Constitutionality of Federal Financial Privacy Legislation, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 163, 178. 
283   15 U.S.C. § 6701(c)(2)(A) & (C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
284   15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The state action may be a statute, a regulation, an order, 
an interpretation or any other action. 
  Special rules apply to state action dealing with insurance sales, solicitation and cross-marketing [herein 
state insurance sales laws].  State insurance sales laws may not prevent or significantly interfere with 
insurance sales, solicitation or cross-marketing activities of depository institutions and their affiliates.  Such 
preventing or significantly interfering state insurance sales laws are preempted.  15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999) (expressly incorporating the legal standards for preemption set forth in Barnett 
Bank of Marion County N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)).  State insurance sales laws are also 
preempted if they are discriminatory under the four-pronged test of 15 U.S.C. § 6701(e) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999).  However, the § 6701(e) discrimination test does not apply to any state insurance sales law enacted 
before Sept. 3, 1998 or to state insurance sales laws falling within one of the 13 safe harbors of 15 U.S.C. § 
6701(d)(2)(B).  15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(C).  See Pandozzi, supra note 282, at 179–81. 
  15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) is a federal act that “specifically relates to the business of insurance”.  15 U.S.C.  
§ 1012(b) (1994).  Thus, in accordance with Barnett Bank, supra, and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, supra 
note 277, state law cannot override, restrict or significantly interfere with 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2).  See 
Pandozzi, supra note 282, at 179. 
285   15 U.S.C. § 6701(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Discrimination must be determined under a four-pronged 
test.  The State action may be a statute, or regulation, an order, an interpretation or any other action. 
  57 The antidiscrimination provisions discussed above,
286 protecting depository 
institutions engaging or desiring to engage directly, indirectly or through affiliates in insurance 
activities, also protect foreign banks maintaining a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending 
company and companies controlling such banks.  Depository institution, for purposes of the 
antidiscrimination provisions, includes not only depository institutions under Section 3, FDIA
287 
but also foreign banks that maintain a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the 
United States.
288  Since the provisions protecting the insurance business of depository institutions 
against state action generally also refer to affiliates of the depository institutions,
 289 affiliates of 
such foreign banks are also protected. 
The provisions discussed above have the purpose of preventing the states from 
using their regulatory power over insurance companies in a discriminatory manner against FHCs 
that wish to acquire or establish insurance companies.  The reverse is also true:  the states may 
not, by law, regulation, order, interpretation or otherwise, prevent or significantly interfere with 
the ability of any insurer or any affiliate of an insurer to become an FHC or to acquire control of 
a depository institution
290 or limit the amount of an insurer’s assets that may be invested in the 
voting securities of a depository institution or any company which controls such institution.
291  
The state of an insurer’s domicile may, however, by law limit the amount of the insurer’s assets 
that may be invested in the voting securities of a depository institution or a company controlling 
such depository institution to an amount that is not less than 5 percent of the insurer’s admitted 
assets.
292 
Mutual insurance companies can affiliate with banks only by buying a bank.
293 
                                                                                                                                                             
  See also 12 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (to avoid federal preemption, state laws that 
govern insurance activities (other than state insurance sales laws) must meet a four-part test, one part being 
that they must be non-discriminatory under 15 U.S.C. § 6701(e)). 
286   15 U.S.C. § 6701 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra text accompanying notes 282–285. 
287   12 U.S.C. § 1813 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
288   15 U.S.C. § 6701(g)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
289   Affiliate is defined for purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) in 15 U.S.C. § 6701(g)(1) as 
“any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, another company.” 
290   15 U.S.C. § 6715(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
291   15 U.S.C. § 6715(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
292   15 U.S.C. § 6715(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See, e.g., § 1301, N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney 2000) for 
definitions of admitted assets. 
293   15 U.S.C. § 6715(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  15 U.S.C. § 6715(3) prohibits the states from preventing or 
significantly interfering with the demutualization of mutual insurers except for the state of domicile of the 
insurer.  See Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr., Ivan E. Mattei & Thomas M. Kelly, Financial Services Reform: The 
New Business of Banking and Insurance under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 1232 PLI/Corp. 121, at 148–50 for a 
discussion of affiliations with mutual insurers.  See 15 U.S.C. § 6701(c)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (a 
state may not restrict a change in the ownership of stock of a holding company formed to control an insurer 
  58 9. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Types of Financial Activities – Overview 
The BHCA distinguishes between financial activities predetermined by and set 
forth in the BHCA,
294 additional financial activities determined by the Board in conjunction with 
the Secretary of the Treasury,
295 pre-approved additional financial activities enumerated in the 
BHCA but still requiring action by the Board (in conjunction with the Secretary of the 
Treasury),
296activities incidental to financial activities as determined by the Board in conjunction 
with the Secretary of the Treasury,
297 and activities determined by the Board to be 
complementary to financial activities.
298  Complementary activities are nonfinancial activities 
that may be engaged in by FHCs.  The Board in Regulation Y uses the term financial activities to 
include financial activities predetermined by and set forth in the BHCA, additional financial 
activities, and pre-approved additional financial activities.
299  All financial activities are listed or 
referred to in Section 225.86, Regulation Y.
300  Complementary activities are subject to different 
 
after conversion of a mutual to a stock form in a manner discriminating against depository institutions or 
their affiliates). 
294   Section 4(k)(4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), contains a list of statutorily 
predetermined financial activities.  Since the activities listed in § 4(k)(4), BHCA “shall be considered to be 
financial in nature”, the Board has no discretion with respect to the predetermined listed activities.  It 
cannot decrease, limit or restrict such powers.  The congressional intent, as expressed in a colloquy 
between Senator Dodd and Senator Gramm, is that the financial activities of § 4(k)(4), BHCA are 
permissible upon the effective date of the GLBA without further action by the regulators.  145 CONG. REC. 
S13,901 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999).  The conferees have recognized, however, that “refinements in 
rulemaking may be necessary and desirable going forward.”  Id. An identical statement was made by 
Representative Leach, 145 CONG. REC. H11,529 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999). 
295   Section 4(k)(1)(A) & (2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A) & (2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See infra C.5. 
for a discussion of additional financial activities. 
296   Section 4(k)(5), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5) (1994 Supp. V 1999).  See infra  C.6. for a discussion of 
pre-approved additional financial activities. 
297   Section 4(k)(1)(A) & (2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A) & (2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
298   Section 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See infra C.7. for a 
discussion of complementary activities. 
299   Financial activities predetermined by and set forth in the BHCA:  12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a), (b) & (c) (2002) 
(Regulation Y); additional financial activities: 12 C.F.R. § 225.88 (2002) (Regulation Y) (procedure for 
determination of an activity as additional financial activity), 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)(1) (2002) (Regulation 
Y) (acting as finder), see infra note 323, and proposed § 225.86(d)(2) & (3), Regulation Y (to be codified 
as 12 C.F.R  § 225.86(d)(2) & (3) (2002) (Regulation Y)) (real estate brokerage and real estate 
management determined to be additional financial activities), see infra notes 324 & 325; pre-approved 
additional financial activities:  interim rule 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e) (2002) (Regulation Y) (procedure for 
determination of a pre-approved financial activity as additional financial activity).  See Final FHC Release, 
supra note 32, at 404 n.7. 
300   12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  59 rules than financial activities and, not being financial activities, are not listed in Section 225.86, 
Regulation Y.
301 
Although Section 4(k)(1)(A), BHCA
302 clearly makes a distinction between 
financial activities and activities incidental to financial activities and although the term incidental 
has a distinct meaning in U.S. banking law,
303 the Board in Regulation Y disregards any 
distinction between the two categories of activities and labels all financial activities as “financial 
in nature or incidental to a financial activity”.
304  Thus, the Board treats both terms as 
synonymous.  Since plain English indicates that an activity can be incidental to another activity 
of a certain type without belonging to that type, the Board’s interpretation of Section 4(k)(1)(A), 
BHCA limits the range of activities permitted to be engaged in by FHCs.
305 
An FHC or other interested party may request an advisory opinion from the Board 
about whether a specific proposed activity falls within the scope of an activity listed in Section 
225.86, Regulation Y
306 as financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity.
307 
10. 
                                                
Laundry List of Financial Activities – Section 225.86, Regulation Y 
In Section 225.86, Regulation Y,
308 the Board sets forth or refers to (1) all 
financial activities that are predetermined as financial activities by and set forth in the BHCA
309 
and (2) all additional financial activities that the Board and the Secretary of the Treasury have 
 
301   Section 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.89 (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  See infra C.7. for a discussion of complementary activities. 
302   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
303   See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.13 B.3., at 834–43 (discussing the use of the term incidental in various U.S. 
banking laws and regulations). 
304   See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.86 (introductory clause), 225.88(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  For example, in the 
Board release accompanying 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)(1), 65 Fed. Reg. 80,735–41 (Dec. 22, 2000), the Board 
did not distinguish whether the activity of acting as a finder that the Board added to the laundry list in 12 
C.F.R. § 225.86(d)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) as additional financial activity is a financial activity or an 
incidental activity.  See also Board release accompanying proposed 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)(1), 65 Fed. Reg. 
47,696–701 (Aug. 3, 2000). 
305   Incidental to an activity means dependent on, or appertaining to, another thing (the activity); directly and 
immediately pertinent to, or involved in, something else, though not an essential part of it.  WEBSTER’S 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1933). 
306   12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
307   12 C.F.R. § 225.88(e) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Board will provide an advisory opinion within 45 
calendar days from receiving a complete written request for an advisory opinion.  12 C.F.R. § 225.88(e)(2) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  As to the required contents of the written request, see 12 C.F.R. § 225.88(e)(1) 
(2002) (Regulation Y). 
308   12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
309   Section 4(k)(4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  60 determined to be financial in nature.
310  The Board will add to Section 225.86, Regulation Y all 
pre-approved additional financial activities that the Board and the Secretary of the Treasury will 
in the future determine to be financial activities.
311  The following is a summary of the financial 
activities laundry list: 
Financial Activities Predetermined by the BHCA 
 lending business:  (i) lending, exchanging, transferring or safeguarding 
money, (ii) lending, exchanging, transferring or safeguarding securities 
and (iii) investing monies for others;
312 
 insurance:  insurance business as principal, broker or agent, in connection 
with life, accident and health, property and casualty, liability, disability 
insurance and issuing annuities;
313 
 advisory services:  providing financial, investment or economic advisory 
services, including advising investment companies, as defined in 
Section 3, Investment Company Act of 1940;
314 
                                                 
310   See supra C.3. and infra C.5. 
311   See supra C. 3. and infra C.6. 
312   Section 4(k)(4)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(c) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  Money lending is also permitted by 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation 
Y); safeguarding money is also permitted to some extent by 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
(safe deposit business). 
313   Section 4(k)(4)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“insuring, guaranteeing, or 
indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability, or death, or providing and issuing annuities”); 
12 C.F.R. § 225.86(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Insurance includes reinsurance.  See Final FHC Release, 
supra note 32, at 405; Interim Financial Activities Release, supra note 272, at 14,435.  See infra D.1. for a 
discussion of the authority to engage in insurance activities and the investment authority related thereto and 
D.4. for a discussion of the investment authority related thereto. 
  Before the adoption of the GLBA, a BHC could, and it may continue to, (i) underwrite or sell as agent 
accident, health, life and unemployment insurance, that is related to credit extended by the BHC or its 
subsidiaries, 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(11)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y), (ii) sell as agent property insurance that is 
related to small credits issued by the BHC’s finance company subsidiary, 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(c)(11)(ii) 
(2002) (Regulation Y), and (iii) perform insurance agency activities from a place with a population of 
5,000 or less (or which has otherwise inadequate insurance facilities, as determined by the Board) if the 
BHC or any of its subsidiaries has a lending office in such small town (insurance can be sold to customers 
nationwide from such location, regardless of the customer’s location), 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(11)(iii) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994). 
314   Section 4(k)(4)(C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(c) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  These activities are also already permitted in a somewhat more limited form by 12 
C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(6) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See § 3, Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 80a-3 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  61  securitization:  issuing and selling instruments representing interests in 
pools of assets permissible for a bank to hold directly;
315 
 securities activities:  securities underwriting, dealing or market making;
316 
 activities closely related to banking:  Section 4(c)(8), BHCA activities, 
i.e., the same activities that are “closely related to banking” in which a 
BHCA that has not elected FHC status may engage in after the adoption of 
the GLBA;
317 
                                                 
315   Section 4(k)(4)(D), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(D) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(c) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  For pre-GLBA law, see Securities Industry Association v. Security Pacific N.A., 
885 F.2d 1034, 1047 (2d Cir. 1989) (national bank’s sale of mortgage pass-through certificates is within the 
business of banking).   
316   Section 4(k)(4)(E) & (H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) & (H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 
225.86(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Dealer is defined in § 3(a)(5)(A), Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See infra D.1. for a discussion of the authority to engage in 
the activities of underwriting and dealing and the investment authority related thereto and D.3. for a 
discussion of the investment authority related thereto. 
317   Section 4(k)(4)(F), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(F) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), referring to § 4(c)(8), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  
Section 4(k)(4)(F), BHCA refers to activities that the Board has determined, by order or regulation that is in 
effect on the date of enactment of the GLBA (Nov. 12, 1999) [§ 4(c)(8), BHCA refers to Nov. 11, 1999], to 
be closely related to banking.  Thus, the § 4(c)(8), BHCA activities are frozen.  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 
10.10 C.   
The § 4(c)(8), BHCA activities determined by Board regulation to be closely relating to banking are listed 
on the laundry list of 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2002) (Regulation Y) that is referred to in 12 C.F.R. § 
225.86(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).   
Activities that the Board had determined by an order that was in effect on Nov. 12, 1999 to be closely 
related to banking and that therefore may be engaged in by FHCs are set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a)(2) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  They are:  (i) providing administrative and other services to mutual funds; (ii) 
owning shares of a securities exchange; (iii) acting as a certification authority for digital signatures and 
authenticating the identity of persons conducting financial and nonfinancial transactions; (iv) providing 
employment histories to third parties for use in making credit decisions and to depository institutions and 
their affiliates for use in the ordinary course of business; (v) check cashing and wire transmission services; 
(vi) in connection with the offering of banking services, providing notary public services, selling postage 
stamps and postage-paid envelopes, providing vehicle registration services, and selling public 
transportation tickets and tokens; and (vii) real estate title abstracting. 
FHCs that engage in any activity pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) must conduct 
the activity in accordance with the terms of and conditions contained in 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2002) 
(Regulation Y), and FHCs that engage in any activity pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) must conduct the activity in accordance with the Board orders authorizing the activity 
which are referenced in 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Sections 4(c)(8) & 4(k)(4)(F), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(8) & 1843(k)(4)(F) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The Board may modify such 
terms and conditions.  See §§ 4(c)(8) & 4(k)(4)(F), BHCA and 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) (each containing the clause “unless modified by the Board”).  See generally Final FHC 
Release, supra note 32, at 405.  For example, the Board has proposed to modify 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(14) 
(data processing) by increasing from 30 to 49 percent the amount of revenues that may be derived from 
  62  management consulting:  providing management consulting services, 
including to any person with respect to nonfinancial matters, as long as the 
management consulting services are advisory and do not allow the FHC to 
control the person to which the services are provided;
318  
 travel agency business:  operating a travel agency in connection with 
financial services offered by the FHC to others;
319 
                                                                                                                                                             
nonfinancial data processing.  The Board proposes this change as a change of the conditions that govern the 
conduct of financial data processing activities.  Complementary Activities Release, infra note 362, at 
80,385; proposed § 225.28(b)(14), Regulation Y, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,387–88 (Dec. 21, 2000). 
318  Section 4(k)(4)(G), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(G) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), permits FHCs to engage in 
activities (inside or outside the United States) in which a BHC may engage in outside the United States 
pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (2001) (Regulation K), as in effect on Nov. 11, 1999 (the day before the 
enactment of the GLBA).  Thus, the 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (2001) (Regulation K) activities are frozen.  12 
C.F.R. § 211.5 (2001) (Regulation K) was promulgated under Section 4(c)(13), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(c)(13) (1994).  The GLBA does not give the Board the power to modify the terms and conditions of 
the § 211.5, Regulation K laundry list activities as it does with respect to the laundry list activities of 12 
C.F.R. § 225.28 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See §§ 4(c)(8) & 4(k)(4)(F), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(8) & 
1843(k)(4)(F) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.10 C.  12 C.F.R. § 225.86(b) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) states that the 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (2001) (Regulation K) activities are financial activities 
“subject to the terms and conditions in part 211 [Regulation K] and Board interpretations in effect on [Nov. 
11, 1999] regarding the scope and conduct of the activity”.  However, the notice procedures of Regulation 
K do not apply to activities that are conducted under § 4(k)(4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999).  Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 405 n.12. 
  Most activities set forth in the 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (2001) (Regulation K) laundry list have been either 
authorized for FHCs in a broader form by the BHCA or are also contained in the laundry list of 12 C.F.R. § 
225.28 (2002) (Regulation Y) that is based on Section 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999).  The remaining activities of the § 211.5, Regulation K laundry list are enumerated in 12 
C.F.R. § 225.86(b) (2002) (Regulation Y), and are set forth in this and the following two bullet points.  See 
Interim Financial Activities Release, supra note 272, at 14,435.  Because 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(b) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) sets forth the relevant activities that were contained on November 11, 1999 in § 211.5, 
Regulation K (12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (2001) (Regulation K)), it does not matter that the 2002 version of 
Regulation K modifies the activities in which a BHC may engage outside the United States.  See 12 C.F.R 
§ 211.10 (2002) (Regulation K). 
The Board interprets § 4(k)(4)(G), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(G) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), as 
permitting FHCs to engage in the activities that are listed in 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d) (2001) (Regulation K) as 
interpreted by the Board, but not in activities that the Board has approved in individual orders under 
§ 4(c)(13), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13) (1994).  Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 405 n.11; 
Interim Financial Activities Release, supra note 272, at 14,435. 
The management consulting services referred to in this bullet point are permitted by 12 C.F.R. § 
225.86(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) and were already permitted to be engaged in outside the United States 
by 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(12) (2001) (Regulation K). 
319  See supra note 318.  Travel agency activities are permitted by 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation 
Y) and were already permitted to be engaged in outside the United States by 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(15) 
(2001) (Regulation K).  The Board’s legal staff has indicated that the “in connection with financial 
services” requirement has a low threshold.  Travel agency business is effectively prohibited to foreign 
banks that operate a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States but are not 
FHCs.  See 12 C.F.R. § 211.23(f)(5)(iii)(B)(2) (2002) (Regulation K). 
  63  mutual funds:  organizing, sponsoring and managing a mutual fund, so 
long as (i) the fund does not exercise managerial control over the entities 
in which the fund invests, and (ii) the FHC reduces its ownership in the 
fund, if any, to less than 25 percent of the equity of the fund within one 
year of sponsoring the fund or such additional period as the Board 
permits;
320 
 owning securities as part of merchant banking investments:  owning 
securities as part of bona fide underwriting or merchant or investment 
banking activities;
321 and 
 owning securities as part of insurance company portfolio investments:  
owning securities in connection with investments made in the ordinary 
course of insurance business.
322 
Additional Financial Activities Determined by the Board and the Secretary of the 
Treasury 
 acting as finder, i.e., bringing together one or more buyers and sellers of 
any product or service for transactions that the parties themselves 
negotiate and consummate;
323 
 real estate brokerage (proposed);
324 and 
 real estate management (proposed).
325 
                                                 
320  See supra note 318.  Fund activities are permitted by 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) and 
were already permitted to be engaged in outside the United States by 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(11) (2001) 
(Regulation K). 
321  Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(c) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra D.1. & 2. for a discussion of this authority. 
322  Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(c) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  See infra D.1. & 4. for a discussion of this authority. 
323   12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Board releases accompanying the proposed rule 
§ 225.86(d)(1), 65 Fed. Reg. 47,696–701 (Aug. 3, 2000) (Regulation Y, Docket No. R-1078) and the final 
rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,735–41 (Dec. 22, 2000) (Regulation Y, Docket No. R-1078).  See also the technical 
amendments to 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d) & (e) (Regulation Y), 66 Fed. Reg. 19,081–82 (Apr. 13, 2001) 
(Regulation Y, Docket Nos. R-1078 and R-1094).  See Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie, Jr., The 
Impact of Technology on Banking:  The Effect and Implications of “Deconstruction” of Banking Functions, 
5 N.C. BANKING INST. 135, 150–56 (2001), for a discussion of the activity of banks acting as finders. 
324   Proposed § 225.86(d)(2), Regulation Y, 66 Fed. Reg. 313 (Jan. 3, 2001) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. § 
225.86(d)(2) (Regulation Y)).  See Board release accompanying the proposed rule § 225.86(d)(2), 66 Fed. 
Reg. 307–14, at 308-11 (Jan. 3, 2001) (Regulation Y, Docket No. R-1091).  The final rule has not been 
issued as of the date hereof. 
  64 Pre-approved Additional Financial Activities Determined by the Board and 
the Secretary of the Treasury 
   
 None so far. 
It must be emphasized that the authorities to engage in financial activities of 
(i) making merchant banking investments, (ii) making insurance company portfolio investments 
and (iii) underwriting, dealing and market-making differ from all other financial activities in that 
these three authorities permit the acquisition and ownership of companies that are not engaged in 
financial activities. 
11. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Determination of Activities as Additional Financial Activities 
Although the BHCA may well have intended a distinction between an additional 
activity that is financial in nature and an activity that is incidental to a financial activity, the 
Board treats both terms as being synonymous
326 and refers in the procedure for the determination 
of additional financial activities to activities that are “financial in nature or incidental to a 
financial activity”.
 327  The procedure apparently does not permit a request to the Board for a 
determination of an additional activity as either only financial in nature or as only incidental to a 
financial activity.   
An FHC or other interested party may request a determination from the Board that 
an activity not set forth in the BHCA and not previously determined by the Board to be a 
financial activity, in short, an activity not set forth in § 225.86, Regulation Y,
328 is “financial in 
nature or incidental to a financial activity”.
329  It appears that a favorable determination by the 
Board will always result in an addition to the list of the financial activities set forth in Section 
225.86, Regulation Y and not only in an order permitting the applicant to engage in the requested 
activity.
330 
Upon receipt of such request, the Board must notify the Secretary of the Treasury 
of, and consult with the Secretary about, such request.
331  The Secretary of the Treasury may 
 
325   Proposed § 225.86(d)(3), Regulation Y, 66 Fed. Reg. 313 (Jan. 3, 2001) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. § 
225.86(d)(3) (Regulation Y)).  See Board release, supra note 324, at 311–13.  The final rule has not been 
issued as of the date hereof. 
326   See supra text accompanying notes 302–305. 
327   12 C.F.R. § 225.88 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
328   12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
329   12 C.F.R. § 225.88(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  This right to file a request with the Board is implied in 
§ 4(k)(2)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The information required to be 
submitted with such request is set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.88(b) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
330   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 407. 
331   Section 4(k)(2)(A)(i), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.88(c) 
(2002) (Regulation Y). 
  65 reject the request.
332  The BHCA also permits the Board to propose ex officio an activity as an 
additional financial activity or an activity incidental to a financial activity.
333  A proposal for an 
additional or incidental financial activity may also be originated by the Secretary of the Treasury 
and be recommended to the Board.
334  The Board may reject the proposal.
335  If the Board does 
not reject the Treasury proposal, the Board must initiate a public rule-making proposing that the 
recommended activity be found financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity.
336 
The determination of whether or not an activity is a financial activity or an 
activity incidental to a financial activity for an FHC is always made jointly by the Board and the 
Secretary of the Treasury.  A BHC or an FHC, however, cannot submit a request to the Secretary 
of the Treasury to have an activity designated financial or incidental; they can submit such 
request only to the Board.   
Factors that the Board must take into account when determining whether an 
activity is financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity are set forth in Section 4(k)(3), 
BHCA.
337  The Board has provided an interesting comparison between the test under 
Section 4(c)(8), BHCA
338 which requires an activity to be “closely related to banking” and the 
test under Section 4(k)(1)(A), BHCA
339 which requires that an activity is “financial in nature or 
incidental to a financial activity”.  The Board said that the financial activity test was specifically 
designed to create a test that is broader than the “closely related to banking” test of Section 
4(c)(8), BHCA.
340  The “closely related to banking” test allows BHCs to conduct activities that 
are permissible for banks to conduct, are operationally similar to activities conducted by banks, 
or are activities that BHCs are particularly well equipped to conduct because of their other 
activities.
341  The new “financial in nature” test is intended to allow activities to be authorized in 
                                                 
332   Section 4(k)(2)(A)(ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The Secretary of the 
Treasury must respond within 30 days to the request, § 4(k)(2)(A)(ii), BHCA, and the Board will endeavor 
to make a decision on the request within 60 calendar days following the completion of the consultative 
process with the Secretary of the Treasury and the public comment period, if any, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.88(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.88(d) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
333   Section 4(k)(2)(A)(i), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
334   Section 4(k)(2)(B)(i), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(B)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
335   Section 4(k)(2)(B)(ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(B)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
336   Id. 
337   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
338   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
339   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
340   See Complementary Activities Release, infra note 362, at 80,385. 
341   Id. 
  66 response to technological and other developments that more broadly affect the market for 
financial products and services.
342 
The Board has so far approved one additional financial activity (acting as finder) 
and proposed two additional financial activities (real estate brokerage and real estate 
management).
343 
12. 
                                                
Determination of Pre-approved Financial Activities as Additional 
Financial Activities 
Section 4(k)(5), BHCA
344 contains a list of three activities
345 that are not 
designated by law as financial activities but that the BHCA mandates the Board to define as 
being financial in nature.
346  Thus, Congress has determined that these three activities are in 
concept financial in nature.  The Board has the power to determine by regulation or order the 
extent to which such activities are financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity.
347 
Because these three activities encompass a wide range of activities, including 
some activities in which FHCs and national banks and their financial subsidiaries are already 
permitted to be engaged,
348 the Board and the Secretary of the Treasury have solicited comments 
 
342   Id. 
343   See supra text accompanying notes 323–325. 
344   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
345   These activities are: 
(1)  lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding financial 
assets other than money or securities; 
(2)  providing any device or other instrumentality for transferring money or other 
financial assets; and 
(3)  arranging, effecting, or facilitating financial transactions for the account of third 
parties.  
346   Section 4(k)(5)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
347   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
348   See release of the Board and the Secretary of the Treasury accompanying the interim rule 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.86(e) (2002) (Regulation Y), 66 Fed. Reg. 257–261, at 258 (Jan. 3, 2001) [herein Section 4(k)(5) 
Release].  See also technical amendments to 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e), 66 Fed. Reg. 19,081–82 (Apr. 13, 
2001).  The Section 4(k)(5) Release states at 258: 
For example, these categories [Section 4(k)(5), BHCA] include providing safe 
deposit services, electronic funds transfer activities, credit and stored-value card 
activities, securities brokerage activities, as well as finders activities.  These 
categories [Section 4(k)(5), BHCA] were intended, however, to allow 
[FHCs] . . . to engage in activities that were not otherwise permitted for these 
companies. 
  67 on the question of what activities should be defined by rule as financial in nature or incidental to 
a financial activity for purposes of Section 4(k)(5), BHCA.
349   
In addition, the Board and the Secretary issued an interim rule that creates a 
procedure by which FHCs or others may request Board determinations that specific proposed 
activities fall within one of the three categories of Section 4(k)(5), BHCA.
350  The Board 
believes that requiring FHCs that seek to engage in particular activities pursuant to 
Section 4(k)(5), BHCA to file requests with the Board for approval of those activities is 
necessary because of “the broad scope of the statutory language”.
351  Although Section 4(k)(5), 
BHCA could be interpreted as giving the Board the power to issue regulations or orders with 
respect to the three named activities without cooperation with the Department of the Treasury,
352 
the Board and the Treasury apply the consultative procedure of Section 4(k)(2)(A), BHCA
353 to 
Board determinations under Section 4(k)(5), BHCA.
354  In evaluating a request made under 
Section 4(k)(5), BHCA, the Board will take into account the factors listed in Section 4(k)(3), 
BHCA
355 that it must consider when determining whether an additional activity is financial in 
nature or incidental to a financial activity.
356  By using the factors of Section 4(k)(3), BHCA for 
purposes of Section 4(k)(5), BHCA, the Board ignores that the BHCA has already determined in 
Section 4(k)(5), BHCA that the three activities or categories of activities are financial in nature 
and that only the scope of such activities or the specific description of activities within the scope 
of such categories is subject to Board discretion.
357 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also interim rule 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e)(2)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y) (permitting a request for 
determination that an activity “that is not otherwise permissible for [an FHC]” is permitted under interim 
rule 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y)). 
349   See Section 4(k)(5) Release, supra note 348, at 258.  The Section 4(k)(5) Release and the interim rule treat 
the terms financial in nature and incidental to a financial activity as being synonymous.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 302–305. 
350   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See interim rule 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e) (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
351   See Section 4(k)(5) Release, supra note 348, at 258. 
352   Different from § 4(k)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), § 4(k)(5), BHCA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), does not refer to the coordination between Board and the 
Secretary of the Treasury covered in § 4(k)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
353   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
354   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Interim rule 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  The procedure set forth in interim rule 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) is 
similar to but not identical with the procedure for the determination of an activity as additional financial or 
incidental activity set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.88 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
355   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
356   Interim rule 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
357   Section 4(k)(5), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), provides that “the Board shall . . . 
define, consistent with the purposes of [the BHCA] the [three] activities . . . as financial in nature, and the 
extent to which such activities are financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity”.  If the 
  68 Once the Board has determined that a particular activity is financial in nature or 
incidental to a financial activity under Section 4(k)(5), BHCA, either by rule or by order, other 
FHCs are eligible to engage in the activity if applicable requirements are met.
358  The 
post-transaction notice requirements apply to additional financial activities under Section 
4(k)(5), BHCA.
359 
13. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Complementary  Activities 
An FHC may, in addition to financial activities, engage in any activity, and may 
acquire and retain shares of any company engaged in any activity, that the Board determines is 
complementary to a financial activity and that does not pose a substantial risk to the safety and 
soundness of depository institutions or the financial system generally.
360  An FHC that seeks to 
engage in or acquire more than 5 percent of the outstanding shares of any class of voting 
securities of a company engaged in an activity that the FHC believes is complementary to a 
financial activity must obtain prior approval from the Board.
361  Complementary activities must 
be approved on a case-by-case basis by the Board under the notice procedures of Section 4(j), 
BHCA.
362  The Board apparently does not have the power to declare ex officio by regulation 
 
requirement that a Board determination must be consistent with the BHCA is interpreted to mean that the 
factors of § 4(k)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), must be met, there would be 
no difference between additional financial activities in general and pre-approved additional financial 
activities.  A statutory interpretation that gives meaning to a provision is always preferred over an 
interpretation that renders a provision meaningless.  See NORMAN J. SINGER, 2 A STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 81-85 (6th ed. 2000). 
358   See Section 4(k)(5) Release, supra note 348, at 258. 
359   12 C.F.R. § 225.87 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Section 4(k)(5) Release, supra note 348, at 258. 
360   Section 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
361   12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
362   The approval must be obtained in accordance with § 4(j)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(1)(A) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The issues that must be addressed in the 
notice and the factors for consideration by the Board in evaluating a notice are set forth in 12 C.F.R.  
§ 225.89(a) & (b) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The waiver of notice and the expedited notice provisions for 
§ 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), activities do not apply.  See § 4(j)(3), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 
155. 
In addition, the Board release accompanying a proposed rule approving engaging in and making 
investments in companies engaged in expanded data processing and e-commerce activities as 
complementary activities, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,384–88, at 80,386 (Dec. 21, 2000) [herein Complementary 
Activities Release], proposed that each investment under any of the complementary activities discussed in 
the Complementary Activities Release (data storage, general data processing and electronic information 
portal services) would be subject to review by the Board on a case-by-case method under § 4(j), BHCA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The Board further stated, id. at 80,386, that it would revisit the 
case-by-case notice requirement once experience with complementary activities investments has been 
gained and decide whether a more streamlined process (e.g., a one-time approval to make investments in 
companies engaged in the listed activities) is appropriate. 
  69 certain activities as being complementary.  No notice to, and no consultation with, the Secretary 
of the Treasury are required from the Board with respect to complementary activities.
363   
Activities complementary to financial activities are not financial activities.
364  The 
term complementary has no precedent in the banking law terminology.  The complementary 
activity must be complementary to a financial activity.
365  That is, the activity must in some way 
complement or enhance a financial activity or there must be a relationship or connection between 
the complementary activity and the financial activity.
366  The Board said: 
The authority to engage in complementary activities was 
included as a mechanism for allowing some amount of 
commercial or nonfinancial activities as long as there is a 
connection between the complementary activity and a financial 
activity conducted by the FHC and the activity does not pose 
unacceptable risks to the safety and soundness of the FHC, its 
banks or the banking system.
367 
It would seem that the necessary relationship of a new activity to financial 
activities also exists when the skills and resources created and developed by an FHC in 
connection with financial activities can be utilized without substantial investments or substantial 
additional risk.  The Board, however, has not yet accepted this view. 
The relationship between merchant banking investments and investments in 
companies involved in complementary activities is of interest.  In a proposed rule that would 
permit an FHC to engage in and to invest in companies engaged in data storage, general data 
processing and electronic information portal services activities,
368 the Board observed that such 
investments would be permissible under the merchant banking investments authority but that a 
permission of the investments under the complementary activities authority would be 
advantageous for the FHC because it would not place the investments under the prohibition of 
cross-marketing between the depository institution owned by the FHC and the company engaged 
in the complementary activities.
369  The Board noted that it is precisely the cross-marketing 
opportunity that motivated the requested investments in companies involved in these expanded 
                                                 
363   See § 4(k)(2)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
364   See 145 CONG. REC. H11,529 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999) (Rep. Leach). 
365   Section 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
366   See Complementary Activities Release, supra note 362, at 80,385.  See also the application for a 
determination that the activities discussed in the Complementary Activities Release are permissible, 
submitted by the New York Clearing House (Apr. 24, 2000). 
367   Complementary Activities Release, supra note 362, at 80,385. 
368   See Complementary Activities Release, supra note 362, at 80,386 and proposed § 225.89(d), Regulation Y, 
65 Fed. Reg. 80,388 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(d) (Regulation Y). 
369   See Complementary Activities Release, supra note 362, at 80,385 & 80,386. 
  70 data processing services.
370  Companies engaged in complementary activities would not be under 
the restrictions on managing companies that are applicable to companies acquired under the 
merchant banking investment authority.
371  The FHCs that requested the Board to permit 
investments in data processing and e-commerce activities argued that they must be in a position 
to make equity investments in companies that have found innovative methods of reaching the 
same customers that the banking organizations seek to reach for their own financial products and 
services, that they must be able to participate in and influence the development of new 
technologies that in the future may be useful in delivering financial products and services, and 
that they must be permitted to own delivery systems in order to assure that these technologies for 
the delivery of products and services remain available to them.
372 
For these reasons the Board does not propose that any restrictions be placed on 
the FHC’s ability to be involved in the management of these companies or cross-marketing or 
delivery of financial products and services through these companies.
373  The Board noted that in 
each case it is expected that financial products and services, such as storing and processing 
financial data or providing access to financial advice or home banking services, would be 
provided as an integral part of the activities of the FHC.
374  In order to limit the potential risk of 
these investments and activities to the safety and soundness of the FHC, its depository 
institutions and the financial system as required by Section 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA,
375 the Board 
proposed to limit the total carrying value of all investments permitted under the three categories 
to an aggregate of 5 percent of the FHC’s Tier 1 capital.
376 
14. 
                                                
Interplay Between the Various Authorities 
The various sections of the BHCA that authorize activities for BHCs and FHCs, 
most notably Sections 4(c)(8), 4(c)(13) and 4(k), BHCA,
377 remain separate sources of authority 
under which an FHC may engage in various activities.
378  If an activity is listed in more than one 
provision of Section 4, BHCA,
379 the FHC may choose to conduct the activity under any 
 
370   Id. at 80,385 & 80,386.  The Board does not propose that any restrictions be placed on the FHC’s ability to 
cross-market financial products and services through these companies.  Id. at 80,386. 
371   See infra D.2.j.  The Board does not propose that any restrictions be placed on the FHC’s ability to be 
involved in managing these companies.  Complementary Activities Release, supra note 362, at 80,386. 
372   Id. at 80,384–85. 
373   Id. at 80,386.   
374   Id. 
375   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
376   See Complementary Activities Release, supra note 362, at 80,386; proposed § 225.89(d)(1)(ii), Regulation 
Y, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,388 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(d)(1)(ii) (Regulation Y). 
377   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), (c)(13) & (k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
378   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 406; Final Merchant Banking Release, infra note 418, at 8,469. 
379   12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  71 applicable provision, subject only to the procedures and limitations that the chosen source of 
authority imposes on the activity.
380  For example, an FHC could engage in securities 
underwriting under Section 4(c)(8), BHCA, in which case it must comply with the applicable 
notice provisions and the restrictions set forth on the laundry list of Section 225.28, Regulation 
Y,
381 or it could engage in securities underwriting under Section 4(k)(4)(E), BHCA,
382 in which 
case only post-transaction notice would be required.
383  If an FHC engages in travel agency 
business pursuant to Regulation K,
384 all the procedures and investment limitations of Section 
211.8 & 9, Regulation K apply;
385 however, if the FHC relies on Section 4(k)(4)(G), BHCA, the 
Regulation K limitations do not apply.
386 
An FHC may use a combination of authorities to invest through the same 
subsidiary or fund in ownership interests of both nonfinancial companies and financial 
companies.
387  The decision whether to base new activities on, or classify acquired activities 
under, the merchant banking investment authority or under any other authority depends on issues 
such as whether the FHC intends to dispose of the investment after the permitted holding 
                                                 
380   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 406; Final Merchant Banking Release, infra note 418, at 8,469 
(“The authority granted by [§ 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA] to [FHCs] to make merchant banking investments is also 
an alternative to any other authority that [an FHC] may have to make investments in nonfinancial 
companies under other provisions of the [BHCA]”). 
381   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.28(b)(8) (limited underwriting power), 225.23 (expedited notice for well-run BHCs) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.10 D (discussion of notice procedures). 
382   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
383   12 C.F.R. § 225.87 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra F.2. 
384   12 C.F.R § 211.10(a)(16) (2002) (Regulation K).  See former 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(15) (2001) (Regulation 
K). 
385   12 C.F.R. § 211.8 & 9 (2002) (Regulation K).  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.17 E. 
386   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 406. 
387   See Final Merchant Banking Release, infra note 418, at 8,469.  This does not mean, however, that an FHC 
is permitted to avoid investment size limitations or investment restrictions by using a combination of 
investment authorities for the investments in one target company.  For purposes of determining whether an 
investment qualifies under § 4(c)(6) & (7), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) & (7) (1994), an FHC must 
aggregate all investments held by the FHC in a single company.  Sections 4(c)(6) & (7), BHCA are only 
available if the FHC’s aggregate investment in the target company under a combination of authorities is 
within the 5 percent investment limitation.  An FHC may not own any shares of a company in reliance of 
§ 4(c)(6) or (7), BHCA where the FHC owns or controls, in the aggregate under a combination of 
authorities, more than 5 percent of any class of voting securities of the company.  See Interim Merchant 
Banking Release, infra note 418, at 16,463 n.1; Final Merchant Banking Release, infra note 418, at 8,469 
n.10 & 8,481 n.29; Proposed Regulation W Release, infra note 793, at 24,204 n.95. 
 
The same is true for investments held under Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 (2002), in particular 12 C.F.R. 
§ 211.8 (2002) (Regulation K).  The Regulation K authority is only available if the FHC’s aggregate 
investment in the target company under a combination of authorities is within the applicable investment 
limitations and restrictions set forth in Regulation K.  See Final Merchant Banking Release, infra note 418, 
at 8,469 n.10. 
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388 and whether the FHC can live with the applicable management restrictions.
389  Capital 
adequacy requirements are no longer a relevant factor because the capital requirements are 
identical for all equity investments in nonfinancial companies.
390 
D. 
7. 
                                                
Investment Activities:  Merchant Banking Investments, 
Underwriting, Insurance Company Portfolio Investments 
Distinction Between Activities and the Investment Powers  
Inherent in Such Activities 
The principal purpose of the GLBA was to provide a framework for the affiliation 
of banks, securities firms, insurance companies and other financial service providers in a holding 
company structure.
391  Therefore, the most important powers for a BHC that has effectively 
elected the status of an FHC are the authorities to engage in underwriting, dealing and market 
making activities,
392 merchant banking
393 and insurance activities.
394  All these activities involve 
the investment in securities of companies engaged in any kind of activities, i.e., activities that are 
not financial activities.  Merchant banks and insurance companies also invest in assets other than 
securities.  Consequently, it was important that the GLBA amendments to the BHCA not only 
authorized FHCs to invest in companies that are engaged in securities, insurance, merchant 
banking or other financial activities, but also permitted the FHC, directly or indirectly, in the 
exercise of those authorities to engage in financial activities to make investments in securities or 
assets of companies engaged in nonfinancial activities. 
The BHCA distinguishes between permitted financial activities and the 
investments in securities made in carrying out such financial activities.  Section 4(k)(4)(B), 
BHCA
395 permits insurance activities and Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA
396 permits investments by 
 
388   See infra D.2.k. 
389   See infra D.2.j; Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.09B (discussing the passivity requirement for § 4(c)(6), BHCA, 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994), investments). 
390   See infra D.2.m. 
 
391   See 145 CONG. REC. S13,888-89 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999) (Sen. Reed); 145 CONG. REC. S13,904 (daily 
ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999) (Sen. Kerry). 
392   See supra text accompanying notes 316 & 321. 
393   See supra text accompanying note 321. 
394   See supra text accompanying notes 313 & 322. 
395  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
396  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  73 insurance companies; Section 4(k)(4)(E), BHCA
397 permits underwriting and Section 4(k)(4)(H), 
BHCA
398 permits the acquisition of shares as part of an underwriting. 
This legislative approach - the distinction between the financial activities in which 
an FHC may engage and the authorization to make investments in carrying out such financial 
activities - was not followed in connection with investment banking and merchant banking.  
Although Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
399 permits investments in companies engaged in any 
activities as part of the merchant or investment banking activities of an FHC, there is no explicit 
authority for FHCs to engage generally in merchant/investment banking activities.  Thus, 
merchant/investment banking is treated differently from underwriting or insurance.  However, 
since the authority to invest in securities as part of merchant/investment banking activities 
logically presupposes the authority to engage in merchant/investment banking activities, such 
authority arguably is implied.  Neither the BHCA nor Regulation Y defines the activity of 
merchant banking or investment banking, and the legislative history of the GLBA is not helpful 
either.
400  Merchant and investment banking have been defined in the literature as including 
counseling, negotiating in merger and acquisition transactions, securities portfolio management 
for customers, dealing in bullion, arranging credit financing without holding the loan to maturity, 
investing own capital in leveraged buyouts, corporate acquisitions and structured finance 
transactions, acting as underwriter or agent for the issuer of securities and acting as dealer in 
securities.
401  The definitions of merchant or investment banking are generally descriptive and 
inclusive, not limiting, in nature. 
                                                 
397  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
398  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
399  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
400  See Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 154; Report 106-44 of the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to accompany S. 900, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) [herein Senate 
Report on S. 900], at 9, 64, 72–73.  See infra note 414. 
401 A  merchant bank has been defined in the literature as a financial institution that “engages in investment 
banking, counseling, and negotiating in mergers and acquisitions, and a variety of other services including 
securities portfolio management for customers, insurance, the acceptance of foreign bills of exchange, 
dealing in bullion, and participating in commercial ventures.”  JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN E. GOODMAN, 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (5th ed. 1998), at 357.  Merchant banking has been 
defined as a “form of banking where the bank arranges credit financing, but does not hold the loans in its 
investment portfolio to maturity.  A merchant bank invests its own capital in leveraged buyouts, corporate 
acquisitions, and other structured finance transactions.”  THOMAS P. FITCH, DICTIONARY OF BANKING 
TERMS (1990), at 383.  See JERRY M. ROSENBERG, DICTIONARY OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES (2d 
ed. 1985), at 433 (the term merchant bank is “used in Great Britain for an organization that underwrites 
securities for corporations, advises such clients on mergers, and is involved in the ownership of commercial 
ventures”).  Investment banker has been defined as a firm, acting as underwriter or agent, that serves as 
intermediary between an issuer of securities and the investing public.  Downes & Goodman, supra, at 296–
97.  Downes & Goodman continue: 
  Where a client relationship exists, the investment banker’s role begins with  
preunderwriting counseling and continues after the distribution of securities is 
completed, in the form of ongoing expert advice and guidance, often including a seat 
on the board of directors . . . .  In addition to new securities offerings, investment 
  74 The Board in Regulation Y apparently takes the position that FHCs do not have a 
general authority to engage in all merchant/investment banking activities.  Most, if not all, of the 
activities that fall under the general description of merchant banking activities, such as 
investment advisory services, asset management services, acting as underwriter or dealer, 
arranging credit financing and credit financing, are already permitted financial activities for 
FHCs under various provisions of the BHCA and Regulation Y.
402  The GLBA amendments to 
the BHCA add to these authorities the authority to make merchant banking investments, i.e., 
controlling or noncontrolling investments in companies engaged in any kind of business for the 
purpose of appreciation and ultimate resale.
403  Subpart J of Regulation Y (Merchant Banking 
Investments)
404 deals only with the authority to make merchant banking investments, and 
Regulation Y does not generally deal with merchant or investment banking activities.  When 
Regulation Y refers to merchant banking activities or engaging in merchant banking activities, it 
means merchant banking investment activities and engaging in investments under the merchant 
banking investment authority.  Although Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
405 refers to merchant 
banking and to investment banking, the Board in Regulation Y never mentions investment 
banking.  Presumably it takes the position that merchant banking and investment banking are 
synonymous terms. 
                                                                                                                                                             
bankers handle the distribution of blocks of previously issued securities, either 
through secondary offerings or through negotiations; maintain markets for securities 
already distributed; and act as finders in the private placement of securities. 
  Id.  See also Fitch, supra, at 329, entry “investment banking” and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 
1999), at 831, entries “Investment banker” and “Investment banking,” defining investment banking as 
underwriting.  However, others define investment banking broader, as long-term financing or the financing 
of capital requirements.  See Rosenberg, supra, at 375, who defines investment banking more broadly as 
the “financing of the capital requirements of an enterprise rather than the current ‘working capital’ 
requirements of a business.”  GLENN G. MUNN, F.L. GARCIA & CHARLES J.WOELFEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
BANKING FINANCE (9th ed. 1991), at 585, defines “Investment Banks” as banking institutions “that supply 
long-term and intermediate credit to borrowers.” 
402   Investment advisory services:  see § 4(k)(4)(C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999); § 4(k)(4)(F), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(F) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), in connection with 12 
C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(6) (2002) (Regulation Y) (see supra note 314); underwriting and dealing:  see § 
4(k)(4)(E), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (see supra note 316); lending:  see § 
4(k)(4)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); § 4(k)(4)(F), BHCA in connection 
with 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) (see supra note 312); and buying and selling bullion:  
see § 4(k)(4)(F), BHCA in connection with 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(iii) (2002) (Regulation Y) (see supra 
note 317). 
403  Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA 
is curiously drafted in that the requirement that investment activities must be engaged in for the purpose of 
appreciation and ultimate resale is introduced by the word “including”, leaving room for the argument that 
investments for other purposes are also permissible.  Regulation Y does not accept this argument and limits 
all merchant banking investments to investments for the purpose of appreciation and ultimate resale.  See 
12 C.F.R. § 225.172 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
404   See Subpart J (Merchant Banking Investments) of Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170–225.177 (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
405   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  75 A similar interpretation issue arises in connection with the financial activity of 
dealing and market making in securities.  Section 4(k)(4)(E), BHCA
406 permits an FHC to 
engage in underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in securities.  Although Section 
4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
407 permits the acquisition of securities as part of underwriting, it does not 
expressly permit the acquisition of securities as part of dealing or market making.  Dealing and 
market making, however, necessarily imply the acquisition and ownership of securities; these 
activities are not conceivable without such acquisition and ownership.
408  The same is true for 
underwriting:  the activity of underwriting essentially consists of the acquisition and sale of 
securities and the grant of a specific investment power for underwriting in Section 4(k)(4)(H), 
BHCA seems to be superfluous.
409  One could argue that the reference to underwriting in Section 
4(k)(4)(H), BHCA is unnecessary and superfluous and erroneous or one could argue that the 
references to dealing and market making were erroneously omitted from Section 4(k)(4)(H), 
BHCA.
410 
                                                 
406  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
407  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
408  Without a specific investment authorization for the dealing and market-making activities, equity 
investments in connection with such activities could be limited to 5 percent under § 4(c)(6), BHCA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994).  Rep. Leach has made it clear, however, that the 5 percent limitation does not 
apply to dealing and market-making activities.  (“I would like to make clear that by permitting [FHCs] to 
engage in underwriting, dealing and market making, Congress intends that the five-percent limitation no 
longer applies to bona fide securities underwriting, dealing and market-making activities.”) 145 CONG. 
REC. H11,529 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999).  Furthermore, such limitation to 5 percent would be inconsistent 
with the intent of the GLBA to tear down the wall between commercial banking and securities activities. 
409   See infra note D.3. for a discussion of the investment authority of the underwriting activity. 
410   Dealing is generally recognized as part of the investment or merchant banking activity.  In Securities 
Industries Association v. Board of Governors, 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 
(1988), the court accepted the position taken by the Board that dealing is part of merchant banking.  The 
court said that “[t]he Board notes that NatWest engages in extensive merchant banking activities outside 
the United States, including acting as a dealer of securities”.  Id. at 819 n.9.  See also MUNN, GARCIA & 
WOELFEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING FINANCE, supra note 401, at 657, entry “Merchant Bank”, stating 
that “merchant banks frequently . . . underwrite [and] deal in securities”. 
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a. 
b. 
                                                
Merchant Banking Investments  
General 
Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
411 permits an FHC, directly or indirectly, to invest in 
securities, assets or other ownership interests as part of merchant/investment banking activities, 
subject to certain conditions: 
 the investment is made as part of a “bona fide” merchant or investment banking 
activity; 
 the investment is made by a securities affiliate or by a registered investment 
adviser that is affiliated with an insurance company and provides investment 
advice to an insurance company, or by an affiliate of such securities affiliate or 
such investment adviser; 
 the investment is not made by a depository institution of the FHC, or by a 
subsidiary of a depository institution; 
 the investment is “held for a period of time to enable the sale or disposition 
thereof on a reasonable basis” consistent with the financial viability of the 
merchant/investment banking activity; and 
 the FHC does not routinely manage or operate the entity in which the investment 
is made except as may be necessary or required to obtain a reasonable return on 
investment upon resale or disposition. 
The Nature of Merchant Banking Investments 
The authority of Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
412 to make investments as part of 
merchant/investment banking activities permits an FHC or a subsidiary of an FHC to make 
controlling or noncontrolling equity or other investments in companies engaged in any kind of 
nonfinancial activities (businesses).
413 
 
411  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
412   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
413  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (introductory paragraph) (“whether or not constituting 
control of such company or entity, engaged in any activity not authorized pursuant to [§ 4, BHCA]”).  See 
12 C.F.R. § 225.170(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) (“any amount of shares” of a company or other entity  “that 
is engaged in any activity not otherwise authorized” for FHCs under § 4, BHCA).  See § 4, BHCA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  An FHC must make merchant banking investments directly or 
indirectly through a subsidiary.  See supra text accompanying note 229 and infra 444. 
  77 Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA does not define merchant banking or investment 
banking and the legislative history is not helpful.
414  Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA states that 
merchant/investment banking investments include “investment activities engaged in for the 
purpose of appreciation and ultimate resale or disposition of the investment”.
415  The Board in 
Regulation Y limits the authority to make merchant banking investments to the authority to make 
investments for the purpose of appreciation and ultimate resale.  Regulation Y contains a not 
very helpful definition of merchant banking investments.  It defines
416 merchant banking 
investments as “shares, assets or ownership interests” acquired or controlled under Section 
4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
417 and Sections 225.170–225.177, Regulation Y.
418  This “definition” mixes 
the activity and the results of the activity.  The subsequent provision
419 that an FHC may not 
make a merchant banking investment except in compliance with Sections 225.170–225.177, 
Regulation Y makes little sense because under the above definition, such investments would not 
be merchant banking investments.  Regulation Y should have defined merchant banking 
investments as a “direct or indirect acquisition, control or ownership of shares, assets or 
                                                 
414   See Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 154; Senate Report on S. 900, supra note 400, at 9, 64, 
72–73.  Certain Senators gave the following definition in an Additional View in the Senate Report on 
S. 900: 
  Merchant banking refers to the practice whereby an investment bank takes a 
passive equity stake in a company in connection with the provision of financial 
services, such as underwriting the company’s securities, with a view towards 
appreciation and eventual sale.  
 Id. at 64.  This definition is narrower than § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. 
V 1999), would require. 
415   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
416   12 C.F.R. § 225.170(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
417   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
418   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170–225.177 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
On Mar. 17, 2000, the Board issued an interim rule governing merchant banking investments of FHCs 
(Regulation Y, Docket No. R-1065), 65 Fed. Reg. 16,472–76 (Mar. 28, 2000) and adopted final rules on 
Jan. 10, 2001 (Regulation Y, Docket No. R-1065), 66 Fed. Reg. 8,484–89 (Jan. 31, 2001).  The final rules 
are codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170–225.177 (2002) (Subpart J of Regulation Y).  The Secretary of the 
Treasury also issued on Mar. 17, 2000 regulations governing merchant banking investments of FHCs, 65 
Fed. Reg. 16,476–79 (Mar. 28, 2000) and issued final regulations on Jan. 10, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,489–93 
(Jan. 31, 2001).  The final rules are codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1–1500.8 (2002).  These rules were 
accompanied by joint release, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,460–79 (Mar. 28, 2000) [herein Interim Merchant Banking 
Release] and 66 Fed. Reg. 8,466–93 (Jan. 31, 2001) [herein Final Merchant Banking Release].  See Letter, 
dated May 15, 2000, from Michael Gruson, Bradley K. Sabel and Jonathan M. Weld to the Secretary of the 
Board commenting on the interim rules.   The merchant banking rules issued by the Secretary of the 
Treasury and by the Board are identical and therefore the rules issued by the Secretary of the Treasury are 
not specifically referred to herein.  The authority to issue the rules relating to merchant banking 
investments is derived from § 4(k)(7)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(7)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
419   12 C.F.R. § 225.170(a), last sentence (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  78 ownership interests of a company or other entity [herein the portfolio company]
420 that is 
engaged in any activity not otherwise authorized for an FHC under Section 4, BHCA, provided 
such investment is made in accordance with Subpart J [Sections 225.170–225.177, Regulation 
Y]”.
421  In summary, the investment in a company that is not engaged in financial activities
422 
qualifies as a permitted merchant banking investment if the FHC does not routinely manage the 
portfolio company
423 and if the investment is disposed of during the holding period.
424   
Pursuant to Regulation Y, a portfolio company may not be engaged in any activity 
authorized for FHCs under Section 4, BHCA.
425  The meaning of this prohibition is not 
completely clear.  An FHC may make investments in any company of up to 5 percent of the 
outstanding voting shares of any class,
426 it may engage in complementary activities
427 and may 
retain investments in grandfathered activities.
428  Does the characterization of an activity as 
complementary result in a prohibition of merchant banking investments in companies engaged in 
such activities?  The answer must be no.  The Board has indicated that an FHC has a choice of 
whether to invest in a company engaged in complementary activities under the merchant banking 
investment authority subject to the limitations inherent in that authority or to invest under the 
authority to invest in companies engaged in complementary activities.
429 
It is likely that the Board meant that the portfolio company acquired under the 
merchant banking investment authority should not be engaged in financial activities.
430  This is 
in contrast to the requirement that an FHC may engage in financial activities either directly or 
                                                 
420   12 C.F.R. § 225.177(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) defines portfolio company as a company that is engaged in 
any activity not authorized for an FHC under § 4, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) in 
which an FHC has invested pursuant to Subpart J [12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170–225.177 (2002) (Regulation Y)]. 
421   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170–225.177 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
422   The company must not be engaged in any activity authorized for an FHC under § 4, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(c) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
423   12 C.F.R. § 225.171 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra D. 2. j. 
424   12 C.F.R. § 225.172 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See infra D. 2. k. 
425   12 C.F.R. § 225.177(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra note 420.  See also 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999). 
426   Section 4(c)(6), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994). 
427   Section 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra C.7. 
428   See infra E.2. 
429   See supra text accompanying notes 368–372. 
430   The Board seems to agree with this interpretation in the Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, 
at 8,469 (“Because section 4(k)(4)(H) does not authorize investments in financial companies . . . .”).  
However, see infra text accompanying notes 488 and 489 (FHC’s interest in a nonqualifying fund is treated 
as an investment in a portfolio company even though the fund is engaged in investment activities). 
  79 through controlled or minority-owned companies that are exclusively (or at least substantially) 
engaged in financial activities.
431 
Does the requirement that portfolio companies cannot engage in financial 
activities prevent an investment under the merchant banking investment authority in a minority 
interest in an insurance company, or a broker-dealer or a merchant bank?  As stated above,
432 an 
insurance company in which an FHC invests must be a subsidiary of the FHC in order that the 
FHC can utilize the insurance company investment authority under Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA.
433  
Thus, a minority investment in an insurance company is in effect not permitted under the Section 
4(k), BHCA investment authorities, and therefore a minority investment in an insurance 
company must be permissible under the merchant banking authority.  The definition of portfolio 
company must be read to the effect that a portfolio company is a company that is not engaged in 
a financial activity and also a company that may be engaged in a financial activity if the 
investment in such company by an FHC is not otherwise authorized under Section 4(k), BHCA.  
There is no legislative purpose in prohibiting a less-than-controlling merchant banking 
investment in an insurance company subject to the restrictions applicable to merchant banking 
investments.  On the other hand, the investment in a controlling interest in an insurance company 
is authorized by Section 4(k)(1)(A) & (4)(B), BHCA,
434 and the activities of the insurance 
company constitute the indirect activities of the FHC.  Thus, an FHC cannot invest under the 
merchant banking authority in a controlling interest of an insurance company.  A similar analysis 
applies to minority investments under the merchant banking investment authority in broker-
dealers and merchant banks.
435 
A U.S. bank, a BHC, a savings association or a company that controls a savings 
association, on the other hand, can never be a portfolio company under the merchant banking 
authority.
436 
The Board has stated that an FHC may retain a portfolio company acquired under 
the merchant banking investment authority that at the time of acquisition was a nonfinancial 
company but subsequently commenced a financial activity.
437 
c. 
                                                
Bona Fide Requirement 
Investments made as part of a merchant banking investment must be bona fide.
438  
The Board has stated that the bona fide requirement addresses the motive of an investment made 
 
431   See supra C.1. 
432   See text accompanying supra note 229 & infra note 624. 
433   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
434   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A) & (4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
435   See text accompanying supra note 229 & infra note 601. 
436   See infra D. 2. i. 
437  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,469. 
  80 by an FHC.  The requirement is, in the Board’s view, intended to distinguish between merchant 
banking investments that are made for the purpose of resale or other disposition, and investments 
that are made for the purpose of allowing the FHC to engage in the nonfinancial activities 
conducted by the portfolio company.
439  The Board intends to monitor the merchant banking 
activities of FHCs to ensure that all merchant banking investments are made in compliance with 
the BHCA’s bona fide requirement and that FHCs do not use the merchant banking authority as a 
means of becoming impermissibly involved in nonfinancial activities.
440  Since all merchant 
banking investments must be disposed of within a certain period of time, it is difficult to see why 
the motive of the FHC should make a difference.  An indication of the Board’s real concern can 
be gleaned from a statement of the Board that it expects all FHCs to establish policies governing 
portfolio diversification.
441  If, for instance, an FHC makes merchant banking investments only 
in real estate development companies, it might be seen as being engaged in real estate 
development.
442 
d. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Entity in the FHC Group that May Make Merchant Banking 
Investments 
An FHC may directly or through a subsidiary engage in merchant banking 
investment activities.  Whereas Section 4(k)(1), BHCA
443 generally permits an FHC to engage in 
financial activities through a controlled or a noncontrolled company, the financial activities of 
making merchant/investment banking investments must be carried out by the FHC itself 
(directly) or indirectly through a subsidiary (a controlled company).
444  The FHC or the 
 
438   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 
225.170(b) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
439   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,469. 
440   Id. 
441   Id. at n.12. 
442   Id. at 8,469.  See also Interim Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 16,463. The Board seems to 
be particularly concerned about investments in real estate investment or development companies.  Final 
Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,469; Interim Merchant Banking Release, supra, at 16,462–
63.  The Final Merchant Banking Release, supra, at 8,469 dispelled a concern created by the Interim 
Merchant Banking Release, supra, at 16,463 that the first merchant banking investment of an FHC may not 
be made in a company engaged in real estate investment or development. The Final Merchant Banking 
Release, supra, at 8,469, also clarified that the bona fide requirement does not prohibit an FHC from 
specializing in making merchant banking investments in particular industries.  Concentration in particular 
industries or in individual investments may cause supervisory concerns.  See Board SR Letter No. 00-9 
(SPE) (June 22, 2000), sub III B, at 5–6, Policy and Limits (requiring portfolio diversification). 
443  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra text accompanying note 228. 
444  This follows from § 4(k)(4)(H) (introductory paragraph), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. 
V 1999), which permits an FHC only directly or indirectly (i.e., through a subsidiary) to acquire securities 
or make investments as part of the merchant banking business (“[d]irectly or indirectly acquiring or 
controlling . . . shares . . . as part of a . . . merchant or investment banking activity”).  See 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.170(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra note 229.  See also infra text accompanying note 601 
(discussing the directly or indirectly requirement in connection with the underwriting authority) and infra 
  81 merchant/investment banking subsidiary of such FHC, however, may invest in the exercise of its 
merchant banking investment authority in minority or majority positions of portfolio 
companies.
445 
Although Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
446 permits an FHC to make merchant 
banking investments “directly or indirectly”, this is modified in several respects by the 
subsequent language of paragraph (H).   
First, the investment may not be made by a depository institution (or a subsidiary 
thereof).  This restriction does not affect FHCs that are foreign banks, because foreign banks are 
not depository institutions.
447   
Furthermore, Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA provides that the merchant banking 
investments must be made and held by a securities affiliate,
448 or by a registered investment 
adviser that is affiliated with an insurance company in the FHC group and provides investment 
advice to an insurance company,
449 or by an affiliate of such securities affiliate or such 
investment adviser.
450  This language is very ambiguous and leaves room for various 
                                                                                                                                                             
text accompanying note 624 (discussing the directly or indirectly requirement in connection with the 
insurance company portfolio investment authority). 
445  Section 4(k)(4)(H) (introductory paragraph), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) 
(permitting the acquisition of shares or other ownership interests of another company or entity “whether or 
not constituting control of such company or entity”). 
446   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
447  The restriction applies to the U.S. bank and nonbank depository institution subsidiaries that the foreign 
bank may have.  Section 4(k)(4)(H)(i), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 
C.F.R. § 225.170(d) (2002) (Regulation Y).  For purposes of the merchant banking rules [Subpart J of 
Regulation Y], the term depository institution includes a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank.  12 
C.F.R. § 225.177(b) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The distinction between a branch of a foreign bank or the 
foreign bank acquiring assets is not meaningful as a matter of law.  If a branch acquires or owns assets, the 
bank that has established the branch acquires or owns the assets; since a branch is not a legal entity separate 
from the bank it cannot have a separate ownership interest in assets.  See Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Principles for the Supervision of Bank’s Foreign Establishments 
(Basle Concordat) at 2 (May 1983) (defining branches as operating entities that do not have separate legal 
status and are thus integral parts of the foreign parent bank).   
448  Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (merchant 
banking investments are permitted if “such shares, assets, or ownership interests are acquired and held by – 
(I) a securities affiliate or an affiliate thereof”). 
449  Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (merchant 
banking investments are permissible if “such shares, assets, or ownership interests are acquired and held by  
. . . (II) an affiliate of an insurance company described in [12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999)] that provides investment advice to an insurance company and is registered pursuant to the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq.], or an affiliate of such investment adviser.”). 
450  Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(I) & (II), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii)(I) & (II) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  82 interpretations.
451  The Board in Regulation Y provides that an FHC may, directly or indirectly 
through a subsidiary, acquire or control merchant banking investments if the FHC is or has an 
affiliate that is a company that is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a 
broker-dealer under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
452  Regulation Y does not require that 
                                                 
451 An  affiliate is defined in Section 2(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k) (1994), as a company that controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with, another company.  The BHCA does not say with whom the 
securities company must be affiliated.  If affiliate means affiliate of the FHC in the meaning of Section 
2(k), BHCA, it would include not only subsidiaries of the FHC but also a securities company controlling 
the FHC and securities companies controlled by a securities company controlling the FHC. Any person 
controlling a BHC is also a BHC and would have to qualify as an FHC in order to engage in underwriting 
and merchant/investment banking activities.  Thus, the securities affiliate of one FHC that controls the FHC 
would itself be an FHC and would also require a securities affiliate to engage in underwriting and 
merchant/investment banking activities.  If securities affiliate means a securities subsidiary of an FHC, this 
would contradict the introductory language of § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999), which permits FHCs to directly engage in underwriting and merchant/investment banking 
activities.  Affiliate could also mean an affiliate of the depository institution — other than a subsidiary of 
the depository institution.  In that case, the securities company that engages in merchant/investment 
banking activities could be a sister company of the depository institution or the parent of the depository 
institution, i.e., the FHC itself, if such FHC is a securities company. 
  Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), permits not only 
a securities affiliate of an FHC to make and hold investments in connection with underwriting or 
merchant/investment banking activities, but also an affiliate of a securities affiliate.  Even if securities 
affiliate is interpreted to mean a securities subsidiary of the FHC, the FHC as parent of the subsidiary is an 
affiliate of the securities subsidiary.  If securities affiliate is interpreted to mean an affiliate of the 
depository institution, the FHC as parent of the depository institution clearly is an affiliate of the depository 
institution. 
  The conclusion that the FHC itself may engage in merchant/investment banking activities permits a 
consistent interpretation of § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA and it makes sense.  When Congress used the term 
securities affiliate, it arguably meant to designate a broker-dealer in the FHC group. 
  The legislative history of the GLBA indicates a third interpretation.  The Conference Report on S. 900, 
supra note 4, at 154 states that § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA permits an FHC, “that has a securities affiliate or an 
affiliate of an insurance company . . . to conduct such activities.  Under this provision, the FHC may 
directly or indirectly acquire or control any kind of ownership interest . . . in an entity engaged in any kind 
of trade or business whatsoever.  The FHC may make such acquisition . . .”.  (emphasis added).  
Representative Leach made a similar statement: 
[T]he Act would permit [an FHC] to engage in merchant banking only if the 
company has a securities affiliate, or a registered investment adviser that performs 
these functions for an affiliate insurance company. 
145 CONG. REC. H11,529 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999).  Thus, the Conference Report on S. 900 clearly says 
that an FHC may directly acquire securities in connection with merchant/investment banking activities, as 
long as it has a securities affiliate.  The securities affiliate need not make the investments. 
452   12 C.F.R. § 225.170(d) & (f) (2002) (Regulation Y).  An FHC may only acquire or control merchant 
banking investments if the FHC is, or has an affiliate that is, registered under §§3, 15 & 15B,  Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o, 78o-4 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) as a broker-dealer or as a 
municipal securities dealer.  12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f)(1)(i) & (ii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  It suffices if a bank 
has a separate and identifiable department or division that is registered as a municipal securities dealer.  12 
C.F.R. § 225.170(f)(1)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  83 the broker-dealer be the investor.  The legislative history of the GLBA supports this 
interpretation of Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA.
453   
Regulation Y further permits an FHC to acquire or control merchant banking 
investments if the FHC controls (1) an insurance company
454 and (2) a registered investment 
adviser
455 that provides investment advice to an insurance company.
456  Again, Regulation Y 
does not require that the investment adviser be involved in the merchant banking investments. 
e. 
                                                
Investments Through Private Equity Funds 
Securities firms typically make significant percentages of their merchant banking 
investments through funds that are limited partnerships or other investment vehicles that pool the 
firm’s capital with capital provided by third-party investors.
457  These investors typically are 
 
453  See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 154; 
Rep. Leach, 145 CONG. REC. H11,529 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999).  See supra note 451 (penultimate 
paragraph). 
454   The insurance company must be predominantly engaged in underwriting life, accident and health or 
property and casualty insurance (other than credit-related insurance), or providing and issuing annuities.  
12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f)(2)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See § 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II), BHCA in connection with 
§ 4(k)(4)(I)(ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II) & 4(k)(4)(I)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); it is 
curious that Regulation Y does not cover the case where the FHC itself is an insurance company.  Such 
FHC should be permitted to make merchant banking investments even if it does not control a second 
insurance company.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) (the FHC itself may be the 
broker dealer or municipal securities dealer).  The interim rule, § 225.170(f)(1), 65 Fed. Reg. 16,473 (Mar. 
28, 2000) did not permit the FHC itself to be the broker-dealer, but the final version of 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.170(f)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) corrected this oversight.  See Final Merchant Banking Release, 
supra note 418, at 8,468.  A corresponding change was (probably erroneously) not made in 12 C.F.R. § 
225.170(f)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) with respect to insurance companies. 
455   12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f)(2)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See § 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The investment adviser must be registered under § 203(a), 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), or be an affiliate thereof.  
Since the license as an investment adviser does not permit an entity to act as underwriter, subclause (ii)(II) 
relates only to merchant/investment banking activities.  Regulation Y correctly does not require the 
investment adviser to acquire and hold the investments as the language of § 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II) might 
indicate.  Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), as in the case of a 
securities affiliate, requires that the investment adviser is an affiliate of an insurance company or an 
affiliate thereof.  See § 2(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k) (1994) (definition of affiliate).  The affiliate of an 
insurance company could be a subsidiary thereof, a sister company or a parent company of the insurance 
company.  It includes the FHC parent of the insurance company, although 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f)(2)(ii) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) does not seem to expressly cover this case.  The investments may also be made by 
an affiliate of such investment adviser affiliate.  Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  This last provision is odd, because an affiliate of an affiliate 
of a company is an affiliate of such company. 
456   12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f)(2)(ii)(B) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Note that § 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii)(II) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f)(2)(ii)(B) only require that the 
affiliate give advice to an insurance company; the provisions do not require advice to the affiliated 
insurance company. 
457   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,475. 
  84 institutional investors, such as other investment companies, pension funds, endowments, 
financial institutions or corporations, and sophisticated individual investors with high net 
worth.
458  In most instances, the securities firm is the sponsor or advisor to the fund and has a 
general partnership or similar interest in the fund.
459  Securities firms also make noncontrolling 
investments in funds that are sponsored and advised by unaffiliated companies.
460  Under 
Regulation Y,
461 a private equity fund qualifies for the special provisions of Regulation Y if the 
fund has a fixed duration of not more than 15 years including all potential extensions, and the 
FHC (including its officers, directors, employees and principal shareholders) does not own more 
than 25 percent of the total equity of the fund.
462  Regulation Y does not impose any limits on 
advisory fees or on the various types of incentive compensation that the FHC may receive for 
services rendered to the fund, provided that such fees do not increase the FHC’s equity stake in 
the fund above the 25 percent threshold.
463 
Regulation Y requires that the fund not be an operating company,
464 engage 
exclusively in the business of investing in financial and nonfinancial companies for resale or 
other disposition,
465 and not be established or operated for the purpose of making investments 
that are inconsistent with Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
466 or evading the limitations on merchant 
banking investments.
467  As discussed below, the fund must have policies and systems for 
monitoring and addressing the various risks associated with merchant banking activities.
468  The 
private equity fund may be organized in any legal form.
469  In addition, the fund may be, but 
need not be, registered as an investment company under the Investment Company Act.
470 
                                                 
458   Id. 
459   Id. 
460   Id. 
461   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
462   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(a)(3) & (4) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
463   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,475. 
464   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
465   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
466   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  It seems that the blanket authority granted by 12 
C.F.R. § 225.173(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) to funds to invest in companies engaged in financial or 
nonfinancial activities is inconsistent with § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. 
V 1999).  See supra text accompanying note 465.  See the discussion supra text accompanying 425-435. 
467   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(a)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
468   See infra D.2.l. 
469   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(b) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
470   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,476.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-65 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999). 
  85 Regulation Y permits an FHC, without Board approval, to own or control an 
investment in a private equity fund that makes merchant banking investments for the duration of 
the fund, which may be up to 15 years.
471  Regulation Y contemplates that a qualifying private 
investment fund may hold investments in portfolio companies for the duration of the fund.
472  
Accordingly, a private equity fund that conducts merchant banking investment activities is not 
required to dispose of its investments within the 10-year period applicable to other types of 
merchant banking investments.
473  An FHC may seek the Board’s approval to retain an 
investment in a qualifying private equity fund or to extend the duration of a private equity fund 
for a period longer than 15 years in special circumstances.
474 
The BHCA and Regulation Y prohibit an FHC from routinely managing or 
operating any portfolio company.
475  This prohibition also applies to any portfolio company that 
is owned or controlled by a private equity fund in which the FHC owns or controls any 
interest.
476  Likewise, a private equity fund that is controlled by an FHC may not routinely 
manage or operate a portfolio company.
477  Regulation Y does not prohibit an FHC from 
routinely managing or operating a private equity fund.
478   
Regulation Y defines situations in which an FHC is considered to control a 
private equity fund.
479  An FHC is considered to control a private equity fund if the FHC, 
                                                 
471   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The 15-year limitation relates to any interest in the 
private equity fund and any interest in a portfolio company that is owned or controlled by a private equity 
fund in which the FHC owns or controls any interest.  Id. 
472   Id.  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,476. 
473   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,476. 
474   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The holding period tacking rules set forth in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.172(b)(2) & (3) (2002) (Regulation Y) must be applied in determining whether a private equity fund 
investment has been held longer than the period permitted by Regulation Y.  12 C.F.R. § 225.172(c)(3) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,476 n.19.  See also infra 
note 531.  Any request for extension must be filed at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the holding 
period and include the information described in 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y).  If the 
Board grants the extension request, the FHC must apply the capital charge described in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.172(b)(6) (2002) (Regulation Y) to the FHC’s investment in the fund and must comply with other 
restrictions imposed by the Board.  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,476.  See 
also infra text accompanying notes 533 & 534. 
475   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iv), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.171(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
476   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
477   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See the discussion of 12 C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) in Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,476.  A private equity fund may 
routinely manage or operate a portfolio company so long as no FHC controls the private equity fund.  12 
C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
478   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,476. 
479   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  86 including any director, officer, employee or principal shareholder of the FHC (1) serves as 
general partner, managing member or trustee of the private equity fund; (2) owns or controls in 
the aggregate 25 percent or more of any class of voting shares or similar interests in the fund or 
(3) selects, controls or constitutes a majority of the directors, trustees or management of the 
fund.
480  The adviser of the fund typically establishes the policies that govern the fund’s 
investments and operations, makes investment and disposition decisions on behalf of the fund, 
and otherwise controls the fund and its operations.
481  For this reason, Regulation Y provides that 
an FHC is deemed to control a private equity fund if the FHC owns more than 5 percent of any 
class of voting shares or similar ownership interests in the fund and serves as the fund’s 
investment adviser.
482   
It appears that the rules determining control over a private equity fund
483 are 
exclusive, i.e., they exclude the rules on control and controlling influence that have developed 
under the BHCA.
484  The specific rules on control over a private equity fund apply only to equity 
funds that meet the definition of private equity fund,
485 one of the elements of the definition 
being that the FHC has an investment in the private equity fund.
486  The situation could arise that 
an FHC that has no investment in a private equity fund is found to control that fund under 
application of the general control rules but would not control the fund if it made a small 
investment in the fund.   
An FHC may routinely manage or operate a portfolio company that is owned or 
controlled by a private equity fund, and a private equity fund that is controlled by an FHC may 
routinely manage or operate a portfolio company when the intervention is necessary or required 
to obtain a reasonable return on the FHC’s investment upon resale or other disposition of the 
investment, such as to avoid or address a significant operating loss or in connection with the loss 
of senior management of the portfolio company.
487 
f. 
                                                
Investment Through Funds that Are Not Private Equity Funds 
Although Regulation Y permits certain advantages to funds that meet the 
definition of a private equity fund, Regulation Y also permits FHCs to invest in and control a 
fund that does not meet the definition of a private equity fund.  If the FHC controls the 
non-qualifying fund, then the provisions of Regulation Y, including the provisions governing the 
 
480   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
481   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,476. 
482   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(4)(iv) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
483   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
484   Supra note 11. 
485   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
486   12 C.F.R. § 225.173(a)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
487   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e)(1), in connection with § 225.173(d)(1) & (2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  87 holding periods for portfolio companies, the routine management restrictions, the 
risk-management and recordkeeping requirements, the cross-marketing provisions, and Sections 
23A and 23B, FRA, apply to investments made by the non-qualifying fund in the same manner 
as those provisions would apply if the investment in the portfolio company were held directly by 
the FHC.
488  If the FHC owns a noncontrolling interest in the fund, then the fund is itself 
considered to be a portfolio company and provisions of Regulation Y apply to that investment in 
the same way as they apply to any other investment in a portfolio company.
489 
Thus, under Regulation Y, an FHC may own more than 25 percent of the equity 
of a fund that has an unlimited life (and, consequently, is not a qualifying private equity fund), so 
long as the fund does not hold investments in portfolio companies for more than the 10-year 
holding period that would apply if the FHC held the investment in the portfolio company directly 
and the fund complies with the routine management and other restrictions in Regulation Y.  
Similarly, an FHC may invest in a fund that, in addition to making merchant banking 
investments, engages in other businesses (and, consequently, is not a qualifying private equity 
fund), so long as the FHC does not control the fund, divest its interest in the fund within the 
10-year holding period, and complies with the other provisions of Regulation Y that apply to 
other investments in a portfolio company.
490 
g. 
h. 
                                                
Acting as Agent 
FHCs and their subsidiaries may invest as principal under the merchant banking 
investment authority.  Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
491 makes it clear that an FHC and its 
subsidiaries may also make such investments on behalf of others.  The others may be controlled 
companies (but not a depository institution or their subsidiaries) or third parties.  Thus, e.g., an 
FHC may act as investment adviser to a fund, regardless of whether the FHC is also an investor 
in the fund.
492 
Permitted Types of Investments 
The BHCA is very inclusive in its description of the types of permitted 
merchant/investment banking.  Such investments may be acquired or controlled by the FHC 
directly or indirectly by any subsidiary
493 (other than a depository institution or a subsidiary 
thereof), whether as principal, on behalf of one or more entities (including entities controlled by 
 
488   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,477.  See holding period:  infra D.2.k.; routine 
management restrictions:  infra D.2.l.; risk-management and recordkeeping requirements:  infra D.2.j.; 
cross-marketing provisions:  infra G.3.; application of prudential safeguards and application of §§ 23A and 
23B, FRA:  infra G.4. 
489   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,477. 
490   Id. 
491  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
492  See Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 154. 
493  See the discussions supra note D.2.d. 
  88 the FHC other than a depository institution or subsidiary thereof), or otherwise, and may consist 
of shares, assets, or ownership interests (including debt or equity securities, partnership interests, 
trust certificates, or other instruments representing ownership) of a company or other entity, 
whether or not the FHC or the subsidiary has control over such company or entity, and such 
company or entity may be engaged in any activity.
494 
i. 
                                                
Investment in a Bank or Savings Association 
The question arises whether an FHC may under the authority of Section 
4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
495 acquire a bank or a BHC.  The language of Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA 
permits the target company or entity (the portfolio company) to be “engaged in any activity not 
authorized pursuant to this section [4, BHCA]”.
496  Thus, if the activities of a bank are authorized 
by Section 4, BHCA, a portfolio company could not engage in such activities, i.e., a bank could 
not be a portfolio company.  By clear implication, Section 4, BHCA permits the acquisition of a 
controlling or noncontrolling equity interest in a U.S. bank or BHC
497 and, therefore, a bank 
cannot be a portfolio company.  At any rate, the requirements of Section 3, BHCA are not 
overruled by Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA and any acquisition of a bank or BHC must comply with 
Section 3, BHCA.
498  This conclusion is supported by Section 5(a), BHCA that provides that a 
declaration to become an FHC does not satisfy any requirements to file an application to acquire 
a bank pursuant to Section 3, BHCA.
499  The Board took a clear position on the relation between 
Sections 3 and 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, stating that the merchant banking investment authority does 
 
494  Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.170(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) enumerating the types of ownership interests that may be acquired 
under the merchant banking investment authority.  An FHC may only acquire and hold shares and other 
ownership interests; other assets must be held or promptly transferred to a portfolio company in which the 
FHC has an ownership interest that maintains a corporate separateness from the FHC, has a management 
separate from the FHC and has policies that ensure the limitation of legal liability of the FHC.  12 C.F.R. § 
225.170(e) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(iv) (2002) (Regulation Y).  It is the purpose 
of the separateness provision to avoid a situation in which the corporate veil between the FHC and the 
portfolio company could be pierced.  See infra note 546 (discussing the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil). 
495   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
496  Section 4(k)(4)(H) (introductory paragraph), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
The parenthetical exclusion of depository institutions in § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA refers only to the principal for 
whom the FHC may act as agent.  The Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 154, goes further than 
§ 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, when it states that the target company may be “engaged in any kind of trade or 
business whatsoever”. 
497   Section 4(a)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), provides that no BHC shall 
“acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of the voting shares of any company which is not a bank”.  
Thus, the acquisition of shares of a bank is permitted.  One could also argue that a bank is engaged in some 
of the activities in which an FHC is authorized to engage under § 4, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999), such as § 4(k)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (lending). 
498   12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994). 
499  Section 5(a), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See § 3, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 
(1994). 
  89 not override the prior approval requirements of Section 3, BHCA that govern the acquisition of 
shares of a U.S. bank or BHC, the provisions of Sections 211.8–211.10, Regulation K to the 
extent they apply to the acquisition of a foreign bank,
500 or the provisions of Sections 4(k)(6)(B) 
and 4(j),
501 BHCA that govern the acquisition of shares of a savings association.
502  On the other 
hand, Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA does not incorporate the approach of Section 2(h)(3), BHCA.
503 
j. 
                                                
Management of Portfolio Companies 
The merchant banking investments permitted by Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
504 
need not be noncontrolling in the meaning of the Board’s Policy Statement
505 or the Board’s 
Guidelines
506 and need not be passive in the meaning of Section 4(c)(6), BHCA investments.
507  
Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iv), BHCA provides that during the period when such shares in a portfolio 
company, assets or ownership interests are held by an FHC or a subsidiary of an FHC, the FHC 
may not “routinely manage or operate such company or entity except as may be necessary or 
required to obtain a reasonable return on investment upon resale or disposition”.
508  One might 
 
500   12 C.F.R. §§ 211.8–211.10 (2002) (Regulation K). 
501   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
502   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,469 n.8; Interim Merchant Banking Release, 
supra note 418, at 16,463 n.4.  See also Interim FHC Release, supra note 32, at 3,787 (a company may file 
an application to become a BHC by virtue of the acquisition of a depository institution and an election to 
become an FHC at the same time).   
503  Section 2(h)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(h)(3) (1994), and 12 C.F.R. § 211.23(f)(5)(iii)(B) (2002) 
(Regulation K) require Board approval before a foreign company controlled by a qualifying foreign 
banking organization can acquire a company engaged in the United States in any banking, securities, 
insurance or other financial activities.  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.14 D. 
504   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
505   12 C.F.R. § 225.143 (2002) (Regulation Y, Board Interpretations), 2 FED. RES. REG. SERV. 4-172.1, 68 
FED. RES. BULL. 413 (1982), reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13-843).  See Gruson, supra note 
1, § 10.06 C. 
506   Staff Op. of Nov. 5, 1984, 2 FED. RES. REG. SERV. 4-305.1, reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 60-
055.  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.06 D. 
507  12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994).  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.09 B. 
508  Sections 4(k)(4)(H)(iv), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See 12 C.F.R. § 
225.171(a).  However, in the case of a controlling and actively managed investment there is a risk that 
loans granted to the target company are subject to equitable subordination.  The doctrine of equitable 
subordination gives courts the power to change the relative priorities of claims in bankruptcy cases, in 
effect treating debt claims as equity.  Developed by the United States Supreme Court in the 1930s (see 
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric, 306 U.S. 307 (1939)) the 
doctrine was adopted by the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. § 510(c)). 
As a general matter, courts have been more likely to subordinate claims by “insiders”.  The term insider 
includes any party that has a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject 
to greater scrutiny than those dealing at arm’s length with the debtor.  A lender can be attacked as an 
insider on the basis that he has exercised excessive control over the debtor.  The fact that the lender is the 
dominant creditor is not alone enough to show that the creditor controls the debtor.  There must be evidence 
  90 think that this provision refers to the management of the portfolio company by its board of 
directors.
509  The language of Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iv), BHCA which refers to “routine” 
management and operation of the portfolio company and the legislative history indicate, 
however, that the restriction does not refer to the typical policy setting function of the board of 
directors but to day-to-day management and routine business decisions that typically the officers 
or employees of the corporation are engaged in.
510  An FHC routinely manages or operates a 
portfolio company, for example, if (1) any director, officer or employee of the FHC or a 
subsidiary of the FHC serves as or has the responsibility of an executive officer of the portfolio 
company;
511 (2) any executive officer of the parent FHC or of certain of its major subsidiaries 
serves as or has the responsibility of an officer or employee of the portfolio company;
512 or 
                                                                                                                                                             
of managerial or economic interference before a lender is found to be in control (see National Westminster 
Bank USA v. Century Healthcare Corp., 885 F. Supp. 601, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).  However, control is 
likely to be found when the board of directors of the debtor is not capable of making independent decisions 
concerning the steps which the debtor will take in relation to the repayment of its debts.  See GERALD 
BLANCHARD, 1 LENDER LIABILITY – LAW, PRACTICE AND PREVENTION § 9.08 (1999 & Supp. 2001).  This 
will often be the case if the lender holds or acquires a controlling interest in the debtor’s stock (see In re 
American Lumber Co., 5 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980)). 
 
The doctrine of equitable subordination might well apply where a FHC is a controlling shareholder of a 
company that borrowed from the bank subsidiary of the FHC. 
509  See, e.g., § 141(a) of the Delaware Corporation Law, 4 Del. Code Ann. (1991 Replacement Vol. & 1998 
Supp.) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
510  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 155.  
511   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y).  For a discussion of the subsidiaries of an FHC that are 
included in the term FHC for purposes of the presumptions of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(i) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) (officer of FHC serves as executive officer of portfolio company), see infra note 512 
(second paragraph). 
512   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2002) (Regulation Y).  For purposes of § 225.171(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) (executive officer of FHC serves as officer of portfolio company), FHC means the FHC 
itself and only certain subsidiaries of the FHC, namely:   securities broker-dealers; depository institutions 
(and subsidiaries of such depository institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y)); 
affiliates of the FHC engaged in merchant banking activities under Subpart J of Regulation Y (2002); 
affiliates of the FHC engaged in insurance company portfolio investments (§ 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)); small business investment companies (§ 302(b), Small Business 
Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 682(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) controlled by the FHC or by a 
depository institution controlled by the FHC (the term depository institution includes a branch or agency of 
a foreign bank, 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(b) (2002) (Regulation Y)); any other affiliates engaged in significant 
equity investment activities that are subject to a special capital charge under the capital adequacy rules of 
the Board.  12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Thus, if an executive officer of any of 
such subsidiaries serves as an officer or employee of the portfolio company, the FHC is presumed to 
routinely manage the portfolio company.  The definition of FHC set forth in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.171(b)(1)(ii)(B) supersedes the general FHC definition of 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(a) (2002) (Regulation 
Y) because that general definition only applies “except as otherwise expressly provided”.  Executive officer 
is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(d) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra 
note 418, at 8,471.  See also 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(e)(1) (2002) (Regulation O). 
The definition of FHC contained in 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2002) (Regulation Y) does not apply 
to the situation where a director, officer or employee of the FHC serves as executive officer of the portfolio 
  91 (3) any contractual arrangement exists between the FHC and the portfolio company that would 
restrict the portfolio company’s ability to make routine business decisions, such as entering into 
transactions in the ordinary course of business or hiring officers or employees other than 
executive officers.
513  These presumptions are irrebuttable. 
In addition, Regulation Y contains a rebuttable presumption of routine 
management or operation if any director, officer or employee of the FHC serves as or has the 
responsibility of an officer (other than an executive officer) or employee of the portfolio 
company,
514 or if any officer or employee of the portfolio company is supervised by any director, 
                                                                                                                                                             
company.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The definition of FHC generally 
applicable to Subpart J of Regulation Y (Merchant Banking Investments) applies with one exception to 12 
C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(a)(1) & (2) (2002) (Regulation 
Y).  Pursuant to this general definition, FHC means the FHC and all of its subsidiaries, including private 
equity funds and other funds controlled by the FHC, but does not include a depository institution or 
subsidiaries thereof or any portfolio company controlled, directly or indirectly, by the FHC.  However, for 
purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(a)–(d) (and of § 225.173(d)) (2002) (Regulation Y), depository 
institutions controlled by an FHC and subsidiaries of such depository institutions are treated as FHCs (the 
term depository institution includes a branch or agency of a foreign bank, 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(b) (2002) 
(Regulation Y)).  Thus, the exception for depository institutions in the general FHC definition does not 
apply.  12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Consequently, a director, officer or employee of 
an FHC or of any subsidiary of the FHC may not serve as an executive officer of a portfolio company of 
the FHC; and, as stated above, subsidiary includes depository institutions controlled by the FHC and 
subsidiaries of such depository institutions (including branches and agencies of foreign banks), as well as 
private equity funds or other funds controlled by the FHC.  Directors, officers or employees of such entities 
may not serve as executive officers of a portfolio company.  The term subsidiary does not include portfolio 
companies controlled by the FHC and directors, officers or employees of one portfolio company of any 
FHC may serve as executive officers of another portfolio company of such FHC.  12 C.F.R. § 
225.177(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
 
The use of different definitions of FHCs for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(i) and (ii)(A) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) and the resulting difference in the groups of subsidiaries whose officers could violate the 
prohibition on routine management is curious.  The Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 
8,471 seems to imply that the FHC definition of 12 C.F.R. 225.171(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2002) (Regulation Y) is 
necessary to enlarge the scope of affected officers.  In fact, however, it limits the scope.  See the words 
“only the following subsidiaries” in 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The 
definitional maze built around the term FHC does not appear to meet the plain language requirement of 12 
U.S.C. § 4809 (1999 & Supp. V 1999). 
513   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(iii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  It is noteworthy that 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(iii) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) only refers to covenants and agreements, not to charter or by-law restrictions.  FHC 
for purposes of this presumption is the FHC and its subsidiaries as determined for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 
225.171(b)(1)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra note 512 (second paragraph). 
514   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(2)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The method by which the presumption may be 
rebutted is set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  FHC for purposes of this 
presumption is the FHC and its subsidiaries as determined for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(i) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra note 512 (second paragraph). 
  92 officer or employee of the FHC (other than in that individual’s capacity as a director of the 
portfolio company).
515   
Directors, officers and employees of the FHC may constitute a majority of the 
board of the portfolio company.
516  However, where an FHC controls the board of directors of a 
portfolio company, the board must refrain from engaging in day-to-day management functions, 
although the board has the right to do so under corporate law.
517   
                                                 
515   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(2)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The method by which the presumption may be 
rebutted is set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  FHC for purposes of this 
presumption is the FHC and its subsidiaries as determined for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(1)(i) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra note 512 (second paragraph). 
The rebuttable presumption of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) is supported by the 
legislative history of the GLBA.  The Conference Report on S. 990, supra note 4, at 155 indicates that the 
service of FHC officers and employees as officers and employees of the portfolio company might be 
permissible when it states that the prohibition on routine management is “irrespective of any overlap 
between board members and officers of the FHC and the portfolio company”.  See also the colloquy 
between Senator Bennett and Senator Gramm, infra note 517.  Personnel overlap might be advisable, for 
instance, if a staff member of the finance department of the FHC is sent for a period of time to the portfolio 
company.  It does not necessarily indicate involvement in routine management; it is rather unlikely that the 
delegated staff member will get day-to-day instructions from the FHC. 
516   The Conference Report on S. 900 supra note 4, at 155 states that the prohibition on routine management is 
“irrespective of any overlap between board members and officers of the FHC and the portfolio company” 
and thereby seems to envision any overlap, even an overlap that gives directors and employees of the FHC 
a majority on the board of the portfolio company.  12 C.F.R. § 225.171(d)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
provides that an FHC may select any or all of the directors of a portfolio company or have one or more of 
its directors, officers or employees serve as directors of the portfolio company, if the portfolio company 
employs officers and employees responsible for routinely managing and operating the portfolio company 
and the FHC does not routinely manage or operate the portfolio company.  The selection of partners 
(including the general partners) of a partnership is considered to be the equivalent of selecting the directors 
of a company.  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,472.  A representative of an FHC 
that serves as a director of a portfolio company may participate fully in those matters that are typically 
presented to directors, except that the director may not participate in the day-to-day operations of the 
portfolio company or in management decisions that are made in the ordinary course of business and not 
customarily presented to the directors of a company.  See id. at 8,472. 
A director, officer or employee of a depository institution (or a subsidiary thereof) or a U.S. branch or 
agency of a foreign bank may serve as director of a portfolio company to the same extent as would be 
permitted for a director of an FHC.  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra, at 8,473.  This follows 
from 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(a) in connection with § 225.171(f)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) which defines FHC 
for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171 (2002) (Regulation Y) to include a depository institution controlled by 
the FHC (and a subsidiary of such depository institution) and thereby modifies the FHC definition 
contained in 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Branches and agencies of foreign banks are 
depository institutions for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171 (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.177(b) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  A director, officer or employee of any subsidiary of an FHC (including a private 
equity fund or other fund controlled by the FHC) may serve as director of a portfolio company to the same 
extent as would be permitted for a director of an FHC.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
(defining FHC for purposes of Subpart J of Regulation Y to include subsidiaries of the FHC). 
517  A colloquy between Senator Bennett and Senator Gramm supports this interpretation: 
  93 If the FHC or its affiliates only elect a minority of the board of directors, neither 
the FHC nor its affiliates have the power to manage or operate the portfolio company.  However, 
on the basis of provisions in the charter or bylaws of the portfolio company or on the basis of a 
shareholder agreement, the FHC could make the decisions of the portfolio company dependent 
on its or its affiliate’s consent.  Regulation Y sets forth examples of permissible covenants and 
agreements between an FHC and a portfolio company that restrict the ability of the portfolio 
company to take actions outside of its ordinary course of business or require the portfolio 
company to consult with or obtain the approval of the FHC with respect to such actions.
518  Such 
restrictions and consultation rights are not limited by Regulation Y to FHCs that only own a 
minority interest in a portfolio company, but, as a practical matter, an FHC that owns a majority 
interest in a portfolio company does not need such rights.  The approach of Regulation Y to 
provide a list of examples of permissible restrictions and consultation rights but not to provide a 
list of impermissible restrictions gives the FHC certain safe harbors.  Regulation Y further 
permits FHCs to provide financial, investment and management consulting advice to a portfolio 
company, to provide underwriting and private placement services to a portfolio company in 
connection with the portfolio company’s securities, and have consultations with officers and 
                                                                                                                                                             
  Mr. BENNETT.  Mr. President, I rise to engage the distinguished chairman of 
the Banking Committee in a colloquy on the ability of insurance companies to make 
investments that are treated as “financial in nature” under this legislation even though the 
investments are made in companies that are not engaged in financial activities. 
  Am I correct that overlap between board members and officers of a financial 
holding company and a portfolio company in which an insurance company has an 
investment is not intended to result necessarily in a determination that the holding 
company routinely manages or operates the portfolio company? Or to state this intention 
another way, the existence of routine holding company management or operation is to be 
based upon an assessment of actual holding company involvement in day-to-day 
management and operations of the portfolio company, rather than board member or 
officer overlaps. 
  Mr. GRAMM.  Mr. President, the understanding of the Senator from Utah is 
correct. 
 145  CONG. REC. S13,902 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(d)(1)(ii) (2002) (Regulation 
Y). 
518   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  It is noteworthy that § 225.171(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation 
Y) only refers to (written) covenants and agreements, not to charter or by-law restrictions.  The Section 
does not prohibit agreements among shareholders of a portfolio company, it only prohibits agreements with 
the portfolio company.  The FHC’s consulting advice must not lead to a responsibility for decision-making 
or for day-to-day management or operations of the portfolio company, and the meetings with officers and 
employees of the portfolio company must not lead to such management or operation.  See Final Merchant 
Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,472.  The Final Merchant Banking Release, id., refers only to 
“regular or periodic” meetings with officers and employees of the portfolio company.  However, nothing in 
12 C.F.R. § 25.171(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) excludes ad hoc meetings. 
  94 employees of the portfolio company to monitor or provide advice with respect to the portfolio 
company’s performance or activities.
519   
The approach of Section 225.171, Regulation Y
520 to set forth acts that are 
irrebuttably or rebuttably presumed to constitute routine management and control and acts that 
do not constitute routine management and control leaves, of course, a wide range of unallocated 
acts.  These acts are permissible for FHCs if they do not constitute routine management and 
control.  Regulation Y does not provide a presumption for such unallocated acts. 
A more active role on the part of the FHC and its subsidiaries
521 is permitted 
when intervention by the FHC is necessary or required to obtain a reasonable return on the 
FHC’s investment in the portfolio company upon resale or other disposition.
 522  Section 
225.171(e)(1), Regulation Y
523 adds to the permission of the FHC to intervene in the 
management of the portfolio company in order to obtain a reasonable return, the following 
                                                 
519   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(d)(3)(i)–(iii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The consulting advice must be consistant with 
and subject to any restrictions on such activities contained in 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(6) or in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.86(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.171(d)(3)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
520   12 C.F.R. § 225.171 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
521   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) (defining FHC as including all of its subsidiaries, 
including private equity funds and other funds controlled by the FHC, but as excluding any depository 
institution or subsidiary thereof); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(2) & (3) (2002) (Regulation Y) (for purposes of 
12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e) (2002) (Regulation Y) the term FHC does not include a depository institution 
controlled by the FHC and a subsidiary of such depository institution; however, there is an exception for 
certain subsidiaries of depository institutions); and 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) (a 
depository institution and a subsidiary of a depository institution may not routinely manage and operate a 
portfolio company in which an affiliated FHC owns or controls an interest).  This prohibition also applies 
to branches and agencies of foreign banks.  12 C.F.R. § 225.177(b) (2002) (Regulation Y).   
  12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) lists certain subsidiaries of FHC-controlled depository 
institutions as being included in the definition of FHC for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) and states that such subsidiaries may routinely manage or operate a portfolio company in 
which the FHC has an investment in accordance with 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The 
provision on its face contradicts 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) that prohibits depository 
institutions and all subsidiaries of depository institutions from routinely managing or operating portfolio 
companies pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e) (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(3) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) is intended to be an exception to the prohibition of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) as if that Section read “A depository institution and a subsidiary of a depository institution, 
other than a subsidiary referred to in § 225.171(f)(3), may not routinely manage or operate a portfolio 
company …”.  The purpose of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) is not clear in any event.  If 
an FHC may routinely manage a portfolio company, and if pursuant to 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.177(a)(2) and 
225.171(f)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) a depository institution subsidiary of an FHC (and the subsidiaries of 
such depository institution) is not included in the term FHC for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e) (2002) 
(Regulation Y), the provisions of 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(f)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) that depository 
institutions and their subsidiaries may not routinely manage or operate is superfluous and only adds to the 
definitional confusion. 
522   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  This Section of Regulation Y is based on 
§ 4(k)(4)(H)(iv), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
523   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  95 words:  “such as to avoid or address a significant operating loss or in connection with the loss of 
senior management at the portfolio company”.  If the language is read as an exclusive description 
of the situations in which intervention by the FHC in the portfolio company’s management is 
necessary to obtain a reasonable return, Regulation Y would be substantially narrower than the 
statutory language of Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iv), BHCA.
524  However, the Board has stated that the 
situations mentioned in Section 225.171(e)(1), Regulation Y are examples and do not represent 
an exclusive list of situations when an FHC may permissibly intervene in the routine 
management of a portfolio company.
525  Still, there is a certain contradiction in Section 
225.171(e)(1), Regulation Y when it permits routine management by the FHC of the portfolio 
company if necessary “to obtain a reasonable return” but the triggering event for such routine 
management is a “significant operating loss”.  An FHC should be concerned about a reasonable 
return upon resale if the portfolio company generates a below average rate of return.
526 
An FHC may routinely manage or operate a portfolio company only for the period 
of time as may be necessary to address the cause of the FHC’s involvement, to obtain suitable 
alternative management arrangements, to dispose of the investment, or to otherwise obtain a 
reasonable return upon the resale or other disposition of the investment.
527  However, an FHC 
may not routinely manage or operate a portfolio company for a period greater than 9 months 
without prior written notice to the Board.
528  An FHC must maintain and make available to the 
Board upon request a written record describing its involvement in routinely managing or 
operating a portfolio company.
529 
                                                 
524   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  That Section permits routine management or 
operation “as may be necessary or required to obtain a reasonable return on investment upon resale or 
disposition”. 
525   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,473. 
526   A colloquy between Senator Bennett and Senator Gramm supports this interpretation.   
  Mr. BENNETT.  Mr. President, I also inquire of the distinguished chairman of 
the Banking Committee whether I am also correct that the exception under which a 
holding company may routinely manage or operate a portfolio company when necessary 
or required to obtain a reasonable return on investment is intended to apply to an 
investment in a company that has been generating a below average rate of return on 
investment either at the time the holding company becomes a bank holding company or 
that generates a below average rate of return at a subsequent time? 
    Mr. GRAMM.  Mr. President, the understanding of the Senator from Utah is 
 also  correct. 
145 CONG. REC. S13,902 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999).  Whereas the colloquy refers to a below-average 
return, 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) requires a significant operating loss. 
527   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
528   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y).  As to the form and content of the notice, see Final 
Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,473. 
529   12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  96 k. 
l. 
                                                
Holding  Period 
The Board interprets the requirement that the merchant banking investment must 
be held “for a period of time to enable the sale or disposition thereof on a reasonable basis”
530 as 
meaning that an FHC may hold a merchant banking investment for up to 10 years, except that a 
merchant banking investment in or held through a private equity fund may be held for the 
duration of the fund (which may not exceed 15 years).
531  In unusual circumstances an FHC may 
seek Board approval to hold an interest in a portfolio company in excess of 10 years 
(respectively, 15 years).
532  However, an FHC that holds a merchant banking investment in 
excess of 10 years or in excess of the duration of the private equity fund must, for purposes of 
determining the FHC’s regulatory capital, apply to the FHC’s adjusted carrying value of the 
shares, assets, or ownership interests held in excess of the holding period, a capital charge 
determined by the Board
533 and abide by any other restrictions that the Board may impose in 
connection with granting approval of the extension of the holding period.
534  
Risk Management, Record Keeping and Reporting 
An FHC, including a private equity fund
535 controlled by an FHC, that makes 
merchant banking investments must establish and maintain policies, procedures, records, and 
systems reasonably designed to conduct such investments in a safe and sound manner, to manage 
the risk associated with such investments in a safe and sound manner and to monitor compliance 
with the statutory and regulatory provisions governing such investments.
536  The requirements of 
risk management, record keeping, and reporting policies with which an FHC has to comply when 
making merchant banking investments are set forth in Section 225.175, Regulation Y.
537  In 
 
530  Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See 12 C.F.R. § 
225.172(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
531  12 C.F.R. §§ 225.172(b)(1) & 225.173(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Private Equity Fund is defined in 12 
C.F.R. § 225.173(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) and discussed supra D.2.e.  12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) contains provisions determining when an interest in a portfolio company was acquired if it 
was acquired by the FHC from, or transferred by the FHC to, a company in which the FHC held an interest.  
12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) addresses the issue of interests previously held by an 
FHC under a limited authority.  12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(2) & (3) (2002) (Regulation Y) also applies to 
interests in, held through or acquired from a private equity fund.  12 C.F.R. § 225.173(c)(3) (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
532  12 C.F.R. §§ 225.172(b)(4) & (5) and  225.173(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
533   12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(6)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The capital charge must not be less than 25 percent of 
the adjusted carrying value of the investment 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(6)(i)(B) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
534   12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(6)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
(approval required to hold interest in excess of time limit). 
535   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.173(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra D. 2. e. 
536   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 
8,478. 
537   12 C.F.R. § 225.175 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  97 addition, the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation of the Board has issued a 
Supervisory Guidance on Equity Investment and Merchant Banking Activities [herein the 
Guidance Letter].
538  Although the Guidance Letter applies to equity investments made under 
any authority in nonfinancial companies,
539 it is particularly relevant for equity investments 
under the merchant banking investment authority.  The Guidance Letter “discusses basic safety 
and soundness issues regarding the management of equity investments, and identifies sound 
investment and risk management practices that merit the attention of both management and 
supervisors”
540 and describes in detail the internal controls and risk management policies, 
procedures and systems that the Board expects BHCs engaged in equity investment activities to 
have and to maintain in order to conduct such activities in a safe and sound manner.  The 
Guidance Letter notes that foreign banks should incorporate the basic principles set forth in the 
Guidance Letter into their U.S. operations with appropriate adaptation to reflect the fact that 
those operations are an integral part of a foreign bank, which should be managing its risks on a 
consolidated basis and that the bank is subject to overall supervision by its home country 
authorities.
541 
The risk management, record keeping and reporting requirements of Regulation Y 
and the Guidance Letter can be summarized as follows: 
Internal Risk Management Requirements 
Regulation Y
542 requires FHCs engaged in merchant banking investment activities 
to establish policies, procedures and systems and maintain records reasonably designed to: 
 Monitor and assess the carrying value, market value and performance of each 
investment and such values of the FHC’s aggregate merchant banking investment 
portfolio;
543 
 Identify and manage the market, credit, concentration and other risks associated 
with merchant banking investments;
544 
                                                 
538   Board, SR Letter No. 00-9 (SPE) (June 22, 2000). 
539   Guidance Letter, supra note 538, sub II, at 2, 3. 
540   Cover Letter to Guidance Letter, supra note 538, at 2. 
541   Guidance Letter, supra note 538, sub II, at 3. 
542   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 
8,479 states that the list of policies, procedures, records and systems set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) is only intended to identify some of the most important elements of a sound 
approach to monitoring merchant banking investment activities. 
543   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
544   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  98  Identify, monitor and assess the terms, amounts and risks arising from 
transactions and relationships (including contingent fees or contingent interests) 
between the FHC and the portfolio companies;
545 
 Ensure the maintenance of corporate separateness between the FHC and the 
portfolio companies in order to protect the FHC and its depository institution 
subsidiaries from legal liability for the operations conducted and financial 
obligations of any of the portfolio companies;
546 and 
 Ensure compliance with Subpart J (Merchant Banking Investments) of Regulation 
Y and other provisions of law governing transactions and relationships between 
the FHC and portfolio companies.
547 
In addition, the Guidance Letter recommends that FHCs should implement 
“sound management practices”.
548  These practices include: 
 Oversight:  Active oversight by the FHC’s board of directors and senior 
management.  The board should approve portfolio objectives and investment 
                                                 
545   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1)(iii) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
546   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1)(iv) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Clause (iv) connects the requirement to maintain 
corporate separateness and the protection against piercing the corporate veil with an “and”.  The meaning 
seems to be that corporate separateness must be maintained in order to prevent piercing the corporate veil.  
Generally, the principle that shareholders are not personally liable for corporate debts is fundamental to the 
concept of the corporation as a separate legal entity.  Due to the importance of the concept of limited 
liability, courts will not lightly disregard the corporate entity (see Laya v. Erin Homes Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93 
(W. Va. 1986)).  In exceptional circumstances, however, they may do so and “pierce the corporate veil.”  
Although the different states may have somewhat different standards about the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil, there is a common understanding as to the basic rules.  Courts have disregarded the 
corporate separateness of a subsidiary in cases where a combination of factors indicates that the 
relationship between the parent and the subsidiary is too close or that the parent corporation dominates the 
activities of the subsidiary in a certain way.  This occurs typically, when fraud is involved or the legal 
fiction serves as a barrier to righting illegal acts (see United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. 
Supp. 1377–1378 (D. Del. 1972)) and when the corporation is the mere instrumentality, alter ego or agent 
of the parent corporation (see Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 99 A.2d 490, 493 (Del. 1953)); see also 
Advocat v. Nexus Indus., 497 F. Supp. 328, 334–335 (D. Del. 1980).  For a detailed list of factors that are 
relevant in the decision whether a corporate entity will be held liable for the actions of a subsidiary, see 
Laya, 352 S.E.2d, at 98-99.  See generally EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE 
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATE LAW:  FUNDAMENTALS at 797 (2000 ed.).  Although the separate 
corporate entity will be ignored when the controlling stockholder treats the corporation as if it were a facet 
of his own personality or when the corporate formalities have been disregarded, mere control, even the total 
ownership of a corporation is not in itself sufficient for ignoring the separate entity.  See Buechner v. 
Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 154 A.2d 684 (Del. 1959).  Additionally, common management 
between affiliated corporations is not a basis for disregarding the corporate entity absent some showing that 
fraud is involved or that the subsidiary is the alter ego of the parent.  See Advocat v. Nexus Indus., 497 F. 
Supp. at 335 (D. Del. 1980). 
547   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1)(v) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Clause (v) specifically refers to fiduciary principles 
and to §§ 23A & 23B, FRA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c & 371c-1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See infra G.4. 
548   See Guidance Letter, supra note 538, sub III, at 3. 
  99 strategies and policies, limits on aggregate investment and exposure amounts, 
types of investments and diversification-related aspects of equity investments.  
The board should actively monitor the performance and risk profile of the equity 
investment business in light of its established objectives, strategies and policies.  
The board should ensure that there is an effective management structure for 
conducting the institution’s equity activities, including adequate systems for 
measuring, monitoring, controlling and reporting on the risks of equity 
investments, and should specify lines of authority and responsibility for 
acquisition and sales of investments.
549 
Senior management must ensure that there are adequate policies, procedures and 
management information systems for managing equity investment activities on a 
day-to-day and longer-term basis and that there is competent staff.
550 
 Management of the Investment Process: 
 Policies and Limits:  The FHC must have effective policies that (i) govern 
the types and amounts of investments that may be made; (ii) provide 
guidelines on appropriate holding periods for different types of 
investments; (iii) establish parameters for portfolio diversification;
551 (iv) 
govern compensation arrangements, including co-investment structures 
and sale of portfolio company interests by employees of the FHC;
552 (v) 
govern the terms and conditions of employee loans and sales of 
participants’ interests prior to the release of the lien securing such loans in 
connection with key employees’ co-investments;
553 and (vi) limit the legal 
liability of the FHC and its affiliates for the financial obligations and 
liabilities of the portfolio companies.
554 
 Procedures:  The FHC must have procedures for assessing, approving and 
reviewing investments based upon the size, nature and risk profile of an 
investment.  This includes (i) analytical assessments of investment 
opportunities and formal approval process; (ii) internal risk rating for 
equity investments; (iii) periodic and timely review of the FHC’s equity 
investments; (iv) valuation accounting policies and procedures; (v) exit 
strategies; (vi) policies and procedures to govern the sale, exchange or 
                                                 
549   Id. sub III A, at 4–5. 
550   Id. sub III A, at 5. 
551   Id. sub III B, at 5. 
552   Id. sub III B, at 6. 
553   Id. sub III C, at 12. 
554   See Guidance Letter, supra note 538, sub V, at 14.  See supra note 546 (discussing the doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil) and note 508 (discussing the doctrine of equitable subordination). 
  100 other disposition of the FHC’s investments; (vii) internal methods for 
allocating economic capital based on the risk inherent in the investment 
activities; and (viii) terms and conditions of employee loans and sales of 
participants’ interests prior to the release of the liens securing such loans 
in connection with key employees’ co-investments.
555 
 Control System:  An adequate system of internal controls, with appropriate checks 
and balances and clear audit trails, that focuses on all of the elements of the 
investment management process including:  (i) the appropriateness of existing 
policies and procedures; (ii) the adherence to policies and procedures; (iii) the 
integrity and adequacy of investment valuations, risk identification, regulatory 
compliance, and management reporting; (iv) departures from policies and 
procedure; and (v) compliance with all federal laws and regulations applicable to 
an FHC’s investment activities (in particular compliance with prohibition on 
impermissible control over equity investments
556 and compliance with restrictions 
on cross-marketing between depository institution and portfolio companies of 
FHCs.)
557 
It seems clear that the policies and procedures described above are expected to be 
at the top-tier FHC level and applied by it on a consolidated basis to its subsidiaries.  
Accordingly, any subsidiary of an FHC should be informed of the policies and procedures that it 
would be expected to follow when engaged in merchant banking investments, including 
reporting requirements to the parent FHC. 
Record Keeping Requirements 
Regulation Y requires FHCs to keep records designed to conduct, monitor and 
manage the investment activities and the risks associated with such investments in a safe and 
sound manner.
558   
The Guidance Letter recommends the following record keeping measures:
559 
 documentation of key elements of the investment process, including initial due 
diligence, approval reviews, valuation and disposition; 
 documentation of board-approved objectives, strategies, policies and 
procedures;
560 
                                                 
555   Id. sub III B, at 6–10. 
556   See, e.g., supra D.2.j. (impermissible control over portfolio companies); Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.09 B 
(impermissible control over § 4(c)(6), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994), investments). 
557   See Guidance Letter, supra note 538, sub III C, at 10–11.  See infra G.3. (limitations on cross-marketing). 
558   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
559   See Guidance Letter, supra note 538, sub III C, at 11. 
  101  records of transactions between an FHC and companies held under the merchant 
banking investment authority, specifically documentation transactions that are not 
on market terms; 
 documentation of incentive arrangements in connection with controlling or 
advising a fund, including the carrying value and market value of the arrangement 
and amounts that may be payable based on future asset performance; and 
 documentation of the legal separation between the FHC and the portfolio 
company.
561 
Regulation Y does not require an FHC to maintain the records at a central 
location.  Instead, an FHC must be able to identify and promptly make the records – wherever 
located – available to the Board upon request.
562 
Reporting Requirements 
Upon request by the Board or the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank, an FHC 
must make the policies, procedures and records maintained with respect to its merchant banking 
investments available to the Board or the Federal Reserve Bank.
563  Furthermore, an FHC must 
provide reports to the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank in such format and at such times as the 
Board may prescribe.
564 
FHCs must file both annual and quarterly reports with the appropriate Federal 
Reserve Bank in such format as shall be prescribed by the Board.
565 
                                                                                                                                                             
560   Id. sub III A, at 4 & sub III C, at 11. 
561   Id. sub III C, at 11.  It appear that this documentation requirement would apply to a controlled investment 
and that the Board expects that the FHC will maintain the usual corporate forms necessary to avoid 
“piercing the corporate veil.”  See supra note 546. 
562   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,479. 
563   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
564   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(b) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
565   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(b) (2002) (Regulation Y).  For foreign banking organizations (including FBOs that 
have elected FHC status), see Board Form FR Y-10F, OMB Number 7100-0297 (expires Dec. 31, 2003) 
(Report of Changes in FBO Organizational Structure) containing the Investments and Activities Schedule 
that collects information on acquisitions and sales of reportable entities.  The reportable events include the 
acquisition of control of nonbanking companies and certain large merchant banking investments.  See 
Report of Changes in FBO Organizational Structure (FR Y-10F) – Specific Instructions for the Investments 
and Activities Schedule, and – General Instructions, Reportable Entities.  Form FR Y-10F must be filed by 
FBOs, i.e., foreign banks that operate a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United 
States or that control a bank in the United States and any company of which the foreign bank is a 
subsidiary.  See FR Y-10 and Y-10F Glossary and 12 C.F.R. § 211.21(o) (2002) (Regulation K).  See infra 
note 696 discussing that compliance with Form FR Y-10F can be very onerous.  Reports on Form FR Y-
10F must be received within 30 calendar days of the occurrence of the reportable transaction.  For U.S. 
BHCs (including BHCs that have elected FHC status but not FBOs controlling a U.S. bank) and U.S. 
  102 Notice Requirements for Acquisitions of Interests in Portfolio Companies 
The notice requirements are discussed elsewhere.
566 
Disclosure of Merchant Banking Investment Activities 
The Guidance Letter recommends that FHCs adequately disclose to the public 
relevant information that is necessary for the markets to assess the risk profiles and performance 
of the FHCs’ merchant banking investment activities.  FHCs are encouraged to disclose 
information relating to:
567 
 The size of their merchant banking investment portfolios; 
 The types and nature of their merchant banking investments, such as 
direct/indirect, domestic/international, public/private and equity/debt with 
conversion rights; 
 The initial cost, carrying value, and fair value of investments, and where 
applicable, comparisons to publicly quoted share values of portfolio companies; 
 The accounting techniques and valuation methodologies, including key 
assumptions and practices affecting valuation and changes in those practices; 
 The realized gains and losses arising from sales and unrealized gains and losses; 
and 
 Any insights regarding the potential performance of equity investments under 
alternative market conditions. 
The Guidance Letter recognizes that disclosure regarding each of the above issues 
might not be appropriate, relevant or sufficient in every case.
568 
 
Institutions Lending to or Engaging in Other Transactions with Portfolio 
Companies 
 
Additional risk management issues may arise when a banking institution 
subsidiary of an FHC or an affiliate lends to or has other business relationships with:  (i) a 
company in which the FHC or an affiliate has invested (i.e., a portfolio company); (ii) the 
general partner or manager of a private equity fund that has also invested in a portfolio company; 
                                                                                                                                                             
banks, see Board Form FR Y-10, OMB Number 7100-0297 (expires Dec. 31, 2003) (Report of Changes in 
Organizational Structure). 
566   See infra F. 
567   See Guidance Letter, supra note 538, at 14–15. 
568   See id. at 12. 
  103 or (iii) a private equity-financed company in which the FHC does not hold a direct or indirect 
ownership interest but which is an investment or portfolio company of a general partner or fund 
manager with which the FHC has other investments.  Given their potentially higher than normal 
risk attributes, FHCs should devote special attention to ensuring that the terms and conditions of 
such lending relationships are at arm’s length and are consistent with the lending policies and 
procedures of the institution.  Similar issues may arise in the context of derivatives transactions 
with or guaranteed by portfolio companies and general partners.
569  
Where a banking institution subsidiary of an FHC lends to a private equity-
financed company in which it has no equity interest but where the borrowing company is a 
portfolio investment of private equity fund managers or general partners with which the 
institution may have other private-equity related relationships, care must be taken to ensure that 
the extension of credit is conducted on reasonable terms.
570 
Private Equity and Other Funds 
If an FHC controls a private equity fund or other fund that makes merchant 
banking investments, the FHC must ensure that the fund has established the types of policies, 
procedures and systems and maintains the types of records described in Regulation Y for making 
and monitoring the fund’s merchant banking investments or, alternatively, the FHC may ensure 
that the fund is subject to the FHC’s merchant banking policies, procedures and systems.
571  
These requirements do not apply if the FHC does not control the fund.
572  Nevertheless, an FHC 
must apply its merchant banking policies, procedures and systems to any investment made by the 
FHC in any fund that is controlled by an unaffiliated entity.
573 
                                                 
569   Id. at 13.  Lending and other business transactions between an insured depository institution and a portfolio 
company that meets the definition of an affiliate must be negotiated on an arm’s-length basis, in accordance 
with § 23B, FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See infra G.4.  The FHC should have 
systems and policies in place to monitor transactions between the FHC, or a nondepository institution 
subsidiary of the FHC, and a portfolio company.  (These transactions are not typically governed by § 23B, 
FRA.)  An FHC should assure that the risks of these transactions, including exposures of the FHC on a 
consolidated basis to a single portfolio company, are reasonably limited and that all transactions are on 
reasonable terms, with special attention paid to transactions that are not on market terms.  See id. at 13. 
570   Id. at 13.  Reliance on implicit guarantees or comfort letters should not substitute for reliance on a sound 
borrower that is expected to service its debt with its own resources.  As with any type of credit extension, 
absent a written contractual guarantee, the credit quality of a private equity fund manager, general partner, 
or other third party should not be used to upgrade the internal credit risk rating of the borrower company or 
prevent the classification or special mention of a loan.  Id. 
571   12 C.F.R. § 225.175(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) applies to private equity funds controlled by an FHC.  See 
Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,479. 
572   Id. 
573   Id. 
  104 Board Review of Risk Management Policies 
The Board has announced that it generally will conduct a review of the 
investment and risk management policies, procedures and systems of an FHC that makes 
merchant banking investments within a short period after the FHC commences the activity.  The 
review may be conducted off-site or on-site, depending on the expected level and complexity of 
the FHC’s merchant banking investments and the FHC’s previous experience in making equity 
investments under other legal authorities.
574 
m. 
                                                
Capital Requirements for Equity Investments in Nonfinancial 
Companies 
Although it is the basic concept of the GLBA amendments to the BHCA that an 
FHC should be permitted to engage in financial activities because the depository institution 
subsidiary of the FHC is in large part immunized from financial difficulties of the FHC by the 
higher capital requirements imposed on it, and that banks, securities firms and insurance 
companies should be permitted to join in a holding company system without any requirements 
other than those set forth in the BHCA, the Board has not resisted the temptation to make the 
formation of FHCs less attractive by imposing special capital requirements on FHCs that engage 
in merchant banking investments. This action is questionable because the GLBA amendments to 
the BHCA enumerate in great detail all conditions for the formation of an FHC, and the statute 
leaves no room for additional substantial regulatory entry barriers.  The Board’s rule imposing 
special capital requirements on FHCs that engage in merchant banking investments undermine 
the basic concept of the GLBA.  The Board’s staff has indicated that the Board will not apply 
this capital surcharge to foreign banks maintaining a branch, agency or commercial lending 
company in the United States that elect to be FHCs. 
The Board initially proposed to impose a 50 percent capital surcharge on FHCs 
for merchant banking investments.
575  Thereafter, the Board imposed until April 1, 2002 on 
 
574   Id. at 8,479. 
575   Under that proposed rule, a BHC would have been required to deduct from its Tier 1 capital an amount 
equal to 50 percent of the total carrying value, as reflected on the consolidated financial statements of the 
BHC, of all consolidated merchant banking investments made pursuant to § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), by the BHC or by its direct or indirect subsidiaries.  The total 
carrying value of any merchant banking investment subject to this capital deduction would be excluded 
from the BHC’s assets for purposes of calculating the asset denominator of the risk-based and leverage 
ratios.  In the case of nonconsolidated merchant banking investments, the total carrying value of any 
merchant banking investment subject to this capital deduction would be excluded from the BHC’s assets 
for purposes of calculating the asset denominator of the risk-based and leverage capital ratios.  The capital 
charges would also have applied, subject to certain exceptions, to all debt extended by a BHC to a 
nonfinancial company in which the FHC owns 15 percent or more of the total equity.  See proposed Board 
rule of Mar. 17, 2000 (Regulation Y, Docket No. R-1067), 65 Fed. Reg. 16,482 (Mar. 28, 2000), amending 
app. A (II. B.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs).  See also Board release 
accompanying this rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480–83 (Mar. 28, 2000);  Letter, dated May 19, 2000, from 
Michael Gruson, Bradley K. Sabel and Jonathan M. Weld to the Secretary of the Board commenting on the 
proposed Board rule of March 17, 2000.  The proposed rule would have applied the same capital treatment 
to investments made directly or indirectly by a BHC in a nonfinancial company under any investment 
authority. 
  105 FHCs the requirement to obtain Board approval before making additional merchant banking 
investments if the aggregate carrying value of all merchant banking investments held by the FHC 
exceeded (1) 30 percent of the Tier 1 capital of the FHC or (2) after excluding investments in 
private equity funds, 20 percent of the Tier 1 capital of the FHC.
576 
Finally, the Board adopted a rule that establishes for FHCs special minimum 
capital requirements for equity investments made on or after March 13, 2000 in nonfinancial 
companies and applies symmetrically to equity investments by banks and BHCs (including 
FHCs).
577  The rule is based on the following principles: 
 equity investment activities in nonfinancial companies generally involve greater 
risks than traditional bank and financial activities; 
 the risk of loss associated with a particular equity investment is likely to be the 
same regardless of the legal authority used to make the investment or whether the 
investment is held by a BHC or a bank; and 
 the financial risks to an organization engaged in equity investment activities 
increases as the level of the organization’s investments accounts for a larger 
portion of its capital, earnings and activities.
578 
In light of these principles, the rule provides for a progression of Tier 1 marginal 
capital charges on covered equity investments that increases with the size of the aggregate equity 
                                                 
576   12 C.F.R. § 225.174(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  This Section speaks about the acquisition of additional 
shares, assets or ownership interests under Subpart J (Merchant Banking Investments) of Regulation Y and 
the making of any additional capital contributions to any company, the shares, assets or ownership interests 
of which are held by the FHC under Subpart J of Regulation Y.  12 C.F.R. § 225.174(a) (2002) (Regulation 
Y) applies to the acquisition by the FHC of interests in a private equity fund, but it does not apply to any 
interest in a company held by a private equity fund or to any interest in the fund held by a person that is not 
affiliated with the FHC.  12 C.F.R. § 225.174(b) (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.174(b) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) only refers to any interest held by a [nonaffiliated] person.  The Final Merchant Banking 
Release, supra note 418, at 8,478 makes it clear that this Section is meant to refer to any interest in a 
private equity fund. 
12 C.F.R. § 225.174 remains in effect until the effective date of a final rule issued by the Board that 
specifically addresses the regulatory capital treatment of merchant banking investments.  12 C.F.R. § 
225.174(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  A final rule concerning regulatory capital treatment of nonfinancial 
equity investments, see infra note 577, becomes effective on Apr. 1, 2002. 
577   See app. A (II. B. 5.) (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs: Risk-Based Measure) and app. D (Capital 
Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs: Tier 1 Leverage Measure) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, 67 Fed. Reg. 3,800 (Jan. 
25, 2002) (to be codified in 2003).  These amendments were accompanied by a joint release by the Board, 
the OCC and the FDIC, 67 Fed. Reg. 3,784 – 3,807 (Jan. 25, 2002) (Docket No. R-1097) [herein Capital 
Release].  See proposed Board rule of Feb. 1, 2001, amending app. A & D to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital 
Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs), 66 Fed. Reg. 10,222–24 (Feb. 14, 2001).  See also release from the 
Board, the OCC and the FDIC accompanying this proposed rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 10,212–26 (Feb. 14, 2001) 
[herein Capital Proposal Release].  See Ashley D. Fluhme, Capital Requirements for Merchant Banking, 5 
N.C. BANKING INST. 265 (2001). 
578   See Capital Release, supra note 577, at 3,784. 
  106 investment portfolio for the BHC relative to its Tier 1 capital.
579  Furthermore, the rule applies 
these higher capital charges symmetrically to all equity investments held by banks and BHCs 
(including FHCs) in nonfinancial companies,
580 except for investments made prior to March 13, 
                                                 
579   See Capital Release, supra note 577, at 3,784. 
580   See Capital Release, supra note 577, at 3,786-87.  The rule applies the same capital treatment to all equity 
investments by BHCs (including FHCs) in nonfinancial companies regardless of the authority under which 
they are held, (i) by FHCs under the merchant banking investment authority, § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); (ii) by BHCs (including FHCs) in less than 5 percent of 
the voting shares of a nonfinancial company or in a company that makes investments in nonfinancial 
companies under the authority of § 4(c)(6) or § 4(c)(7), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) or (c)(7) (1994); 
(iii) by BHCs (including FHCs) in nonfinancial companies through SBICs, § 302(b) of the Small Business 
Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 682(b) (1994); (iv) by BHCs (including FHCs) in nonfinancial 
companies under Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.8(c)(3) (2002) (Regulation K), including the authority to 
make portfolio investments through Edge Act Corporations and Agreement Corporations (portfolio 
investments); or (v) by banking organizations in nonfinancial companies under § 24, FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1831a (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (other than § 24(f), 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(f) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).  App. A 
(II. B. 5. b.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs).  A nonfinancial company is an 
entity engaged in any activity that has not been determined to be financial in nature under § 4(k)(4), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Capital Release, supra, at 3,787.  For a 
definition of equity investments, see app. A (B. 5. g.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for 
BHCs); Capital Release, supra, at 3,787.  
  SBIC investments of BHCs are exempt from the higher capital charges of the rule to the extent the 
aggregate adjusted carrying value of all such investments does not exceed 15 percent of the aggregate of 
the BHC’s pro rata interest in the Tier 1 capital of its subsidiary banks, see app. A (II. B. 5. d.) to 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs), Capital Release, supra, at 3,784-85, 3,787, 3,790-91].  
For a discussion of the capital treatment of investments under § 24, FDIA, see Capital Release, supra, at 
3,787-88. 
The rule does not apply to equity investments by insurance company affiliates of an FHC under § 4 
 (k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), because investments made by 
insurance underwriting affiliates of an FHC generally are already subject to higher capital charges under 
state insurance laws.  See Capital Release, supra, at 3,788.  The Board expects to monitor FHCs with 
insurance underwriting affiliates to ensure that they do not arbitrage any differences in the capital 
requirements applicable to equity investments made by insurance companies and other FHC affiliates.  See 
Capital Release, supra, at 3,788. 
The rule does not apply to equity securities that are acquired by satisfaction of a debt previously contracted 
pursuant to § 4(c)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2) (1999), see Capital Release, supra, at 3,788, or to 
investments by qualifying foreign banking organizations pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 211.23(f) (2002) 
(Regulation K). 
  Finally, the rule does not apply to investments made by an FHC in a company engaged in complementary 
activities under § 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.SC. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The Board intends 
to review and consider the appropriate capital treatment of investments in companies engaged in 
complementary activities in connection with its review of any notice filed by an FHC to acquire a company 
engaged in complementary activities or in connection with its determination that a particular activity is 
complementary to a financial activity.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.89 (2002) (Regulation Y); Complementary 
Activities Release, supra note 362 (requesting comments on a proposal to determine that certain data 
processing and data transmission activities are complementary to financial activities and on the appropriate 
capital treatment for such investments).  See Capital Release, supra, at 3,788. 
  107 2000 or investments made on or after such date pursuant to a binding written commitment 
entered into prior to March 13, 2000.
581 
The rule requires a parent BHC to deduct from its Tier 1 capital the sum of the 
appropriate percentages (as shown in the following diagram) of the adjusted carrying value of all 
equity investments in nonfinancial companies
582 held by it or by its direct or indirect 
subsidiaries.
583  For purposes of the capital charge, investments held by a BHC include all 
investments held directly or indirectly by the BHC or any of its subsidiaries.
584  The structure of 
the rule applies a higher capital charge to equity investments as the aggregate amount of the 
organization’s nonfinancial equity investments increases in relation to its capital.   
Diagram 7 
Deduction for 
Nonfinancial Equity Investments
585 
Aggregate adjusted carrying value 
of all nonfinancial equity 
investments held directly or 
indirectly by the BHC (as a 
percentage of the Tier 1 capital of 
the BHC) 
 
Deduction from Tier 1 capital  
(as a percentage of the adjusted 
carrying value of the investment) 
 
Less than 15 percent 
 
8 percent 
 
15 percent to 24.99 percent 
 
12 percent 
 
25 percent and above 
 
25 percent 
Each tier of charges applies, on a marginal basis, to the portions of the adjusted carrying value of 
the BHC’s nonfinancial equity investments that fall within the specified ranges of the BHC’s 
                                                 
581   See Capital Release, supra note 577, at 3,789. 
582   App. A (II. B. 5. c. i. & f.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs).  See Capital 
Release, supra note 577, at 3,790.  The adjusted carrying value is the value at which the relevant 
investment is recorded on the balance sheet, reduced by (i) net unrealized gains that are included in 
carrying value but that have not been included in Tier 1 capital and (ii) associated deferred tax liabilities.  
Id. 
583   App. A (II. B. 5. a.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs). 
584   Id. 
585   App. A (II. B. 5. c.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs); Capital Release, supra 
note 577, at 3,790. 
  108 Tier 1 capital.
586  The total adjusted carrying value of a nonfinancial equity investment that is 
subject to a deduction under the rule is excluded from the BHC’s risk-weighted assets for 
purposes of computing the denominator of the BHC’s risk-based capital ratio.
587 
For all covered equity investments, an 8 percent Tier 1 capital charge would be 
applied so long as the adjusted carrying value of all such investments represent less than 15 
percent of Tier 1 capital.  In the case of a portfolio of covered equity investments that, in the 
aggregate, exceeds 15 percent of the BHC’s Tier 1 capital, a 12 percent Tier 1 capital charge 
would apply to the portion of the portfolio above the 15 percent threshold.  The 12 percent 
marginal charge would apply to the adjusted carrying value of covered equity investments up to 
25 percent of Tier 1 capital.  In the case of a portfolio of covered equity investments that, in the 
aggregate, exceeds 25 percent of the BHC’s Tier 1 capital, a 25 percent marginal Tier 1 capital 
charge would apply to the portion of the portfolio above the 25 percent threshold.
588 
The rule applies the higher capital charge to equity instruments held in the trading 
account of a BHC as part of an underwriting, market-making or dealing activity.
589  The Board 
points out that BHCs have the authority to underwrite, deal in, and make a market in equity 
securities through a securities broker-dealer subsidiary that is subject to special capital and 
accounting requirements, and securities lawfully acquired under these statutory provisions are 
not covered by the rule.
590  The implication is that the FHC should use its broker-dealer 
subsidiaries in the FHC group for underwriting, dealing and market-making activities.  This 
analysis, however, does not address the situation, clearly permitted by the GLBA, of a broker-
dealer that is a holding company in an FHC group.  The capital rule makes it virtually impossible 
for a broker-dealer to be the top-tier FHC of an FHC group and therefore contradicts the 
intention of the GLBA.  The capital rule, however, does not apply the higher capital charges to 
                                                 
586   App. A (II. B. 5. c. ii.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs); Capital Release, 
supra note 577, at 3,790. 
587   App. A (II. B. 5. c. iii.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs).  See Capital Release, 
supra note 577, at 3,790. 
588   App. A (II. B. 5. c.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs).  See Capital Proposed 
Release, supra note 577, at 10,216.  For example, if the adjusted carrying value of all nonfinancial equity 
investments held by a BHC equals 20 percent of the Tier 1 capital of the BHC, then the amount of the 
deduction would be 8 percent of the adjusted carrying value of all investments up to 15 percent of the 
company’s Tier 1 capital, and 12 percent of the adjusted carrying value of all investments in excess of 15 
percent of the company’s Tier 1 capital.  App. A (II. B. 5. c. ii.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy 
Guidelines for BHCs).  See Capital Release, supra, at 3,791.  The deductions to Tier 1 capital apply not 
only for risk-based capital purposes but also for leverage capital purposes.  See app. D to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 
(Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs); Capital Release, supra, at 3,791-92. 
589   See Capital Release, supra note 577, at 3,788. 
590   See Capital Release, supra note 577, at 3,788.  See also §  4(k)(4)(E), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999) (FHCs);  § 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); and J.P. 
Morgan & Co., Inc. 75 FED. RES. BULL. 192 (1989), aff’d sub. nom. Securities Industry Ass’n v. Board of 
Governors, 900 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  See supra C. 1. sub (1). 
  109 equity securities acquired and held by a BHC as a bona fide hedge of an equity derivative 
transaction lawfully entered into by a BHC.
591 
The Board proposes to apply heightened supervision to the equity investment 
activities of BHCs.  The Board may in any case impose a higher minimum capital charge on a 
BHC as appropriate in light of the nature, concentration or performance of a particular BHC’s 
equity investments, or the sufficiency of the BHC’s policies, procedures and systems used to 
monitor and control the risks associated with the BHC’s equity investments.
592 
In the case of equity investments held through equity investment funds, the capital 
charge would apply only to the holding company’s proportionate share of the fund’s 
investments.
593 
3. 
                                                
Securities Acquired Through Underwriting or Dealing 
Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
594 not only permits FHCs, directly or indirectly, to 
invest in securities as part of merchant or investment banking but also as part of underwriting 
activities.  The conditions are the same: 
 the investment must be made as part of a “bona fide” underwriting activity;
595 
 the investment must be made by a securities affiliate;
596 
 the investment must not be made by a depository institution of the FHC, or by a 
subsidiary of a depository institution;
597 
 
591   See Capital Release, supra note 577, at 3,788. 
592   See Capital Release, supra note 577, at 3,792; app. A (II. B. 5. c. iv.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital 
Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs).   
593   See Capital Proposal Release, supra note 577, at 10,217; app. A (II B. f. ii. & II. B. d. i. n.27) to 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs).  Such treatment would apply even if the fund partnership 
is consolidated in the BHC’s financial reporting statements.  Similarly, the rule provides that minority 
interests resulting from any such consolidation would not be included in the Tier 1 capital of the holding 
company.  See Capital Proposal Release, supra, at 10, 217.   
  Similar treatment applies for minority interests with respect to investments in nonfinancial companies 
under the equity investment authorities covered by the rule.  See supra note 580.  Generally, it would not be 
expected that any nonfinancial company whose shares are acquired pursuant to those authorities would be 
consolidated, either because the investment is temporary as in the case of merchant banking investments, or 
limited to a minority interest.  However, if consolidation does occur, any resulting minority interests must 
be excluded from Tier 1 capital because the minority interest is not available to support the general 
financial business of the banking organization.  See Capital Proposal Release, supra note 577, at 10,217; 
app. A (II. B. f. ii & II. B. d. i. n.27) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs). 
594   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
595   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
596   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  110  the investment is “held for a period of time to enable the sale or disposition 
thereof on a reasonable basis”, consistent with the financial viability of the 
underwriting activity;
598 and 
 the FHC does not routinely manage or operate the entity in which the investment 
is made except as may be necessary or required to obtain a reasonable return on 
investment upon resale or disposition.
599  
Whereas Section 4(k)(1), BHCA
600 generally permits an FHC to engage in 
financial activities through a noncontrolled company, the financial activity of securities 
underwriting (like merchant banking investments) must be carried out by the FHC itself 
(directly) or indirectly through a subsidiary (a controlled company).
601  The requirement that 
investments be made through a securities affiliate that causes interpretative difficulties in 
connection with merchant banking investments,
602 does not create any questions of interpretation 
in connection with the underwriting power.  It is obvious that only a registered broker-dealer, 
either the FHC or a subsidiary of the FHC, has the power to engage in underwriting.
603  The FHC 
or the underwriting subsidiary of the FHC may acquire in the exercise of the underwriting power 
minority or majority positions in other companies.
604  The restriction that depository institutions 
of the FHC (or a subsidiary of a depositary institution) may not engage in underwriting does not 
affect FHCs that are foreign banks, because foreign banks are not depository institutions.
605 
                                                                                                                                                             
597   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(i), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
598   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
599   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iv), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
600   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
601   Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“[d]irectly or indirectly 
acquiring or controlling . . . shares . . . as part of a[n] . . . underwriting activity”).  See supra text 
accompanying note 229.  See also supra text accompanying note 444 (discussing the directly or indirectly 
requirement in connection with the merchant banking investment authority) and infra text accompanying 
note 624 (discussing the directly or indirectly requirement in connection with the insurance company 
portfolio investment authority). 
602   See supra D. 2. d. 
603   Section 15, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
604   Section 4(k)(4)(H), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (permitting the acquisition of shares 
or other ownership interests of another company or entity “whether or not constituting control of such 
company or entity”). 
605   See supra note 33 for the definition of depository institution. 
  111 Voting securities held by an FHC in an underwriting, dealing or market-making 
capacity need not be aggregated with any shares held by the FHC or other affiliates of the FHC 
on the basis of another authority.
606 
The underwriting activity may relate to shares and other ownership interests 
(including debt or equity securities, partnership interests, trust certificates or other instruments 
representing ownership) of a company or other entity, and such company or entity may be 
engaged in any activity.
607  The underwriter may act as principal (firm commitment 
underwriting) or as agent (best efforts underwriting).
608   
The underwriting must be bona fide.
 609  For instance, the purchase of shares of an 
issuer for the purpose of reselling such shares in a public offering in the distant future subject to 
market conditions is probably not a bona fide underwriting and must meet the conditions of a 
merchant banking investment in order to be authorized. 
The provisions of Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA requiring a holding of the securities 
for the purpose of resale on a reasonable basis
610 applies to shares acquired for the purpose of 
underwriting, but it is not very relevant to securities underwritings because the intent to resell is 
inherent in the concept of underwriting.  The prohibition against routine management of the 
issuer is usually not an issue in connection with companies whose securities an FHC 
underwrites.
611 
Are shares acquired by way of underwriting or dealing covered by Subpart J, 
Section 225.170 et seq., of Regulation Y?
612  Section 225.170, Regulation Y defines merchant 
banking investments as “shares . . . acquired or controlled under section 4(k)(4)(H) and this 
subpart”.  Since Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA refers to merchant banking investments and to 
                                                 
606  See Representative Leach, 145 CONG. REC. H11,529 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999).  Representative Leach 
added that this is necessary to allow bank-affiliated securities firms to conduct securities activities in the 
same manner and to the same extent as their nonbank affiliated competitors, which is one of the principal 
objectives of the GLBA.  Id.  But see supra note 387. 
607   Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  That Section states that the 
company whose securities are acquired in connection with an underwriting may be engaged in any activity 
not authorized pursuant to Section 4, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  This limitation 
makes no sense:  why should an FHC not underwrite shares of another FHC, a bank or an insurance 
company?  The limitation is surely only meant to restrict the activities of merchant banking investments in 
portfolio companies.  See supra D.2.b. for a discussion of this requirement in the context of the merchant 
banking investment authority. 
608   Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), permits acting as principal 
or agent.  See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 66-75 (4th ed. 
2001). 
609   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
610   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
611   Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iv), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
612   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170–225.77 (2002) (Regulation Y).   
  112 underwriting, shares acquired for the purpose of underwriting are arguably merchant banking 
investments.  On the other hand, the provisions of Sections 225.170–225.177, Regulation Y are 
not written in a way that seems to be relevant to shares held by virtue of underwriting or dealing 
activities.
613  Subpart J of Regulation Y is entitled “Merchant Banking Investments” and the 
BHCA distinguishes clearly between merchant banking activities and underwriting activities, 
therefore it is unlikely that the Board intended to use the term merchant banking with an intent to 
include underwriting without clearly stating so. 
The term portfolio company is very broadly defined in Subpart J of Regulation Y 
as any company any shares of which are held by an FHC that is engaged in any activity not 
authorized for the FHC under Section 4, BHCA.
614  This would include most companies whose 
securities are underwritten by an FHC or its broker-dealer subsidiary, and the limitations of 
Section 225.171, Regulation Y
615 on management and operation of portfolio companies might 
apply to companies whose shares are owned by an FHC or its subsidiary by virtue of the 
underwriting authority.  However, the caption of Section 225.171, Regulation Y
616 expressly 
limits the application of the Section to portfolio companies held under the merchant banking 
investment authority. 
Only one provision of Subpart J of Regulation Y expressly refers to underwriting, 
namely, the Section requiring that the acquisition or control of ownership interests “under this 
subpart” is not permitted “unless it is a part of a bona fide underwriting or merchant or 
investment banking activity”.
617  The Final Merchant Banking Release states that the rule 
permitting merchant banking investments “does not address or apply to investments acquired as 
part of securities underwriting, dealing or market making activities conducted under Section 
4(k)(4)(E) [BHCA]”.
618 
For the reasons stated above, merchant banking authority cannot be read as 
including the underwriting authority, although underwriting is mentioned in Section 4(k)(4)(H), 
BHCA.  Finally, regulations by the Board dealing with the relation of an underwriter to the 
company whose securities are being underwritten would interfere with the authority of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and violate the principle of functional regulation.
619 
                                                 
613   See 12 U.S.C. § 4809 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (plain language requirement). 
614   12 C.F.R. § 225.177(c) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
615   12 C.F.R. § 225.171 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
616   Id. 
617   12 C.F.R. § 225.170(b) (2002) (Regulation Y) restating § 4(k)(4)(H)(ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The Interim Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, and 
the Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, which in great detail discuss the bona fide 
requirement, 65 Fed. Reg. at 16,463 and 66 Fed. Reg. at 8,469, do not address this requirement in 
connection with underwriting. 
618   Supra note 418, at 8,469.  Accord, Interim Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 16,460. 
619   See infra G. 1. 
  113 Investments in equity securities of nonfinancial companies acquired by an FHC 
itself in exercise of the underwriting, dealing or market-making authority are subject to the 
capital charge applicable to equity investments in nonfinancial companies.
620  These investments 
are not subject to such capital charge, however, if they are acquired through a broker-dealer 
subsidiary of the FHC.
621 
4. 
                                                
Portfolio Investments by Insurance Affiliates 
Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA
622 permits portfolio investments in securities, assets and 
other ownership interests by insurance companies.  Insurance companies typically make such 
investments to invest the funds received from policyholders.  The investment of funds, in 
particular funds received from policyholders and funds generated by investments, is an essential 
and inherent part of the insurance business.  The Board has recognized in the Travelers Order 
that, as an integral part of their insurance business, the insurance underwriting companies invest 
insurance premiums that they collect in a variety of investments.
623 
The authority of Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA permits an insurance company that is 
an FHC or a subsidiary of an FHC
624 to make controlling or noncontrolling equity or other 
investments in a company engaged in any kind of business,
625 subject to certain conditions: 
 the investments must be made by an insurance company that is predominately 
engaged in underwriting life, accident and health, or property and casualty 
 
620   See supra D.2.m and in particular text accompanying notes 589-591. 
621   See Capital Release, supra note 577, at 3,788 and supra text accompanying note 590. 
622  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Insurance as referred to in § 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA includes 
reinsurance.  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 405 and Interim Financial Activities Release, supra 
note 272, at 14,435 (insurance for purposes of § 4(k)(4)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999) includes reinsurance).  Since the group of insurance companies which may be FHCs or in 
which an FHC is permitted to invest (see § 4(k)(4)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999) (insurance as financial activity) must be equal to the group of insurance companies that may make 
insurance portfolio investments (see § 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999)), reinsurance companies must be covered by § 4(k)(4)(B), BHCA and by § 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA. 
623   Travelers Group Inc., Citicorp Order, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 985, at 988 n.18 (“As an integral part of their 
insurance business, the Travelers insurance underwriting subsidiaries invest insurance premiums they 
collect in a variety of investments”.). 
624 An  FHC  may  directly or indirectly make investments, if such investments are held by an insurance 
company.  Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra text 
accompanying note 229.  See also supra text accompanying note 444 (discussing the directly or indirectly 
requirement in connection with the merchant banking investment authority) and supra text accompanying 
note 601 (discussing the directly or indirectly requirement in connection with the underwriting authority).  
625  Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“whether or not constituting 
control of such company or entity, engaged in any activity not authorized pursuant to [§ 4, BHCA]”).  See 
§ 4, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  114 insurance (other than credit-related insurance), or in providing and issuing 
annuities;
626 
 the investment must be made in the ordinary course of business of the insurance 
company in accordance with relevant state law;
627 
 the investment is not made by a depository institution of the FHC or a subsidiary 
of a depository institution;
628 and 
 the FHC does not routinely manage or operate the entity in which the investment 
is made except as may be necessary or required to obtain a reasonable return on 
investment.
629 
Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA provides that investments made in the ordinary course 
of the business of insurance must not be made or held by a depository institution or subsidiary 
thereof but must be made and held by an insurance company.  Because the BHCA permits an 
FHC directly or indirectly to make investments in the ordinary course of business of an insurance 
company,
630 it follows that the insurance company could be the FHC or a subsidiary of the FHC.  
The GLBA does not establish a requirement that insurance company investments must be 
disposed of after a certain period of time. 
Whereas Section 4(k)(1), BHCA
631 generally permits an FHC to engage in 
financial activities through a controlled or noncontrolled company,
632 the financial activity of 
making insurance portfolio investments under Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA must be carried out by 
an insurance company FHC itself (directly) or indirectly through an insurance company 
subsidiary (a controlled company) of an FHC.
633  Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA has the effect of 
prohibiting noncontrolling investments by FHCs under Section 4(k)(1), BHCA in insurance 
companies.  Section 4(k)(1), BHCA is limited to investments in insurance company subsidiaries 
because an FHC could not make insurance company portfolio investments through a 
noncontrolled insurance company.  On the other hand, an FHC would presumably always 
                                                 
626  Section 4(k)(4)(I)(ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The types of insurance 
that are financial activities (§ 4(k)(4)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) and 
the insurance companies that may make investments in other companies (§ 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) are described in different words.  Both sections must be interpreted 
to cover the same lines of insurance business. 
627  Section 4(k)(4)(I)(iii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
628  Section 4(k)(4)(I)(i), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
629  Section 4(k)(4)(I)(iv), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(K)(4)(I)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
630  Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
631   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
632   See supra C.1. 
633   See supra note 624. 
  115 acquire insurance company subsidiaries under the authority of Sections 4(k)(1), and 4(k)(4)(B), 
BHCA
634 and not under the insurance company portfolio investment authority. 
An FHC that is an insurance company or an insurance company subsidiary of an 
FHC may invest in the exercise of the insurance company portfolio investment authority in 
minority or majority positions of other companies.
635  The question arises whether an FHC that is 
an insurance company or an insurance company subsidiary of an FHC is permitted under the 
insurance company portfolio investment authority to invest in minority interests of other 
insurance companies.  Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA provides that the company in which an 
investment is made under the insurance company portfolio investment authority must not be 
engaged in an activity authorized by Section 4, BHCA.
636  Because minority investments in 
insurance corporations are not authorized by Section 4, BHCA, as discussed above, an insurance 
company in an FHC group must be permitted to make a minority investment in an insurance 
company under the insurance company portfolio investment authority.
637  There is no legislative 
purpose why a less than controlling investment in another insurance company should not be 
permitted under the insurance company portfolio investment authority, subject to the conditions 
set forth in Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA.  As a matter of fact, insurance companies and reinsurance 
companies frequently make such investments in other insurance companies.  Furthermore, the 
BHCA should not be interpreted as restricting by implication the power of the states to regulate 
investments by insurance companies.
638  As previously discussed, an FHC could invest in 
noncontrolling interests of insurance companies under the merchant banking investment 
authority of Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA.
639  The above considerations also apply to insurance 
                                                 
634   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) & (k)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
635   Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (permitting the acquisition of 
shares or other ownership interests of a company or entity “whether or not constituting control of such 
company or entity”). 
636  Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (permitting the acquisition of 
shares or other ownership interests of a company or entity “engaged in any activity not authorized pursuant 
to [§ 4, BHCA]”).  See 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
637   See supra text accompanying notes 432-435 discussing noncontrolling investments in insurance companies 
under the merchant banking investment authority.  The prohibition in § 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), of investments in companies engaged in activities authorized by 
§ 4, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), is in fact a prohibition against using the insurance 
company portfolio investment authority to make investments that are otherwise authorized by § 4, BHCA.   
The qualification that the company, in which an investment is made under the insurance company portfolio 
investment authority, must not be engaged in an activity authorized by § 4, BHCA has the effect that an 
insurance company in an FHC group cannot make a controlling investment in another insurance company 
under the insurance company portfolio investment authority.  Such investments must be made pursuant to 
§ 4(k)(1)(A), BHCA in connection with § 4(k)(4)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(k)(1)(A) & (4)(B) (1994 
& Supp. V 1999).   
638   See supra note 277 (referring to the federal deference to state insurance laws).  See, e.g., § 1408, N.Y. Ins. 
Law (McKinney 2000), permitting, subject to certain limitations, insurance companies to invest in 
securities of other insurance companies. 
639   For a discussion of this issue, see supra text accompanying notes 432–435.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
  116 company portfolio investments in noncontrolling interests of broker-dealers, investment advisers, 
etc. 
The BHCA is very inclusive in its description of the types of permitted insurance 
portfolio investments.  Such investments may be acquired or controlled by the FHC directly if it 
is an insurance company, or indirectly by an insurance company subsidiary of an FHC, and may 
consist of shares, assets, or ownership interests (including debt or equity securities, partnership 
interests, trust certificates, or other instruments representing ownership) of a company or other 
entity and such company or entity may be engaged in any activity.
640 
The insurance company portfolio investments must be made “in the ordinary 
course of business” of the insurance company.
641  Although the Board has emphasized in the 
Travelers Order that the investment of insurance premiums is an integral part of the insurance 
business,
642 neither the language of Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA nor the history of the GLBA 
amendments to the BHCA require that insurance company portfolio investments be made with 
funds generated from insurance premium rather than with other funds of the insurance company.  
It is a part of the insurance business that insurance companies invest funds in order to be able to 
pay claims.  The source of the funds is not relevant although the principal source of funds is 
insurance premiums.  Another major source of funds is investment income.  A tracing of funds 
that may be used for insurance company portfolio investments would be completely unworkable.   
FHCs and their insurance subsidiaries may invest as principals under the 
insurance investment portfolio authority.  Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA makes it clear that the FHC 
and such subsidiary may also make such investment on behalf of other entities.  The others may 
be entities controlled by the FHC or third parties, but may not be depository institutions 
controlled by the FHC or subsidiaries of such depository institutions. 
The insurance company portfolio investments permitted by Section 4(k)(4)(I), 
BHCA need not be passive in the meaning of Section 4(c)(6), BHCA investments.
643  Section 
4(k)(4)(I)(iv),
644 BHCA provides that during the period such shares, assets or ownership interests 
are held by the insurance company FHC or an insurance company subsidiary of an FHC, the 
FHC may not “routinely manage or operate such company except as may be necessary or 
required to obtain a reasonable return on investment”.
645  The BHCA prohibits only the FHC to 
routinely manage or operate the companies in which an insurance portfolio investment has been 
made.  The prohibition does not apply to an insurance company subsidiary of an FHC but it does 
apply to an FHC if it is the insurance company.  Regulation Y does not contain rules carrying out 
                                                 
640   Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
641   Section 4(k)(4)(I)(iii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I)(iii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
642   See Travelers Group Inc., Citicorp Board Order of Sept. 23, 1998, 84 FED. RES. BULL. at 988 n.18. 
643   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994).  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.09 B. 
644   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(1)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
645   Section 4(k)(4)(I)(iv), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Section 4(k)(4)(I)(iv) 
should have had added “or entity” after “company”. 
  117 the prohibition on routine management and operation of insurance company portfolio 
investments.
646  If FHCs that are insurance companies make insurance company portfolio 
investments, the provisions of Regulation Y dealing with routine management and operations 
probably provide some guidance.
647  At any rate, the language of Section 4(k)(4)(I)(iv), BHCA 
which refers to “routine” management and operation of the portfolio company and the legislative 
history indicate that the restriction does not refer to the policy-setting function of the board of 
directors but to the day-to-day management and routine business decisions that the officers or 
employees of the company are typically engaged in.
648 
Directors, officers and employees of the FHC may constitute a majority of the 
board of the portfolio company.
649  However, where an FHC controls the board of directors of a 
portfolio company, the board must refrain from engaging in day-to-day management functions, 
although the board has the right to do so under corporate law.
650  The Conference Report on 
S. 900 expresses a presumption that participation by the FHC in the management of a portfolio 
company in which an insurance affiliate of the FHC has invested “would ordinarily be for the 
purpose of safeguarding the investment of the insurance company in accordance with the 
applicable requirements of state insurance law”.
651  If the portfolio company generates a below-
average rate of return or even runs into financial difficulties, a more active role of the FHC or its 
affiliates may be necessary to “obtain a reasonable return on investment upon resale or 
disposition”.
652 
The insurance company portfolio investments are not subject to limitations on the 
permitted holding period.
653 
The principal limitations on insurance company portfolio investments will be state 
insurance legal investment laws, which vary from state to state.  An insurer must comply with 
                                                 
   The definition of portfolio company, 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(c) (2002) (Regulation Y), is broad enough to 
apply to a company in which an insurance company has made an investment under the insurance company 
portfolio investment authority and the limitations on managing or operating portfolio companies, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.171 (2002) (Regulation Y), would then apply.  However, Subpart J of Regulation Y states in its 
caption that it only applies to merchant banking investments.  See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(a) (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
646
647   12 C.F.R. § 225.171 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
648   See supra D. 2. j.  
649   See supra text accompanying note 516. 
650   See supra text accompanying note 517. 
651  See Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 155. 
652  Section 4(k)(4)(I)(iv), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(1)(iv) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The colloquy 
between Senator Bennett and Senator Gramm, supra note 526, supports this interpretation.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 521–526 discussing the right of an FHC to more actively manage a portfolio company 
if required to obtain a reasonable return.   
653   Cf.  Section 4(k)(4)(H)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171 
(2002) (Regulation Y). 
  118 the legal investment laws of its state of domicile
654 and, if it is licensed in New York, must 
comply substantially with the New York law that would apply to a comparable insurer domiciled 
in New York.
655  Such laws generally impose limits, as a percentage of total admitted assets, on 
the amount an insurer may invest in a single issuer, the amount the insurer may invest in equities 
and the amount the insurer may invest in subsidiaries.
656  Investments in excess of the limits do 
not count as admitted assets (for purposes of financial regulation of the insurer),
657 and the 
domestic regulator often has the power to order divestiture of investments that exceed the 
limit.
658 
E. 
1. 
                                                
Exceptions from Restriction to Financial Activities 
As a rule, an FHC may only engage in financial activities.  There are two 
exceptions to that rule.   
Permitted Investments by QFBOs 
A foreign bank with a branch, agency or commercial lending company or a bank 
subsidiary in the United States that is a Qualified Foreign Banking Organization
659 is permitted 
even after it has elected to be an FHC to make investments in non-U.S. commercial and other 
nonfinancial companies (even if such companies have U.S. activities or investments) to the same 
extent as it was permitted to do before it elected to be an FHC.  The GLBA does not abrogate 
investment authority of QFBOs granted by the BHCA and Regulation K.
660  This is most 
important because investments in nonfinancial non-U.S. companies made under the investment 
authority for QFBOs under Section 211.23(f), Regulation K
661 are not subject to the merchant 
banking investment rules of Section 4(k), BHCA on holding periods, management involvement, 
 
654  See, e.g., § 1301(a)(2) of the N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney 2000) (investments in accordance with art. 14, 
N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney 2000) count as admitted assets for purposes of determining the financial 
condition of an insurer), and art. 14, N.Y. Ins. Law (enumerating the investments an insurer may make to 
cover its minimum capital or minimum surplus to policyholders, § 1402, N.Y. Ins. Law, and enumerating 
permitted reserve and other investments, §§ 1403–1407, N.Y. Ins. Law). 
655  See § 1413, N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney 2000). 
656   See §§ 1409(a), 1404(a)(8), 1404(a)(9) N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney 2000). 
657   See § 1412(b), N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney 2000). 
658   See § 1412(a), N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney 2000). 
659 The  term  Qualified Foreign Banking Organization [herein QFBO] is defined as a foreign bank more than 
half of whose worldwide business is banking and more than half of whose banking business is outside the 
United States.  12 C.F.R. §§ 211.21(o) & 211.23(a) & (b) (2002) (Regulation K).  See Gruson, supra note 
1, § 10.12. 
660  See supra C.8.  For a discussion of QFBOs and of the special investment authorities of QFBOs, see 
Gruson, supra note 1, §§ 10.12–10.18. 
661   12 C.F.R. § 211.23(f) (2002) (Regulation K). 
  119 notice, etc.
662  On the other hand, investments made under the QFBO investment authority are 
subject to other restrictions that do not apply to merchant banking investments.
663   
If a foreign company acquires control of a foreign bank that maintains a branch, 
agency or commercial lending company in the United States and that qualifies as a QFBO, the 
acquiror foreign company must also qualify as a QFBO because the investments made by the 
foreign bank under the investment authority of Section 211.23(f), Regulation K for QFBOs are 
indirect investments of the acquiror foreign company.  If the company that acquires control of a 
foreign bank maintaining a branch, agency or commercial banking company in the United States 
meets the full QFBO test
664 (typically this will be the case when the acquiring company also is a 
foreign bank), then the acquiring company also may make use of the full QFBO investment 
authority.
665  If the acquiring company only meets the modified QFBO test
666 (typically this will 
be the case when the acquiring company is a life insurance company), then the acquiring 
company may make use of the QFBO investment authority other than the authority under Section 
211.23(f)(5)(iii), Regulation K.
667  The acquired foreign bank, however, may continue to make 
use of the Section 211.23(f)(5)(iii), Regulation K investment authority.
668  This remains true 
even if the acquiror foreign company and the acquired foreign bank effectively elect the status of 
FHCs.  
                                                 
662   See D.2. 
663   Gruson, supra note 1, §§ 10.12–10.18. 
664   12 C.F.R. § 211.23(a) (2002) (Regulation K).  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.12. 
665   12 C.F.R. § 211.23(f) (2002) (Regulation K). 
666   12 C.F.R. § 211.23(c) (2002) (Regulation K). 
667   12 C.F.R. § 211.23(f)(5)(iii) (2002) (Regulation K).  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.14.  This investment 
authority is based on Section 2(h)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(h)(2) (1994). 
668   See Board Release accompanying Regulation K, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,346, at 54,367–70 (Oct. 26, 2001).  This 
is the case even though the foreign bank QFBO’s investments are indirectly the investments of the 
company controlling it, and this controlling company only meets the modified QFBO test and could not 
itself make the 12 C.F.R. § 211.23(f)(5)(iii) (2002) (Regulation K) investment. 
  120 The following diagram summarizes the investment authorities of a QFBO under 
Regulation K.  If the holding company meets the requirements of a full QFBO, the investment 
authorities of the bank and of the holding company are identical. 
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It might be advantageous for a foreign bank and the company controlling it to use 
the Section 211.23(f) authority for equity investments because equity investments under such 
authority are not subject to a holding period, to restrictions on management involvement or to 
U.S. capital requirements for equity investments.
669 
2. 
                                                
Grandfather Rights Under the GLBA 
The GLBA creates certain grandfather rights for FHCs that were not previously 
BHCs.  A company that is not a BHC or a foreign bank
670 and that after November 12, 1999, the 
date of the enactment of the GLBA, becomes an FHC (through the acquisition of a banking 
subsidiary and the election to be an FHC) may continue to be engaged in, or retain direct or 
indirect investments in companies engaged in, nonfinancial activities until November 12, 
2009.
671  This provision covers, e.g., the case where an insurance company or a broker-dealer or 
 
669   See supra D.2.j., k. & m. 
670   See § 1(b)(7), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3101(7) (1994). 
671  Section 4(n)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The FHC must terminate any 
activity engaged in pursuant to § 4(n), BHCA and divest ownership or control of any shares held pursuant 
to § 4(n), BHCA before the end of a 10-year period beginning on Nov. 12, 1999; however, the Board may 
  121 a holding company of an insurance company or a broker-dealer acquires after November 12, 
1999 a U.S. bank or a foreign bank with a branch, agency, commercial lending company or bank 
subsidiary in the United States.  If the acquiror is engaged in, or has direct or indirect ownership 
in or controls a company engaged in, nonfinancial activities, the acquiror could not qualify as an 
FHC because an FHC may only engage in financial activities.
672  For this case, Section 4(n), 
BHCA
673 grants limited relief.  The  FHC may continue to engage in a nonfinancial activity and 
retain investments in a company engaged in a nonfinancial activity for such ten-year period 
subject to the following conditions:   
 the FHC was lawfully engaged in such activity, or held the shares of a company 
engaged in such activity, on September 30, 1999;
674 
 the FHC is predominantly engaged in financial activities, which requires that at 
least 85 percent of the consolidated annual gross revenues of the FHC must be 
derived from financial activities of the FHC and its subsidiaries (excluding 
revenues from subsidiary depository institutions);
675 and  
 the FHC or the company that is minority-owned or controlled by the FHC 
engages in only those specific activities that are grandfathered and in activities 
that are otherwise permissible under the BHCA.
676 
                                                                                                                                                             
extend this 10-year period for an additional 5 years.  Section 4(n)(7), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(7) (1994 
& Supp. V 1999).  Section 4(n)(1), BHCA permits an FHC to “retain direct or indirect ownership or control 
of shares” of a company engaged in grandfathered activities. This permits minority and controlling 
investments.   
672   See supra C.1.   See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) 
673   12 U.S.C. § 1843(n) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
674  Section 4(n)(1)(A), BHCA 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  This condition implies that 
the minority-owned or controlled company was engaged in such activity on Sept. 30, 1999. 
675  Section 4(n)(1)(B) & (2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(1)(B) & (2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Financial 
activities are the activities under § 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  These 
activities are set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y).  Complementary activities are not 
financial activities.  See supra C.7.  FHC § 4(c) permissible activities (see supra text accompanying notes 
234, 251–265, i.e., activities otherwise permissible for the FHC under § 4(c), BHCA) apparently may not 
be counted towards the 85 percent test, although this result does not appear justified.  See supra C.1.  
Revenues from financial activities include revenues from investments made by an insurance company that 
is the FHC or a subsidiary of the FHC under the insurance company portfolio investment authority and 
investments made by the FHC or its subsidiaries under the merchant banking investment authority in 
companies engaged in nonfinancial activities permitted pursuant to Section 4(k)(4)(H) and (I), BHCA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) & (I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
676  Section 4(n)(1)(C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The company must 
continue to engage only in the same activities that such company conducted on Sept. 30, 1999 and other 
activities permissible under the BHCA.  Id.  Thus, the company is not restricted from engaging in financial 
activities. 
  122 Aggregate annual gross revenues from grandfathered activities may continue to 
grow, but may never exceed 15 percent of the consolidated annual gross revenues of the FHC 
(excluding revenues from subsidiary depository institutions).
677 Furthermore, the grandfathered 
FHC may not directly or indirectly acquire, by merger or other type of business combination, 
assets of any other company not engaged in financial activities, with a very limited exception 
involving control of broadcasting stations.
678 
Section 4(n)(1), BHCA provides that an FHC may take advantage of the 
grandfather provisions only if it is not a foreign bank or a BHC and becomes an FHC after 
November 12, 1999.
679  Section 4(n)(1), BHCA does not give grandfather rights to a company 
that was not a BHC or foreign bank on November 12, 1999, becomes a BHC or foreign bank 
after November 12, 1999 and thereafter elects FHC status.  Such step transaction is not 
permissible because a mere BHC or foreign bank (that is not an FHC) does not have the benefit 
of the grandfather provision of Section 4(n), BHCA and its investment in companies engaged in 
activities not permissible under the BHCA is prohibited under Section 4(a), BHCA.
680  Thus, the 
grandfather rights are only available to companies that were at no time BHCs or foreign banks 
before they elected FHC status, and a company that after November 12, 1999 acquires a bank 
must at the same time apply FHC status,
681 otherwise the acquiror company becomes a BHC and 
the grandfather provisions are lost.   
Foreign banks
682 are excluded from the grandfather privilege of Section 4(n), 
BHCA even if they were not treated as BHCs on the date of the enactment of the GLBA, because 
they did not have a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States.  A 
foreign bank that on November 12, 1999 does not have a branch, agency or commercial lending 
company in the United States but has a U.S. subsidiary engaged in a commercial or industrial 
activity and that after November 12, 1999 opens a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending 
company or acquires a subsidiary bank in the United States and elects to be an FHC does not 
have the grandfather privileges for that industrial or commercial subsidiary.  Section 4(n), BHCA 
should benefit, however, a foreign insurance company with U.S. subsidiaries engaged in 
nonfinancial activities (that are not part of the ordinary course of business portfolio investment of 
the insurance company) that after November 12, 1999 acquires a foreign bank with a U.S. 
                                                 
677  Section 4(n)(4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
678  Section 4(n)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Section 4(n)(3), BHCA prohibits 
an FHC and a subsidiary of an FHC from making acquisitions of companies that are not engaged in 
financial activities.  This Section does not prohibit such acquisitions by minority-owned companies with 
grandfathered activities.  This makes sense because the FHC could not prevent a noncontrolled company 
from making acquisitions. 
679   12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(1) (1994 & Supp.V 1999).  The Section does not provide that the company was not a 
BHC or foreign bank on Nov. 12, 1999; it provides that the company is not a BHC or foreign bank. 
680   12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1994). 
681   12 C.F.R. § 225.82(f) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
682  As to the definition of foreign bank, see supra note 43.  It must be remembered that a company that 
controls a foreign bank is also a foreign bank. 
  123 branch, agency or commercial lending company or a bank subsidiary and at the same time elects 
to become an FHC.  Such insurance company was not a foreign bank before it elected FHC 
status. 
The cross-marketing restrictions and prudential safeguards that apply between 
nonfinancial companies acquired pursuant to the authority to make merchant investment banking 
investments or insurance company portfolio investments, discussed below, also apply to the 
relationship between companies engaged in grandfathered activities and depository institution 
subsidiaries of FHCs.
683 
F. 
1. 
                                                
Notice Requirements in Connection with Financial Activities 
No Prior Application or Notice Required 
An FHC need not file an application for prior approval by the Board or give prior 
notice to the Board to engage, directly or indirectly, in a financial activity
684 or to make a 
controlling or noncontrolling investment in a company that is exclusively or substantially 
engaged in financial activities or to make in the exercise of a financial activity (i.e., the 
underwriting, dealing and market-making authority, the merchant banking investment authority, 
or the insurance company portfolio investment authority) an investment in a company not 
engaged in a financial activity.
685  There are four exceptions to the general rule that no prior 
approval or notice is required: 
 
683  Section 4(n)(5) & (6), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(5) & (6) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  For a discussion of 
these provisions, see infra G.3. & 4. 
  Section 4(o), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), contains a second limited, but 
permanent, grandfathering provision:  a company that on Nov. 12, 1999 was not a BHC or a foreign bank 
and that effectively elects to be an FHC thereafter may continue to be engaged in, or directly or indirectly 
own shares in a company engaged in, activities relating to the trading, sale, or investment in commodities 
and underlying physical properties that were not permissible for BHCs to conduct in the United States as of 
Sept. 30, 1997, if (1) the FHC or any subsidiary of the FHC was engaged in such activity as of Sept. 30, 
1997 in the United States, (2) the assets relating to such activity do not exceed 5 percent of the total 
consolidated assets of the FHC, and (3) there is no cross-marketing between any company engaged in such 
activity and affiliated depository institutions. 
684   I.e., an activity enumerated in 12 C.F.R § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra C.3. 
685   Section 4(k)(6)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a)(1) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 404.  See also supra note 235 (discussing 
whether the absence of a prior notice requirement applies only to the acquisition of a company exclusively 
engaged in financial activities or also to the acquisition of a company merely substantially engaged in 
financial activities).  Engaging in financial activities or acquiring shares or control of a company engaged 
in financial activities by a depository institution subsidiary of an FHC or a subsidiary of such subsidiary are 
not covered by 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(a).   
Section 4(k)(6)(B), BHCA provides that no prior approval of the Board is required to commence any 
activity pursuant to § 4(k)(4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), or to acquire any 
company pursuant to § 4(k)(4), BHCA.  Note that the clause relating to acquisitions does not refer to the 
acquisition of a company engaged in an activity pursuant to § 4(k)(4), BHCA but to the acquisition 
authorized by § 4(k)(4), BHCA.  Thus, § 4(k)(6)(B), BHCA relates not only to the acquisition of companies 
  124  An FHC must obtain Board approval prior to acquiring control or more than 5 
percent of the shares of any class of voting securities of a savings association or a 
holding company of a savings association;
686  
 The Board, in exercise of its supervisory authority, may require an FHC to 
provide notice to or obtain approval from the Board prior to engaging in any 
activity or acquiring shares or control of any company engaged in a financial or 
nonfinancial activity;
687 
 The GLBA amendments to the BHCA did not change in any way the 
requirements that a BHC/FHC must receive prior approval of the Board under § 3, 
BHCA before acquiring 5 percent of shares of any class of voting securities of a 
bank or U.S. BHC/FHC with a U.S. bank subsidiary;
688 and 
 The GLBA amendments to the BHCA did not change in any way the 
requirements that a company must give prior notice to the Board under 4(j), 
BHCA
689 before engaging in activities on the basis of the authority of Section 
                                                                                                                                                             
engaged in financial activities but also to the acquisition in exercise of the financial activities investment 
authorities of companies engaged in nonfinancial activities.  This covers the acquisition of nonfinancial 
companies through the underwriting, dealing and market making authority, the merchant banking 
investment authority and the insurance company portfolio investment authority.  Section 4(k)(4)(E), (H) & 
(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E), (H) & (I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
Complementary activities permitted by § 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12. U.S.C. § 1893(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999), are not financial activities and require prior Board approval.  See supra C.7. 
686   Section 4(k)(6)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(c)(1) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  Board approval must be obtained in accordance with § 4(j), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and either 12 C.F.R. § 225.14 or § 225.24 (2002) (Regulation Y), as 
appropriate. 
687   12 C.F.R. § 225.85(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Board may impose such requirement in accordance 
with its authority pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 225.82(g) (2002) (Regulation Y) (residual supervisory authority 
over FHCs; see supra note 221) or 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(d) (2002) (Regulation Y) (limitations during period 
of noncompliance; see infra H.1.) or any other relevant authority.  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 
404; Interim Financial Activities Release, supra note 272, at 14,434–35.  12 C.F.R. § 225.85(c)(2) speaks 
about “acquiring shares or control of any company”.  This covers the acquisition of companies engaged in 
financial activities, 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y), and of companies that are acquired in 
exercise of the financial activities investment authorities and are engaged in nonfinancial activities, i.e., 
companies acquired through the underwriting, dealing and market making authority, the merchant banking 
investment authority or the insurance company portfolio investment authority.  Section 4(k)(4)(E), (H) & 
(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E), (H) & (I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The Final FHC Release, supra 
note 32, at 404 is incorrect when it summarizes 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(c)(2) as permitting prior Board 
approval to “acquire a company engaged in a financial activity”. 
688   Section 3(a)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 225.11(c)(1) & (f) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,469 n.8; Interim Financial 
Activities Release, supra note 272, at 14,434 n.1. 
689   12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  125 4(c), BHCA
690 to the extent Section 4(c), BHCA or Regulation Y requires prior 
notice.
691 
2. 
                                                
Post-Transaction  Notices 
The BHCA requires an FHC that (i) commences a financial activity,
692 
(ii) acquires shares of a company engaged in a financial activity (an activity listed in § 225.86, 
Regulation K
693) or (iii) acquires in exercise of the financial activities authority shares in a 
company engaged in nonfinancial activities
694 to notify the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank
695 
in writing 30 calendar days after commencing the activity or consummating the acquisition (the 
“post-transaction notice”).
696 
Section 225.87, Regulation Y,
697 which implements the post-transaction notice 
requirement of the BHCA, is badly drafted in that it does not distinguish between companies 
engaged in financial activities and portfolio companies acquired by virtue of a financial activity 
investment authority that are engaged in “any activity” (nonfinancial activities).  If an FHC 
directly or indirectly makes a merchant banking investment in an automobile manufacturer, it is 
 
690   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
691   See supra text accompanying notes 234, 251–265 for a discussion of FHC § 4(c) permissible activities.  See 
also the reference to applicable notice in connection with FHC otherwise permissible Regulation Y 
activities, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 242, 245–255. 
692   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) seems to say that any activity of an FHC requires a post-
transaction notice.  (The reference in that Section to financial activities listed in 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) 
(Regulation Y) related grammatically only to the acquisition of shares.)  This is a drafting error.  
Section 4(k)(6)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), requires a notice only in 
the case of the commencement of any activity “pursuant to this subsection [i.e., § 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)]”, i.e., a financial activity. 
693   12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
694   Section 4(k)(6)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), refers to the acquisition of 
any company pursuant to Section 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  This includes 
the acquisition of companies engaged in financial activities under Section 4(k)(4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), as well as the acquisition in exercise of the financial activities 
investment authorities of companies that are engaged in nonfinancial activities, i.e., companies acquired 
through the merchant banking investment authority, the insurance company portfolio investment authority 
or the underwriting, dealing or merchant banking activities authority.  Section 4(k)(4)(E), (H) & (I), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E), (H) & (I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
695   Appropriate Federal Reserve Bank is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 225.3(b) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
696   Section 4(k)(6)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.87(a) 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  The post-transaction notice must be given by U.S. BHCs on Form F.R. Y-10 and 
by foreign banks on Form FR Y-10F.  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 406 n.15 and supra note 
564.  Experience shows that compliance with the requirement of Form F.R. Y-10F can be extremely 
onerous, in particular in cases of acquisitions of companies engaged in financial activities. Companies that 
are not subject to Board supervision do not keep records in a manner that facilitates completing Form FR 
Y-10F. 
697   12 C.F.R. § 225.87 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  126 neither useful nor correct to call, as Section 225.87, Regulation Y does, the activity of the 
automobile manufacturer a financial activity.  Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA
698 uses correct 
terminology:  it calls the “acquiring or controlling” of the portfolio company by an FHC, and not 
the activity in which the portfolio company is engaged (“engaged in any activity”), a financial 
activity.  Section 225.87(a), Regulation Y
699 does not seem to cover notices in connection with 
the acquisition of a portfolio company (because that Section only refers to the acquisition of 
companies engaged in financial activities and a portfolio company is not engaged in an activity 
listed in Section 225.86, Regulation Y),
700 but by implication it follows from Section 
225.87(b)(3) & (4), Regulation Y
701 that investments in portfolio companies are intended to be 
covered by Section 225.87(a), Regulation Y in addition to investments in companies that are 
engaged in financial activities as such term is used in Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA.
702 
There are three broad exemptions from the requirement to file a post-transaction 
notice. 
 In the case of an acquisition, a post-transaction notice is only required if the FHC 
acquires control of the target.
703 
 Once an FHC has given a post-transaction notice to the appropriate Federal 
Reserve Bank
704 that it has commenced engagement in securities underwriting, 
dealing or market making activities,
705 merchant banking investment activities
706 
or insurance company portfolio investment activities,
707 no further post-
                                                 
698   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Financial activities are lending, insuring, providing 
financial services, underwriting, etc. and acquiring portfolio companies.  Id. 
699   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
700   12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
701   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(3) & (4) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
702   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
703   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) (a post-transaction notice is not required in connection 
with the acquisition of shares of a company if, following the acquisition, the FHC does not control the 
company).  12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) is based on § 4(k)(6)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(k)(6)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“[An FHC] that acquires any company . . . shall provide written 
notice to the Board . . . .”).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 406–07. 
704   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
705   See § 4(k)(4)(E), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
706   See § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
707   See § 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  127 transaction notice is required for any individual acquisition of shares of a 
company in exercise of these authorities.
708 
 Once an FHC has provided a post-transaction notice in connection with a 
particular financial activity, it is not required to submit an additional notice to 
commence such activity de novo through any (other) subsidiary of the FHC.
709  
This exception applies only if the FHC already controls the company through 
which the activity will be commenced and, thus, the acquisition by an FHC of 
control of a company engaged in a listed financial activity does not qualify for 
this exception.
710  In addition, this exemption is not available if the Board, in the 
exercise of its supervisory authority, informs the FHC that notice is required for 
the commencement de novo of financial activities.
711 
The exemptions to the post-transaction notice requirement available for (1) 
noncontrolling investments (first bullet point) and (2) individual acquisitions of shares in 
exercise of the merchant banking investment and the insurance company portfolio investment 
authorities (second bullet point) are not available and post-transaction notices must be filed (x) if 
the FHC in exercise of its merchant banking investment authority or in exercise of its insurance 
company portfolio investment authority acquires more than 5 percent of the shares, assets or 
ownership interests of any company at a total cost that exceeds the lesser of 5 percent of the 
                                                 
708   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Oddly enough, this provision is repeated for merchant 
banking investments in 12 C.F.R. § 225.175(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Board justifies this unusual 
drafting technique by stating that the repetition is “for the convenience of users”.  Final Merchant Banking 
Release, supra note 418, at 8,480.  It is per se more difficult for users to have to work with and to have to 
reconcile two provisions addressing the same rule. 
709   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The FHC must be authorized to control the subsidiary or 
other subsidiary through which it commences the activity de novo.  Id.  This exception does not apply 
where an FHC has previously commenced through a subsidiary an activity under an authority other than 
Section 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (although the activity is also authorized 
as a financial activity under Section 4(k), BHCA), without having submitted a post-transaction notice.  As 
the Board pointed out, some activities are authorized by more than one source of authority.  See supra C.8.  
An FHC therefore may commence the same activity in different subsidiaries using different sources of 
authority in accordance with the procedures applicable to the chosen authority.  See Final FHC Release, 
supra note 32, at 407 n.16. 
710   See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 407. 
711   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) (“unless otherwise notified by the Board”).  See Final  
FHC Release, supra note 32, at 407. 
  128 FHC’s Tier I capital or $200 million,
712 or (y) if the Board in exercise of its supervisory authority 
notifies the FHC that a post-transaction notice is necessary.
713 
The scope of the exemptions from the requirement to file a post-transaction notice 
is not clear.  If an FHC acquires a controlling interest in, for instance, a broker-dealer or a 
company engaged in making merchant banking investments, notice under Section 225.87(a), 
Regulation Y
714 is necessary.  However, if the FHC has previously given notice for securities 
underwriting, dealing and market-making activities
715 or merchant banking activities
716 is the 
FHC still required to give notice in connection with the new acquisition of the broker-dealer or 
company engaged in merchant banking activities or does the exemption of Section 225.87(b)(3), 
Regulation Y apply?
717  Is the $200 million threshold provision relevant?
718  The exemption from 
the post-transaction filing requirement of Section 225.87(b)(3), Regulation Y probably does not 
apply because the acquisition of the broker-dealer or merchant bank is not made “as part  of” the 
merchant banking investment activity.
719  The FHC does not intend to sell the broker-dealer or 
the merchant bank after a holding period.
720 
3. 
                                                
Filings Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
If an FHC makes an acquisition of a company engaged in financial activities or 
makes an acquisition in exercise of its financial activities investment authority (i.e., the merchant 
banking investment authority or the insurance company portfolio investment authority) of a 
company engaged in nonfinancial activities, it may be necessary to file a pre-merger notification 
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976
721 [herein HSRA].   
 
712   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(4)(i) & (ii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Oddly enough, this provision is repeated for 
merchant banking investments in 12 C.F.R. § 225.175(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See supra note 707.  
The danger inherent in repetition becomes apparent:  whereas notice pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 
225.87(b)(4)(i) in connection with 12 C.F.R. § 225.87(a) must be given within 30 calendar days, the same 
notice pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 225.175(c)(2) must be given within 30 days. 
713   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(4)(iii) (2002) (Regulation Y).  This Section does not specify the basis of its 
supervisory authority.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.85(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) (referring to the basis of 
supervisory authority). 
714   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
715   Section 4(k)(4)(E), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
716   Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
717   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
718   12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(4)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
719   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.87(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
720   See supra D. 2. k. 
721   15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Conference Report on S. 900, supra note 4, at 160–62. 
  129 The HSRA is a procedural statute, intended to give the U.S. antitrust enforcement 
authorities advance notice of certain mergers and acquisitions so that the enforcement authorities 
may detect and prevent transactions that may violate the U.S. antitrust laws before they are 
consummated.  The HSRA prohibits acquisitions of substantial amounts of voting securities and 
assets unless (1) a pre-merger notification is filed with both the Federal Trade Commission 
[FTC] and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department 
of Justice [DOJ], and (2) a waiting period subsequent to those filings has passed.
722  
The HSRA provides
723 that no pre-merger notification is necessary for 
transactions which require notice to and approval by the Board under Section 3, BHCA
724 in 
                                                 
722   Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) the HSRA requires a pre-merger notification and a 
30-day waiting period (i) if, as a result of the acquisition, the acquiring person would have an aggregate 
amount of voting securities and assets of the acquired person in excess of $200 million (§18a(a)(2)(A)); or 
(ii) if, as a result of the acquisition, the acquiring person would hold an aggregate total amount of voting 
securities and assets of the acquired person in excess of $50 million but not in excess of $200 million, and 
one of the three following situations apply (§ 18a(a)(2)(B)):  (I) the acquired person, if engaged in 
manufacturing, has annual net sales or total assets of $10 million or more and the acquiring person has total 
assets or annual net sales of $100 million or more; or (II) the acquired person, if not engaged in 
manufacturing, has total assets of $10 million or more and the acquiring person has total assets or annual 
net sales of $100 million or more; or (III) the acquired person has total assets or annual net sales of $100 
million or more and the acquiring person has total assets or annual net sales of $10 million or more.  The 
dollar amounts are subject to adjustments beginning after Sept. 30, 2004.  The adjustments  will be 
determined by the percentage change in the gross national product from Fiscal Year 2003 to the fiscal year 
in question.   
 
There are a number of exemptions from the pre-merger notification requirement for acquisitions by foreign 
persons.  The most relevant for acquisitions made by foreign banks is 16 C.F.R. § 802.51(b)(2002) of the 
FTC Rules under the HSRA.  Pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 802.51(b) (2002) the acquisition by a foreign person 
is exempt from the pre-merger notification requirement if: (a) the acquisition is of assets located outside 
the United States; (b) the acquisition is of voting securities of a foreign issuer, and will not confer control 
of: (1) an issuer which holds assets located in the United States (other than investment assets, voting or 
nonvoting securities of another person, and assets included pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 801.40(c)(2) (2002) 
having an aggregate book value of $ 15 million or more, or (2) a U.S. issuer with annual net sales or total 
assets of $ 25 million or more; (c) the acquisition is of less than $ 15 million of assets located in the United 
States (other than investment assets); or (d) the acquired person is also a foreign person, the aggregate 
annual sales of the acquiring and acquired persons in or into the United States are less than $110 million, 
and the aggregate total assets of the acquiring and acquired persons located in the United States (other than 
investment assets, voting or nonvoting securities of another person, and assets included pursuant to 12 
C.F.R. § 801.40(c)(2) (2002)) are less than $ 110 million.  The term control in this context is defined — 
different from the definition in the BHCA — as holding 50% or more of the outstanding voting securities 
of the target.  16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b)(2002). 
 
723   See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(7) & (8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Clause 7 provides that exempt from the HSRA 
filing requirements are “transactions which require agency approval under . . . [§ 3, BHCA], except that a 
portion of the transaction is not exempt under this paragraph if such portion of the transaction (A) is subject 
to . . . [§ 4(k), BHCA]; and (B) does not require agency approval under . . . [§ 3, BHCA]”; and clause 8 
provides that exempt from HSRA filing requirements are “transactions which require agency approval 
under [§ 4, BHCA] . . . , if copies of all information and documentary material filed with any such agency 
are contemporaneously filed with the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General at 
least 30 days prior to consummation of the proposed transaction, except that a portion of the transaction is 
not exempt under this paragraph if such portion of the transaction (A) is subject to . . . [§ 4(k), BHCA]; and 
(B) does not require agency approval under . . . [§ 4, BHCA].” 
  130 connection with the acquisition of a U.S. bank or BHC or under Section 4, BHCA
725 in 
connection with acquisitions permitted by Section 4, BHCA.
726  However, a pre-merger 
notification under the HSRA is required in connection with acquisitions under Section 4(k), 
BHCA
727 that do not require Board approval.
728  Section 4(k), BHCA acquisitions generally do 
not require Board approval but merely a post-transaction notice or no notice to the Board.
729 
If the acquired company engages, directly or indirectly, in financial activities or 
the investment is made in exercise of the merchant banking investment authority or the insurance  
company portfolio investment authority, and therefore qualifies as financial activity,
730 the 
acquiror must file either a post-transaction notice or no notice
731 and a pre-merger notification 
under the HSRA is necessary.
732  If the acquired company engages in activities permitted by 
                                                                                                                                                             
724   12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994). 
725   Notice for § 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) activities is required under 
§ 4(j), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); however, approval may be required under 
§ 4(c)(9) or (13) BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) or (13) (1994).  Note that § 4(k)(6)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(6)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (acquisition of a savings association and holding companies of 
savings associations), requires Board approval under § 4(j), BHCA, even if acquired in exercise of the 
investment authority of a financial activity. 
726   12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
727   See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(7) & (8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
728   Acquisitions of companies engaged in financial activities (§ 4(k)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)) or acquisitions of companies not engaged in financial activities that were acquired 
in exercise of a financial activity investment authority (merchant banking investment authority or insurance 
company portfolio investment authority, § 4(k)(4)(H) & (I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) & (I) (1994 
& Supp. V 1999)) do not require Board approval.  See supra F.2.  Acquisitions of companies engaged in 
complementary activities (§ 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) require 
prior Board approval under § 4(j), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra C.7.  
  Acquisitions under § 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), require Board approval 
under § 4(j), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) if they involve savings associations or 
holding companies of savings associations.  § 4(k)(6)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6)(B) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999).   
  The Board may require an FHC to provide notice to or obtain approval from the Board prior to acquiring 
shares of any company engaged in a financial activity.  12 C.F.R. § 225.85(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  
However, this approval requirement is based on the Board’s general supervisory authority (see supra note 
687) and not on § 4, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and, therefore, does not exempt 
from the HSRA pre-merger notification. 
729   See supra F.2. 
730   See supra note 728. 
731   See supra F.2.  The acquisition of securities by an underwriter in a firm commitment underwriting is 
exempt from pre-merger filing requirements of the HSRA pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 802.60 (2002). 
732   15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(7) & (8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
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733 or in complementary activities
734 or the acquired company is a U.S. bank 
or BHC
735 or a savings association or savings association holding company,
736 the acquiror must 
file a prior notice with the Board under Section 4(j), BHCA or Section 3, BHCA,
737 as 
applicable, and no pre-merger notification under the HSRA is necessary.
738 
If the acquired company is engaged (directly or indirectly through subsidiaries) in 
banking activities, activities permitted by Section 4, BHCA that require Board approval, and in 
financial activities under Section 4(k), BHCA that do not require Board approval, the transaction 
is split for purposes of the HSRA into portions:  that portion of the acquisition transaction that is 
covered by Section 4(k), BHCA and does not require Board approval requires an HSRA pre-
merger notification, the portion of the acquisition that does require Board approval does not 
require an HSRA pre-merger notification.
739  For instance, if the acquired company is a U.S. 
bank engaged, directly or indirectly, in (i) banking, (ii) financial activities under Section 4(k), 
BHCA and (iii) activities under Section 4(c), BHCA or complementary activities, the acquiror 
would be required to file both a notice with the Board (for the portion of the transaction that is 
subject to Section 4(c), BHCA, the complementary activities and the acquisition of the bank) and 
an HSRA pre-merger notification with the FTC and the DOJ (for the portion of the transaction 
that involves financial activities subject to Section 4(k), BHCA).
740  Financial activities subject 
to Section 4(k), BHCA do not require prior notice to or approval by the Board and, hence the 
acquisition of a company engaged in financial activities requires notification under the HSRA.  
Complementary activities are subject to Section 4(k), BHCA but require Board approval; 
therefore, a notification under the HSRA is not required.  The following diagram illustrates the 
above: 
                                                 
733   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Activities permitted under § 4(c), BHCA include, of course, 
activities permitted upon Board approval under § 4(c)(9) or (13), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) or (13) 
(1994). 
734   Section 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra C.7. 
735   See § 3, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994).  Activities permitted by § 4(c), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), complementary activities under § 4(k)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), and U.S. banks and BHCs are referred to above as FHC otherwise permissible 
Regulation Y activities.  See supra text accompanying notes 242, 245–255.     
736   Section 4(k)(6)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
737   12 U.S.C. § 1843(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) & 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994).  For a discussion of the filing 
requirements under § 4(j), BHCA, see Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.10 D.  For a discussion of the filing 
requirements relating to complementary activities, see supra C.7.  Applications for Board action under § 
4(c)(9) and (13), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) & (13) (1994) are not governed by § 4(j), BHCA. 
738   15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(7) & (8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
739   15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(7) & (8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
740   See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(7) & (8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  132 Diagram 9 
FHC acquires an entity that is engaged, directly or through subsidiaries,  
in one or more of the following activities 
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From a practical point of view, it may be difficult for a target company, that has 
not been under Board supervision and therefore does not keep its records in a manner that 
facilitates separation of its activities according to BHCA authorities, to separate its activities as 
indicated above, and it may be easier to give an HSRA pre-merger notification for the company 
as a whole. 
G. 
1. 
                                                
Consequences  of Becoming an FHC 
Board Supervision over FHCs 
The GLBA combines two principles of supervision of BHC/FHC groups: 
functional regulation and umbrella supervision. 
The GLBA imposes on BHCs, regardless of whether they elected to become 
FHCs or not, the principle of functional regulation.
741  Functional regulation is the opposite of 
 
741  See § 5(c)(1) & (2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1) & (2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  133 regulation along industry lines.  Functional regulation means that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is the regulator of broker-dealers, registered investment advisers and registered 
investment companies that are BHCs having elected to be FHCs or are subsidiaries of an FHC; 
the state insurance supervisory authorities are the regulators of insurance companies that are 
BHCs having elected to be FHCs or are subsidiaries of an FHC; and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission is the regulator of entities subject to its regulations.
742  The functional 
regulation relates, of course, only to those activities of the entity subject to the jurisdiction of the 
respective regulator.  The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency remains the supervisor of 
national banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation remains the supervisor of insured 
depository institutions, and the Office of Thrift Supervision remains the supervisor of thrifts. 
Umbrella supervision gives the Board overall supervisory responsibility for BHCs 
and FHCs
743 but limits the direct supervisory power over functionally regulated companies in the 
holding company group by instructing the Board to rely primarily on, and to show deference to, 
reports filed with and examinations conducted by their functional regulators.
744  In keeping with 
the Board’s role as an umbrella supervisor of BHCs, the BHCA provides that the Board may 
require any BHC and any of its subsidiaries to submit reports regarding its financial condition, 
risk control systems, transactions with depository institution subsidiaries of the BHC, and 
compliance with the BHCA or other federal laws under the enforcement jurisdiction of the 
Board.
 745  The Board may also examine any BHC and any of its subsidiaries in order to inform 
the Board of its nature of operation, financial condition, threats to safety and soundness of any 
depository institution subsidiary of such BHC and the system for monitoring and controlling 
such risks, and to monitor compliance with the BHCA or other federal law under the 
                                                 
742  See § 5(c), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and § 5(g), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(g) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999); § 45, FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1831v (1994 & Supp. V 1999); § 10A, BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1848a (1994 & Supp. V 1999); § 210, GLBA, 113 Stat. at 1396 (1999) (preserving the applicability of the 
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). 
743   Section 5(c), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  One commentator said that the GLBA 
allocated to the Board “regulatory responsibility for overseeing all financial services organizations from a 
safety and soundness perspective.”  Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking:  Before and After 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, at 711 (2000).  See Carter H. Golembe, Reform of the Financial 
Regulatory Structure, Golembe Report, Nos. 2 & 3, at 1 & 3 (2000). 
  The stated ground for ceding such massive power to the Board was the perceived need “for oversight of the 
[financial services] organizations as a whole as well as subsidiaries not subject to functional regulation.”  
Senate Report on S. 900, supra note 400, at 16.  For a critical view of the functional/umbrella regulatory 
scheme of the GLBA, see Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance:  Before and 
After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 723, at 761–65, 776–84 (2000). 
744  Section 5(c)(2)(D) & (E), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(D) & (E) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See also 
§ 5(c)(1)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  One could say that the regulation 
by the Board of BHCs/FHCs and its subsidiaries constitutes functional regulation by the Board to the extent 
such BHCs/FHCs or subsidiaries are not subject to functional regulation by other agencies. 
745  Section 5(c)(1)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
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746  It may examine, however, functionally regulated 
subsidiaries of a BHC only under enumerated circumstances.
747 
The Board supervision over BHCs is largely based on the so-called source of 
strength doctrine, pursuant to which a BHC and indirectly its subsidiaries are expected to support 
the deposit-taking subsidiaries in case of need.
748  The GLBA amendments to the BHC limit the 
source of strength doctrine by prohibiting the Board from requiring an insurance company, a 
registered broker-dealer, a registered investment company, or a registered investment adviser, 
that is a BHC or is an affiliate of a depository institution, to provide funds or other assets to a 
subsidiary depository institution of the BHC if the Securities and Exchange Commission or the 
state insurance authority as the functional regulator of such company determines that such action 
would have a materially adverse effect on the financial condition of such company.
749  If the 
functional regulator of the BHC or its affiliates refuses the use of funds of such functionally 
regulated company for the depository institution, the Board may order the BHC to divest the 
depository institution within 180 days and may impose conditions and restrictions on the BHC’s 
ownership and operation of the depository institution during the divestiture period.
750  By 
limiting the doctrine, the BHCA permits the inference that the doctrine is, in general, 
legitimately available with respect to BHCs.
751 
2. 
                                                
Foreign Banks with Grandfathered Activities that Elect to Be FHCs 
If a foreign bank
752 or other foreign company covered by Section 8(a), IBA
753 is 
engaged in grandfathered activities under Section 8(c), IBA
754 and those activities are financial 
 
746   Section 5(c)(2)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
747  Section § 5(c)(2)(B) & (C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(B) & (C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The 
supervisory purpose must always be the protection of the safety and soundness of the depository institution 
subsidiary of the BHC, § 5(c)(2)(B)(i) & (ii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(B)(i) & (ii) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999), or compliance with federal banking law, § 5(c)(2)(B)(iii), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §1844(c)(2)(B)(iii) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).  This applies even to examinations of BHC subsidiaries that are not functionally 
regulated.  Section 5(c)(2)(A) & (C), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(A) & (C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
748   See James F. Groth, Comment, Can Regulators Force Bank Holding Companies to Bail Out Their Failing 
Subsidiaries? – An Analysis of the Federal Reserve Board’s Source-of-Strength Doctrine, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 112-42 (1991). 
749  Section 5(g)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(g)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Conference Report on S. 900, 
supra note 4, at 158.  The Board must notify the functional regulator of its request that the BHC or its 
functionally regulated affiliates provide funds to the depository institution subsidiary of the BHC.  Section 
5(g)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(g)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Under the source of strength doctrine, the 
functionally regulated affiliates of the depository institution would provide funds or amounts to the BHC 
which would then provide them to the depository institution subsidiary.  See § 5(g)(1), BHCA. 
750  Section 5(g)(3) & (4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(g)(3) & (4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The Board may 
extend the 180-day period.  Section 5(g)(3), BHCA. 
751   See MCORP Fin. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to recognize the 
legitimacy of the source of strength doctrine), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 
(1991). 
752  See supra note 43. 
  135 activities or complementary activities,
755 it will lose such grandfather rights upon filing a 
declaration to be an FHC.
756  For example, a foreign bank with a grandfathered broker-dealer 
subsidiary that elects to be an FHC can no longer rely on the grandfather authority under 
Section 8(c), IBA but must rely on Section 4(k)(4)(F), BHCA
757 for the activities of its 
subsidiary.  This provision is in the nature of a clean-up provision and should create no 
disadvantage for foreign banks.  However, the prudential safeguards applicable to transactions 
between depository institutions and its affiliates in a BHC group, which did not apply to affiliates 
involved in grandfathered activities, will apply to such affiliates after the FHC election.
758  
Nonfinancial activities of a foreign bank subsidiary that were grandfathered continue to be 
grandfathered. 
The GLBA creates one disadvantage for foreign banks:  the Board may impose 
restrictions and requirements on the conduct of grandfathered financial or complementary 
activities
759 of foreign banks that are comparable to the restrictions and requirements imposed on 
FHCs organized under U.S. law if such foreign banks did not elect FHC status by November 12, 
2001.
760  These restrictions will mainly consist of the imposition of prudential safeguards on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
753  12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1994).  See supra note 14. 
754  12 U.S.C. § 3106(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  A foreign bank that prior to the enactment of the IBA in 1978 
was engaged in activities which were permitted at that time but prohibited after the enactment of the IBA 
was under § 8(c), IBA allowed to continue these activities (so-called grandfathered activities).  See Michael 
Gruson & Jonathan M. Weld, Nonbanking Activities of Foreign Banking Operations in the United States, 
1980 Ill. L.F. 129, 137–44 (1980), for a discussion of grandfathered activities. 
755  Section 8(c), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), as amended by the GLBA, refers to “any 
activity that the Board has determined to be permissible for [FHCs]” under § 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  For a discussion of financial activities and complementary activities, see 
supra C.3. & C.7.  Financial activities that will lose their grandfathered status include, e.g., the financial 
activities investment authority to invest in companies engaged in any nonfinancial activity pursuant to the 
underwriting, dealing and market-making authority, the merchant banking investment authority and the 
insurance company portfolio investment authority, § 4(k)(4)(E), (H) & (I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(k)(4)(E), (H) & (I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  However, a portfolio company operated pursuant to the 
grandfather authority will not lose its right to continue to engage in its nonfinancial activities.   
756  Section 8(c)(3)(A), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(c)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See § 4(l)(1)(C), BHCA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (filing of declaration of election).  Although the IBA 
provides that the foreign bank or other foreign company covered by § 8(a), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) 
(1994), loses its grandfather rights upon filing a declaration to be an FHC, the meaning probably is that 
there must have been an effective election to be an FHC. 
757  12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(F) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a)(1) in connection with 12 
C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(7)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
758   See infra G. 4. 
759   See supra note 755. 
760  Section 8(c)(3)(B), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Although the IBA requires that the 
foreign bank or foreign company covered by § 8(a), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1994), must have filed a 
declaration to be an FHC by the stated date, the meaning probably is that it must have made an effective 
election to be an FHC.  In imposing such restrictions and requirements, the Board must give due regard to 
the principle of national treatment and equality of competitive opportunity.  Section 8(c)(3)(B), IBA. 
  136 relationship between grandfathered broker-dealer subsidiaries of foreign banks and the U.S. 
branches or agencies of such foreign banks.
761 
A foreign bank with grandfathered activities other than financial activities or 
complementary activities does not lose those grandfather rights by electing to be an FHC and the 
conduct of such grandfathered activities by the foreign bank or its subsidiaries will not be subject 
to the imposition of prudential safeguards.  More importantly, as discussed above, if a foreign 
bank that is a Qualified Foreign Banking Organization elects to be an FHC, it does not lose its 
status as, and the advantages of being, a Qualified Foreign Banking Organization.
762 
3. 
a. 
                                                
Limitations on Cross-Marketing 
The  Rule 
The BHCA imposes cross-marketing restrictions on the relationship between the 
depository institution controlled by an FHC, on the one hand, and companies whose shares are 
owned or controlled by the FHC in exercise of the merchant banking investment authority, the 
insurance company portfolio investment authority or the underwriting authority and companies 
that are engaged in grandfathered activities pursuant to Section 4(n), BHCA, on the other hand 
[all such companies are referred to in this Section G.3. as restricted companies].
763  A purpose of 
the cross-marketing restrictions is to assist in maintaining the separation between banking and 
commerce.
764 
In particular, the BHCA prohibits any depository institution controlled by an FHC 
from offering or marketing, directly or through any arrangement, any product or service of a 
restricted company, or allowing any product or service of the depository institution to be offered 
 
761  See infra G.4.  Section 8(c)(3)(B), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(c)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), refers by way 
of example specifically to 12 U.S.C. § 1828(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
762  See supra E.1. 
763  Section 4(n)(5)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  That Section refers to 
companies whose shares are owned or controlled or whose activities are conducted by an FHC pursuant to 
§ 4(k)(4)(H) or (I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) or (I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), or pursuant to § 4(n), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Although § 4(n)(5)(A), BHCA does not say whether 
all or any of the shares of such companies must be owned or controlled by an FHC, this Section also 
applies to minority-owned companies because § 4(k) and 4(n), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) & (n) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999), permit noncontrolling investments in portfolio companies or companies grandfathered 
under § 4(n)(1), BHCA.  Thus, ownership of any shares seems to trigger the cross-marketing prohibition.  
This is, however, not a very practical conclusion.  Note the difference in language between § 4(n)(5)(A), 
BHCA (“a company . . . whose shares are owned or controlled by the [FHC] . . .”) and § 4(n)(5)(B), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(5)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“a company owned or controlled [by an 
FHC]”).  Note also that § 4(n)(6), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(6) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), makes § 23A, 
FRA, infra note 793, applicable only to affiliates, i.e., companies in a control relationship.  See infra note 
810.  As to companies engaged in grandfathered activities pursuant to § 4(n), BHCA, see supra E.2. 
764   See H.R. Rep. 106-74 pt. 1, 106th Cong. 1st Sess., at 122–23 (1999); Final Merchant Banking Release, 
supra note 418, at 8,480 (text accompanying n. 27). 
  137 or marketed, directly or through any arrangement, by or through any restricted company.
765  
Section 225.176, Regulation Y implements these restrictions for companies more than 5 percent 
of whose shares are owned or controlled by an FHC in exercise of the merchant banking 
investment authority
766 [such restricted companies covered by Section 225.176, Regulation Y are 
refereed to in this G.3. as restricted portfolio companies].  Regulation Y does not contain rules 
relating to cross-marketing of controlled depository institutions and companies whose shares are 
owned or controlled by an FHC pursuant to the insurance company portfolio investment 
authority
767 or that are engaged in grandfathered activities pursuant to Section 4(n), BHCA.
768 
Neither the BHCA nor Regulation Y defines the term cross-marketing.  In its 
Merchant Banking Release, the Board states that companies use a wide variety of methods or 
arrangements to market or offer their products with those of other companies, and that new 
methods or arrangements for cross-marketing may develop with advances in technology, changes 
in consumer shopping or purchasing habits or other developments.
769  For this reason, the Board 
refrained from defining the terms.  The Board believes “that questions concerning the application 
of [Regulation Y’s] cross-marketing restrictions to particular types of activities or arrangements 
are handled most appropriately on a case-by-case basis”.
770 
b. 
                                                
Restricted Depository Institutions 
The cross-marketing restrictions of Regulation Y apply to companies more than 5 
percent of whose shares are owned by an FHC in exercise of the merchant banking investment 
 
765   Section 4(n)(5)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).   
766   12 C.F.R. § 225.176 (2002) (Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(1)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y) limits the 
application of 12 C.F.R. § 225.176 to companies more than 5 percent of the shares, assets or ownership 
interests of which are owned or controlled by an FHC pursuant to Subpart J (Merchant Banking 
Investments) of Regulation Y. 
767   Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra D.4. 
The BHCA contains special rules regarding cross-marketing arrangements between FHC-controlled 
depository institutions and companies whose shares are owned or controlled by the FHC pursuant to the 
insurance company portfolio investment authority for marketing of products or services through statement 
inserts or Internet Web sites.  Section 4(n)(5)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(5)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999).  The Board regulations called for in that provision has not yet been promulgated.  The special rules 
of § 4(n)(5)(B), BHCA are not applicable to investments made under the merchant banking investment 
authority.  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,480 n.26 (erroneously referring to 
§ 4(k)(5)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).  
Regulation Y does not contain rules relating to cross-marketing of controlled depository institutions and 
companies whose shares are owned or controlled by an FHC pursuant to the underwriting, dealing or 
market-making authority of § 4(k)(4)(E) & (H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) & (H) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999). 
768   12 U.S.C. § 1843(n) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See supra E.2. 
769   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,481. 
770   Id. 
  138 authority and to any depository institutions controlled by such FHC.
771  Regulation Y extends the 
cross-marketing restrictions, with certain exceptions, to subsidiaries of such depository 
institution.
772  The extension of the cross-marketing restrictions to depository institution 
subsidiaries has the purpose of applying the restrictions to operating subsidiaries
773 of depository 
institutions, i.e., subsidiaries that engage in activities permissible for the parent depository 
institution on the basis that the subsidiary is, in essence, a department or division of the 
institution.
774  The very nature of operating subsidiaries of depository institutions makes it 
reasonable to treat them as one and the same for purposes of the cross-marketing restrictions. 
It stands to reason that subsidiaries of a depository institution that are authorized 
to engage in activities different from those permissible for the parent depository institution are 
not subject to the cross-marketing restrictions.  Such subsidiaries that are exempt from the cross-
marketing prohibition are: 
 financial subsidiaries of a depository institution;
775 
 a company held by an Edge Act Corporation or Agreement Corporation 
subsidiary of a depository institution;
776 and 
 any company held by a small business investment company owned in accordance 
with the Small Business Investment Company Act of 1958.
777 
Since Regulation Y defines for purposes of the merchant banking rules (Subpart J 
of Regulation Y) the term depository institution to include U.S. branches and agencies of a 
foreign bank,
778 such branches and agencies may not cross-market the products or services of a 
restricted portfolio company of the foreign bank FHC (or an FHC controlling the foreign bank 
                                                 
771  12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
772   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(1) & (2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
773   See Gruson, supra note 1, at 662 n.10. 
774   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,480. 
775   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Such subsidiaries are permitted by Section 5136A, 
Revised Statutes, 12 U.S.C. § 24a (1994 & Supp. V 1999), or § 46, FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1831w (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999).  See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.15 for a discussion of financial subsidiaries of national 
banks. 
776   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Such subsidiaries are permitted by § 25 or 25A, FRA, 12 
U.S.C. § 601 et seq. & § 611 et seq. (1994).  See Gruson, supra note 1, at 676 n.40. 
777   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Small Business Investment Company Act of 1958, 
15 U.S.C. § 661 et seq. (1994). 
778   12 C.F.R. § 225.177(b) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  139 FHC) held under the merchant banking investment authority
779 or allow any product or service of 
the branch or agency to be offered by such restricted portfolio company.
780 
c. 
d. 
                                                
FHC Affiliates Not Covered 
The cross-marketing restrictions of the BHCA and Section 225.176, Regulation 
Y
781 do not apply to the relationship between nondepository affiliates of FHCs.  Thus, for 
instance, two companies (that are not depository institutions) shares of which are owned by an 
FHC under any investment authority may cross-market each other’s products.  In addition, the 
cross-marketing restrictions do not apply to companies in which the FHC, directly or indirectly, 
owns under the merchant banking investment authority
782 less than 5 percent of the voting shares 
or ownership interests since the FHC could own such interests under Section 4(c)(6) or 4(c)(7), 
BHCA
783 without being subject to the BHC’s cross-marketing restrictions.
784  If a noncontrolled 
restricted portfolio company owns more than 5 percent of the shares of another company, that 
other company is not controlled by the FHC and is not covered by the cross-marketing 
prohibition. 
Cross-Marketing Restrictions and Private Equity Funds 
Generally, the cross-marketing restrictions apply to a private equity fund held by 
an FHC under the merchant banking investment authority and to restricted portfolio companies 
held by such private equity fund, because both kinds of entities are companies owned or 
controlled by an FHC pursuant to Subpart J (Merchant Banking Investments) of Regulation Y.
785  
Since private equity funds, by definition, may engage only in investment activities for resale or 
 
779  Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
780   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,480.  The Final Merchant Banking Release, id., 
inaccurately states that a branch or agency of a foreign bank may not cross-market products or services of a 
restricted portfolio company “owned or controlled by the foreign bank or an affiliate of the foreign bank” 
under the merchant banking investment authority.  As stated in 12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(1)(i) (2002) 
(Regulation Y), the cross-marketing prohibition applies to any restricted portfolio company more than 5 
percent of whose shares are owned or controlled by the FHC.  The Final Merchant Banking Release seems 
to require contrary to Regulation Y, a control relationship between the foreign bank and the restricted 
portfolio company.  It does not clearly follow from the language of 12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) that the cross-marketing prohibition relating to branches and agencies of foreign banks 
includes restricted portfolio companies, shares of which are owned by an affiliate of the foreign bank FHC 
operating the branch or agency, but such inclusion appears to be reasonable. 
781   12 C.F.R. § 225.176 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
782   Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
783   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) & (7) (1994). 
784   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,480.  With this argument the Board “corrects” 
the drafting error of § 4(n)(5)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), that applies 
the cross-marketing prohibition to portfolio companies any shares of which are owned by an FHC.  See 
supra note 763. 
785   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(3)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  140 other disposition in accordance with Regulation Y and may not be engaged in impermissible 
commercial activities,
786 Regulation Y permits FHC controlled depository institutions (and their 
subsidiaries) to sell, offer or market the shares or other ownership interest in a private equity 
fund in which the FHC has an interest, whether or not such interest is controlling.
787 
Furthermore, the cross-marketing restrictions do not prohibit an FHC controlled 
depository institution (and its subsidiaries) from engaging in cross-marketing activities with a 
restricted portfolio company held by a private equity fund that is owned but not controlled by the 
FHC.
788  Where the FHC does not control a private equity fund, shares held by the fund 
generally are not attributed to the FHC.
789 
e. 
                                                
Permitted Marketing Activities of Depository Institutions  
The BHCA and Regulation Y do not prohibit an FHC controlled depository 
institution or subsidiary of a depository institution from marketing its own products or services - 
such as deposit, lending, and advisory products or services to a restricted company so long as the 
restricted company does not then market those products or services to its customers or others.
790  
In addition, the BHCA and Regulation Y do not prohibit an FHC controlled depository 
institution from purchasing the products or services of a restricted company - such as data 
processing hardware, software or services - to support the depository institution’s own 
operations, provided that the institution does not, directly or indirectly or through arrangements, 
market the restricted company’s products or services for the institution’s customers or others.
791  
Likewise, the cross-marketing restrictions do not prohibit an FHC controlled depository 
institution from engaging in cross-marketing activities with a company that is a co-investor with 
the FHC in a restricted company, so long as those activities do not involve products or services 
of the restricted company.
792 
 
786   See supra D. 2. e. 
787   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(3)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
788   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(a)(3)(i) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
789   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,481. 
790   Id. 
791   Id.  Since the Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,481, states that this rule follows from 
the GLBA, the rule is not only applicable to restricted portfolio companies but also to restricted companies 
(supra note 763). 
792   Id. n.28.  Since the Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,481, states that the rule follows 
from the GLBA, the rule is not only applicable to restricted portfolio companies but also to restricted 
companies (supra note 763). 
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a. 
                                                
Application of Prudential Safeguards and Sections 23A and 23B, FRA 
Sections 23A & 23B, FRA and Bank Subsidiaries of FHCs 
Sections 23A and 23B, Federal Reserve Act [herein FRA]
793 impose specific 
quantitative, qualitative and collateral requirements on certain types of transactions between a 
 
793   12 U.S.C. § 371c (1994 & Supp. V 1999) & 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See proposed 
Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,209 (May 11, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 223); Board release 
accompanying proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,186-219 (Docket No. R-1103) (May 11, 2001) 
[herein Proposed Regulation W Release]. The Proposed Regulation W Release, at 24,186-87 summarizes 
§§ 23A & 23B, FRA as follows:   
  [S]ections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act are designed to limit the risks to a 
bank (and the Federal deposit insurance funds) from transactions between the bank and 
its affiliates and to limit the ability of a bank to transfer to its affiliates the subsidy 
arising from the bank’s access to the Federal safety net.  Section 23A achieves these 
goals in three major ways.  First, it limits a bank’s “covered transactions” with any 
single “affiliate” to no more than 10 percent of the bank’s capital and surplus, and 
transactions with all affiliates combined to no more than 20 percent of capital and 
surplus.  “Covered transactions” include purchases of assets from an affiliate, 
extensions of credit to an affiliate, investments in securities issued by an affiliate, 
guarantees on behalf of an affiliate, and certain other transactions that expose the bank 
to an affiliate’s credit or investment risk.  A bank’s “affiliates” include, among other 
companies, any companies that control the bank, any companies under common control 
with the bank, and certain investment funds that are advised by the bank or an affiliate 
of the bank. 
 
    Second, the statute requires all transactions between a bank and its affiliates to be on 
terms and conditions that are consistent with safe and sound banking practices, and 
prohibits a bank from purchasing low-qualify assets from its affiliates.  Finally, the 
statute requires that a bank’s extensions of credit to affiliates and guarantees on behalf 
of affiliates be appropriately secured by a statutorily defined amount of collateral. 
 
    Section 23B protects a bank by requiring that certain transactions between the bank 
and its affiliates occur on market terms; that is, on terms and under circumstances that 
are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to the bank, as those prevailing at the 
time for comparable transactions with unaffiliated companies.  Section 23B applies this 
restriction to any covered transaction (as defined in section 23A) with an affiliate as 
well as certain other transactions, such as the sale of securities or other assets to an 
affiliate and the payment of money or furnishing of services to an affiliate. 
 
  Sections 23A and 23B, FRA apply by their terms to “member banks” — that is, national banks, State 
banks, trust companies, and other institutions that are members of the Federal Reserve System.  The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1828(j) (1994)) subjects insured nonmember banks to sections 
23A and 23B, FRA as if they were member banks.  See § 223.1(c), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 
24,210 (May 11, 2001).  Accordingly, §§ 23A & 23B, FRA apply to all insured depository institutions and 
uninsured member banks.  Proposed Regulation W Release, supra, at 24,187, 24,188 & 24,207; § 
223.26(c), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,218 (May 11,2001).  
 
 See  generally Robert E. Mannion & Linda B. Coe, Transactions Between Banks and Affiliated Entities, 
Chapter 11 in MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER (eds.), REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED 
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL, vol. 1 (3d ed. 2000) for a discussion of §§ 23A & 23B, FRA. 
 
  142 bank and its affiliates, principally companies that are under common control with the bank.
794  
Section 23A and 23B, FRA apply to such transactions between an FHC controlled bank,
795 on 
the one hand, and such FHC and subsidiaries of such FHC, including its subsidiaries engaged in 
financial activities and controlled portfolio companies, on the other hand.
 796 
If an FHC owns or controls 25 percent or more of a class of voting securities of a 
company under the merchant banking investment authority
797 or the insurance company portfolio 
investment authority,
798 the company is an affiliate of a bank controlled by the FHC.
799  Section 
23A, FRA, as amended by the GLBA, lowers the threshold of control for portfolio companies of 
FHCs.  Section 23A(b)(11), FRA creates a rebuttable presumption that a portfolio company 
[herein an (H) or (I) portfolio company], 15 percent or more of whose equity capital is owned or 
controlled by an FHC pursuant to the merchant banking investment authority or the insurance 
company portfolio investment authority, is an affiliate of the bank subsidiary of such FHC for 
purposes of Sections 23A and 23B, FRA.
800  Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, the 15 
percent-owned (H) or (I) portfolio company is an affiliate of the bank subsidiary of the parent 
                                                 
794   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,481.  See § 23A(a)(1) & (b)(1), FRA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 371c(a)(1) & (b)(1) (1994). 
795   As to the scope of the term bank for purposes of § 23A, FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1994 & Supp. V 1999), 
see § 223.1(c), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,210 (May 11, 2001).  See supra note 793 
(penultimate paragraph). 
796   Section 23A, FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1994 & Supp. V 1999), addresses transactions between banks and 
affiliates.  Affiliate is defined in § 23A (b)(1), (2) & (3), FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (b)(1), (2) & (3) (1994), 
and in § 223.24, Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,216 (May 11, 2001), in terms of control.  Control 
is defined in § 223.26(f), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,218 (May 11, 2001).  This definition is 
substantially identical to the definition of control in § 2(a)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (1994).  
Section 23B(d)(1), FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (d)(1) (1994), defines affiliate by reference to § 23A, FRA. 
797   Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
798   Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
799   Section 23A (b)(3)(A), FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (b)(3)(A) (1994); §§ 223.24(a)(2) & § 223.26(f), Proposed 
Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,216 & 24,218 (May 11, 2001).  See Proposed Regulation W Release, supra 
note 793, at 24,204. 
800  Section 23A(b)(11), FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(11) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(1) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) (referring only to the investment authority under § 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)); § 223.24(a)(9)(i), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,217 
(May 11, 2001) (referring to the investment authority under § 4(k)(4)(H) &(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(k)(4)(H) & (I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Section 23A(b)(11), FRA uses the term equity capital 
without defining that term, but a definition is contained in § 223.26(i), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 24,218 (May 11, 2001).  12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) uses the term equity which 
is not defined in Regulation Y or in the BHCA.  For purposes of the presumption of control of 12 C.F.R. § 
225.176(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y), equity capital includes options, warrants and other instruments 
convertible into equity capital.  12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y) (the Section should refer 
to equity rather than equity capital, or 12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(1) should refer to equity capital rather than 
equity).  See the definition of equity in 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(h) (2002) (Regulation K). 
  143 FHC for purposes of §§ 23A and 23B, FRA.  Section 23A gives the Board the power to 
determine whether the presumption of control is rebutted.
801   
Section 225.176(b)(3), Regulation Y
802 and Section 223.24(a)(9)(iii), Proposed 
Regulation W
803set forth situations in which the BHCA’s presumption of control will be 
considered rebutted: 
 no director, officer or employee of the FHC serves as a director, trustee or general 
partner of the H or I portfolio company; 
 a person that is not affiliated or associated with the FHC owns or controls a 
greater percentage of the equity capital of the H or I portfolio company than is 
owned or controlled by the FHC, and no more than one officer or employee of the 
FHC serves as a director or trustee of the H or I portfolio company; or 
 a person that is not affiliated or associated with the FHC owns or controls more 
than 50 percent of the voting shares of the H or I portfolio company, and officers 
and employees of the FHC do not constitute a majority of the directors or trustees 
of the H or I portfolio company.
804 
These safe harbors operate automatically; they do not require Board review or approval.
805  On 
the other hand, the situations identified in Section 225.176(b)(3), Regulation Y and Section 
                                                 
801   Section 23A(b)(11), FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(11) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“unless the company or 
shareholder provides information acceptable to the Board to rebut this presumption of control”).  See 12 
C.F.R. § 25.176(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y); § 223.24(a)(9)(ii), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 
24,217 (May 11, 2001). 
802   12 C.F.R. § 225.276(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
803   66 Fed. Reg. 24,217 (May 11, 2001). 
804   In each of these situations the FHC is assumed to own more than 15 percent of the total equity of the 
portfolio company (thereby triggering the statutory presumption) and less than 25 percent of any class of 
voting securities of the H or I portfolio company (thereby not meeting the statutory definition of control).  
See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,481; Proposed Regulation W Release, supra note 
793, at 24, 204.  For purposes of the safe harbors, the terms holding company and FHC include any 
subsidiary of the holding company/FHC, including any subsidiary depository institution.  Accordingly, if a 
director of a subsidiary bank or nonbank subsidiary of an FHC also serves as a director of a portfolio 
company, such person counts as director of the FHC.  Section 223.24(a)(9)(v), 66 Fed. Reg. 24,217 (May 
11, 2001); 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Proposed Regulation W Release, supra 
note 793, at 24,205. 
805   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) (“without Board approval”); § 223.24(a)(9)(ii), Proposed 
Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,217 (May 11, 2001).  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, 
at 8,481; Proposed Regulation W Release, supra note 793, at 24,204 & 24,205.  Although the Board calls 
the presumptions of nonexistence of control “safe harbors” (see Final Merchant Banking Release, supra 
note 418, at 8,481) they are not really safe harbors in the generally accepted meaning of that term because 
12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(3) (2002) (Regulation Y) permits these presumptions only “[a]bsent evidence to the 
contrary”.  It is unclear who could bring such evidence and in what procedure.  Section 223.24(a)(9)(iii), 
Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,217 (May 11, 2001) does not contain such qualification; and the 
  144 223.24(a)(9)(iii), Proposed Regulation W are not an exclusive list of circumstances in which the 
presumption may be rebutted, and Regulation Y and Proposed Regulation W permit FHCs to 
submit to the Board evidence of other circumstances that would support rebuttal of the 
presumption of control.
806 
An FHC indirectly owns or controls shares of a company that are owned or 
controlled by its subsidiary.
807  Regulation Y and Proposed Regulation W clarify that for 
purposes of applying the presumption of control, an FHC that has an investment in a private 
equity fund will not be considered indirectly to own the equity capital of a portfolio company 
owned by the fund unless the FHC controls the private equity fund.
808  On the other hand, an H 
or I portfolio company is presumed to be an affiliate of the bank subsidiary of an FHC for 
purposes of Sections 23A and 23B, FRA, if the FHC controls a private equity fund and the 
private equity fund owns or controls more than 15 percent of the total equity of such portfolio 
company.
809 
In addition, Section 23A, FRA is made applicable to the transactions between 
banks controlled by an FHC and affiliates controlled by the FHC engaged in grandfathered 
activities pursuant to Section 4(n), BHCA.
810 
The Board has emphasized that an FHC may not own any shares of a company in 
reliance on Sections 4(c)(6) or (7), BHCA
811 where the FHC owns or controls, in the aggregate 
under a combination of authorities, more than 5 percent of any class of voting securities of the 
company.
812  Thus, an FHC may not own in addition to the 15 percent of the total equity of the H 
                                                                                                                                                             
Proposed Regulation W Release, supra note 793, at 24,205 states that these safe harbors do not require 
Board review or approval. 
806   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y); § 223.24(a)(9)(ii), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 
24,217 (May 11, 2001).  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,481; Proposed 
regulation W Release, supra note 793, at 24,205.  
807   See Gruson, supra note 1, § 10.05 C. 
808   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y); § 223.24(a)(9)(iv), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 
24,217 (May 11,2001).  Control of an FHC over a private equity fund is described in 12 C.F.R. § 
225.173(d)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Private equity fund is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 225.73(a) (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
809   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(5) (2002) (Regulation Y); § 223.24(a)(9)(iv), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 
24,217 (May 11, 2001).  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,482.  Control of an 
FHC over a private equity fund is described for purposes of Regulation Y and Proposed Regulation W in 
12 C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y).  An FHC, e.g., controls a private equity fund if it acts as 
general partner of the private equity fund.  Id. 
810  Section 4(n)(6), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(6) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  As to companies engaged in 
grandfathered activities pursuant to § 4(n), BHCA, see supra  E.2. 
811   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) & (7) (1994). 
812   See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,469, n.10 & 8,481 n.29; Proposed Regulation W 
Release, supra note 793, at 24,204 n.95.  See supra note 387. 
  145 or I portfolio company shares in reliance on Section 4(c)(6) or (7), BHCA. 
 
b. 
                                                
Sections 23A and 23B, FRA and Branches and Agencies of Foreign 
Banks 
The Board is empowered to adopt prudential safeguards governing the 
relationships or transactions between depository institution subsidiaries of a BHC (regardless 
whether or not the BHC is an FHC) and any affiliate of such depository institution (other than a 
subsidiary of such depository institution) so as to avoid, among other factors, significant risk to 
the safety and soundness of depository institutions or unsound banking practices.
813  For the 
same purpose the Board may also adopt prudential safeguards governing the relationships or 
transactions between a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company of a foreign bank 
and any affiliate in the United States of such foreign bank.
814   
The Board’s authority to impose prudential safeguards includes the authority to 
apply the restrictions under Sections 23A and 23B, FRA
815 to transactions between depository 
institution subsidiaries of a BHC and its affiliates as well as to transactions between U.S. 
branches and agencies of a foreign bank and its U.S. affiliates.  As stated above, Sections 23A 
and 23B, FRA limit credit and other transactions between a bank and its affiliates in order to 
limit the possibility that the risks of activities conducted in a nonbank affiliate of a bank be 
transferred to the bank.
816 
The Board has implemented the authority in Section 4(g), Regulation Y
817 by 
applying the Sections 23A & 23B, FRA standards to the extension of credit by banks, thrifts, 
branches and agencies that are part of an FHC group to broker-dealer subsidiaries of such group.  
In particular, Section 4(g), Regulation Y requires that any intra-day extension of credit by a bank 
or thrift, or a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank, to a securities affiliate engaged in 
securities underwriting, dealing or market-making must be on market terms consistent with 
Section 23B, FRA.
818  Proposed Regulation W sets forth a more comprehensive proposal on the 
 
813  12 U.S.C. § 1828a(b)(1) & (2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  In addition, the relationship between depository 
institutions and their subsidiaries is subject to prudential safeguards established by (i) the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1828a(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), in the case of 
national banks, (ii) the Board, in the case of state member banks pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1828a(b)(1)(B) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), and (iii) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in the case of state 
non-member banks pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1828a(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
814  12 U.S.C. § 1828a(b)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
815  Section 23A, FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1994 & Supp. V 1999); § 23B, FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999).  See supra note 793 for a summary of §§ 23A & 23B, FRA. 
816  See Board release accompanying interim rule 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g) (2002) (Regulation Y), 65 Fed. Reg. 
14,440-42, at 14,441 (Mar. 17, 2000) [herein Section 225.4(g) Release].  For a definition of bank, see supra 
note 793. 
817   12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g) (2002) (Regulation Y) (interim rule).  See Section 225.4(g) Release, supra note 816. 
818   12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The affiliated company must be engaged in underwriting, 
dealing in, or making a market in, securities pursuant to § 4(k)(4)(E), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) 
  146 treatment of intra-day extensions of credit under Section 23A, FRA than is contained in Section 
4(g), Regulation Y.
819   
In addition, a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank
820 will be required to 
comply with Sections 23A and 23B, FRA with respect to lending and securities purchase 
transactions between the U.S. branch or agency and a securities affiliate engaged in securities 
underwriting, dealing or market-making.
821  These restrictions on purchases apply only if the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The purpose of this restriction is to ensure that intra-day extensions of credits are 
not subsidizing the activities of the securities firm to the detriment of the depository institution affiliate.  
Section 225.4(g) Release, supra note 816, at 14,441. 
819   Section 223.8(b), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,211 (May 11, 2001).  See Proposed Regulation 
W Release, supra 793, at 24,191.  Section 23A(f)(3)(A), FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999), requires the Board to address in a final rule the application of the restrictions of § 23A, FRA, 12 
U.S.C. § 371c (1994 & Supp. V 1999), on intra-day extensions of credit to all affiliates.  See interim rule § 
250.248 (Miscellaneous Interpretations), issued on May 3, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,233 (May 11, 2001) (to 
be codified as 12 C.F.R. § 250.248) providing for the application of §§ 23A and 23B, FRA to intra-day 
extensions of credit by insured depository institutions to their affiliates.  See also the accompanying Board 
release, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,229–233 (May 11, 2001). 
820   12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) is applicable to any foreign bank that “is or is treated as” an 
FHC.  This refers to (i) foreign banks that are treated as BHCs pursuant to the IBA because they maintain a 
branch, agency or commercial banking company in the United States and (ii) foreign banks that are BHCs 
pursuant to the BHCA because they control a U.S. bank that has elected FHC status.  See supra notes 30, 
31 & 41 and accompanying text.  It is not clear why 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) refers 
to foreign banks that are U.S. BHCs, because the rule applies only to branches and agencies of foreign 
banks. 
821   12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The affiliated company must be engaged in underwriting, 
dealing in, or making a market in, securities pursuant to § 4(k)(4)(E), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g) (2002) (Regulation Y) applies two of the so-called § 20 operating standards 
(Operating Standards 5 & 8) to the extension of credit by banks, thrifts, U.S. branches and U.S. agencies 
that are part of an FHC group to a broker-dealer subsidiary of such group.  These Section 20 operating 
standards imposed restrictions on relationships and transactions between depository institutions and so-
called § 20 subsidiaries engaged in underwriting and dealing.  See Securities Activities – Conditions to 
Board’s Section 20 Orders, 2 Fed. Res. Reg. Serv. 4-867.2, 12 C.F.R. § 225.200 (2002) (Regulation Y 
Conditions to Orders).  See supra note 12 referring to § 20 subsidiaries.  The Board is of the view that the 
policies underlying Operating Standard 5 (reflected in 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (g)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y)) and 
Operating Standard 8 (reflected in 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(i) & (ii) (2002) (Regulation Y)) remain relevant 
for FHCs.  See Section 225.4(g) Release, supra note 816, at 14,441.  In particular, §§ 23A & 23B, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 371c & 371c-1 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999), do not by their terms apply to branches and agencies of 
foreign banks and the extension of the applicability to branches and agencies of foreign banks insures 
competitive equality between foreign banks and U.S. banks in the funding of securities affiliates in an  FHC 
group.  See Section 225.4(g) Release, supra, at 14,441.  12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2) (2002) applies only to 
branches and agencies of a foreign bank, not to the foreign bank itself.  See id. 
In order to avoid customer confusion, the U.S. branches and agencies of a foreign bank FHC may not 
advertise or suggest that they are responsible for the obligations of a securities affiliate engaged in 
underwriting, dealing or market-making pursuant to § 4(k)(4)(E), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) (1994 & Supp. 
V 1999), consistent with § 23B(c), FRA, 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (c) (1994).  12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(iii) (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
  147 U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank purchases as principal or fiduciary securities for which 
the securities affiliate is the principal underwriter.
822 
The Board proposes to further implement the authority to adopt prudential 
safeguards governing the relationships or transactions between U.S. branches and agencies of a 
foreign bank and any U.S. affiliates of such foreign bank in Proposed Regulation W.  Proposed 
Regulation W would fully apply Sections 23A and 23B, FRA to covered transactions between a 
U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company of a foreign bank and any affiliate of such 
foreign bank directly engaged in the United States in any of the following financial activities 
newly authorized under the BHCA:
823  (i) insurance underwriting pursuant to Section 4(k)(4)(B), 
BHCA;
824 (ii) securities underwriting, dealing or market-making pursuant to Section 4(k)(4)(E), 
BHCA;
825 (iii) merchant banking investment activities pursuant to Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA;
826 
or (iv) insurance company portfolio investment activities pursuant to Section 4(k)(4)(I), 
BHCA.
827 
Proposed Regulation W also would apply these restrictions to transactions 
between a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company of a foreign bank and any 
subsidiary of an affiliate directly engaged in the four activities set forth above (regardless of 
whether the subsidiary itself engages in any of the four activities).
828  Proposed Regulation W, 
consistent with the rule on merchant banking investments,
829 would impose Sections 23A and 
23B, FRA on a covered transaction between a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending 
company of a foreign bank and its U.S. merchant banking affiliate only to the extent the proceeds 
of the covered transaction are used for the purpose of funding the affiliate’s merchant banking 
activities.
830  In addition, Regulation W would apply Sections 23A and 23B, FRA to transactions 
between a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending company of a foreign bank and any 
portfolio company controlled by the foreign bank under the BHCA’s merchant banking 
investment or insurance company portfolio investment authorities.
831  Proposed Regulation W 
                                                 
822   12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y).   
823   Section 223.23(a)(1), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,216 (May 11, 2001).  See Proposed 
Regulation W Release, supra note 793, at 24,202. 
824   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
825   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
826   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
827   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
828   Section 223.23(a)(2), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,216 (May 11, 2001).  Proposed Regulation 
W would cover subsidiaries of affiliates directly engaged in the four activities in order to prevent evasion.  
See Proposed Regulation W Release, supra note 793, at 24,202 n.80. 
829   12 C.F.R. § 225.176(b)(6)(ii) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
830   Section 223.23(a)(1)(iii), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,216 (May 11,2001). 
831   Section 223.23(a)(3), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,216 (May 11,2001).  That Section would 
apply §§ 23A and 23B, FRA to any portfolio company (as defined in 12 C.F.R. § 225.177(c) (2002) 
  148 would not apply Sections 23A or 23B, FRA to transactions between a U.S. branch, agency or 
commercial lending company and any other type of affiliate of the foreign bank (e.g., foreign 
affiliates or U.S. affiliates engaged in nonbanking activities under Section 4(c)(8), BHCA
832), or 
to transactions between the foreign bank’s non-US. offices and its U.S. affiliates.
833 
Although the rationale of Sections 23A and 23B, FRA is the protection of 
federally insured deposits of insured depository institutions, and branches and agencies of 
foreign banks do not hold federally insured deposits, the Board applied Sections 23A and 23B, 
FRA to such branches and agencies to ensure competitive equality and safe and sound 
banking.
834 
H. 
1. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Failure to Continue Compliance with FHC Requirements 
Failure to Remain Well Capitalized and Well Managed 
If the Board finds that a Foreign Bank FHC,
835 a Controlled Foreign Bank
836 or 
any U.S. depository institution subsidiary
837 controlled by a Foreign Bank FHC or a Foreign 
Company FHC
838 ceases to be well capitalized or well managed, the Board shall give written 
 
(Regulation Y)) that the foreign bank or affiliate controls (for purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 225.173(d)(4) (2002) 
(Regulation Y)) and any company that would be an affiliate of the branch, agency or commercial lending 
company of the foreign bank under § 223.24(a)(9), Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,217 (May 11, 
2001) if the branch, agency or commercial lending company were a bank. 
832   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
833   Proposed Regulation W Release, supra note 793, at 24,202. 
834   Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,482; Proposed Regulation W Release, supra note 
793, at 24,202.  For purposes of applying the restrictions of §§ 23A and 23B, FRA to U.S. branches and 
agencies of foreign banks, the “capital stock and surplus” of the U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending 
company is determined by reference to the capital of the foreign bank as calculated under its home country 
capital standards.  See Final Merchant Banking Release, supra note 418, at 8,482 n.32; § 223.23(b)(3), 
Proposed Regulation W, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,216 (May 11, 2001).  This approach represents a relaxation from 
the Board’s position with respect to foreign banks that operate § 20 subsidiaries (see supra note 12) in the 
United States.  See Proposed Regulation W Release, supra note 793, at 24,203 n.83. 
835   A foreign bank that operates a branch or agency or owns or controls a commercial lending company in the 
United States and that has made an effective election to be treated as an FHC pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
836   A foreign bank that maintains a branch or agency or owns or controls a commercial lending company in the 
United States and that is controlled by a Foreign Bank FHC or by a Foreign Company FHC but that has not 
made an effective election to be treated as an FHC.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.91(b)(3) & (4) (2002) (Regulation 
Y).  See supra B. 2. c. 
837   A U.S. depository institution that is a subsidiary of a Foreign Bank FHC or of a Foreign Company FHC.  
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.91(b)(5) (2001) (Regulation K).  For a definition of depository institution, see supra 
note 33.  
838   A company that owns or controls a Foreign Bank FHC and that has made an effective election to be treated 
as an FHC pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 225.91(a) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  149 notice to the Foreign Bank FHC and the Foreign Company FHC, if there is one, to that effect.
839  
The same applies if the Board finds that a depository institution subsidiary of a U.S. 
BHC/FHC
840 ceases to be well capitalized and well managed:  the Board must give written 
notice to the BHC/FHC to that effect.
841  Regulation Y requires also the reverse:  the Foreign 
Bank FHC and the Foreign Company FHC, if any, and the U.S. BHC/FHC must notify the Board 
promptly upon becoming aware that any of the above-mentioned institutions ceases to be well 
capitalized and well managed.
842  Noncompliance could be the result of business developments 
in the foreign bank or the U.S. depository institution or the result of an acquisition by the FHC of 
a U.S. depository institution or a Controlled Foreign Bank that does not meet the well-capitalized 
and well-managed requirements.
843   
                                                 
839   Section 4(m)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(a) (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
 
Section 4(m)(1), BHCA requires such Board notice only with respect to FHCs that are engaged, directly or 
indirectly, in any activity under § 4(k), (n) or (o), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), (n) or (o) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999), other than activities that are permissible for a BHC under § 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 1843(c)(8) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).  12 C.F.R. §§ 225.83 & 225.93 (2002) (Regulation Y) omit the BHCA exception 
that notice is not required for FHCs that are only engaged in activities permissible under § 4(c)(8), BHCA.  
Presumably the Board is of the view that only in rare cases an FHC will only be engaged in § 4(c)(8) 
activities.  See supra note 37.  Presumably, § 4(m)(1), BHC refers to activities engaged in on the authority 
of § 4(c)(8), BHCA and not to financial activities that are derived from § 4(c)(8), BHCA, but are exercised 
on the authority of § 4(k), BHCA, i.e., activities pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  
The exception for § 4(c)(8), BHCA activities must relate to an FHC that is only engaged in such activities 
because if the FHC is engaged in § 4(k), BHCA and § 4(c)(8), BHCA activities, a Board notice should be 
required if the FHC is in noncompliance with the well-capitalized or well-managed standard.  
840   A U.S. or foreign bank that controls a U.S. bank and that has made an effective election to be an FHC.  See 
supra note 31. 
841   12 C.F.R. § 225.83(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) for U.S. BHCs/FHCs. 
842   12 C.F.R. § 225.93(b)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) for Foreign Bank BHCs and Foreign Company BHCs (the 
provision does not specify the time period in which such notice must be given); 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(b)(1) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) for U.S. BHCs/ FHCs (a U.S. BHC/FHC must give notice within 15 calendar days 
of awareness).  12 C.F.R. § 225.93(b)(2) sets forth certain events upon the occurrence of which the Foreign 
Bank FHC (not the Foreign Company FHC) is deemed to have become aware that it is no longer well 
capitalized or well managed (“triggering events”).  These triggering events relate only to the Foreign Bank 
FHC and create deemed awareness only for the Foreign Bank FHC.  12 C.F.R. § 225.83(b)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) sets forth the triggering events for U.S. BHCs/FHCs.  See the Board Order of Jan. 9, 2002 
in the Matter of Dexia, S.A., Dexia Bank Belgium, S.A. and Dexia Credit Local de France, foreign banks 
that are FHCs, assessing a $50,000 civil money penalty for failure to comply with the requirement of 12 
C.F.R. § 225.93(b) (2002) (Regulation Y) to timely notify the Board when they fell out of compliance with 
the standards for being FHCs. 
Notice from the Foreign Bank FHC, the Foreign Company FHC or the U.S. BHC/FHC to the Board is not a 
condition for the Board notice.  This is expressly stated in 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(a) (2002) (Regulation Y) for 
U.S. BHCs/FHCs, but is not expressly stated for Foreign Bank FHCs and Foreign Company FHCs. 
843   See the example given in the Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 403.  Noncompliance has the same 
consequences, regardless whether it is caused by internal developments or by acquisition.  The 2-year 
conformance period of § 4(a)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1994), does not apply.  Thus, FHC status 
of a Foreign Bank FHC could be endangered if, for instance, its Foreign Company FHC acquires a foreign 
  150 Within 45 days after receipt of notice of noncompliance from the Board by the 
Foreign Bank FHC or the Foreign Company FHC,
844 the Foreign Bank FHC or the Foreign 
Company FHC and the Board shall enter into an agreement (a “corrective action agreement”)
845 
to comply with all applicable capital and management requirements.
846  Equally, if a U.S. 
BHC/FHC receives notice of noncompliance, it must enter into a corrective action agreement 
with the Board within 45 days.
847  The corrective action agreement must address the correction 
of the capital or management deficiency; in particular, it must explain the specific actions that 
the Foreign Bank FHC, the Foreign Company FHC or the U.S. BHC/FHC will take to correct all 
areas of noncompliance and provide a schedule in which each action will be taken.
848  
Difficulties will arise when a Controlled Foreign Bank that is not controlled in a corporate sense 
by the Foreign Bank FHC or the Foreign Company FHC no longer meets the FHC requirements, 
because the Foreign Bank FHC and the Foreign Company FHC may not be in a position to make 
commitments about the correction of the capital or management deficiencies.
849 
During the period of noncompliance, (1) the Board may impose any limitations or 
conditions on the conduct or the U.S. activities of the Foreign Bank FHC or the Foreign 
Company FHC or its affiliates and on the conduct or activities of a U.S. BHC/FHC or its 
                                                                                                                                                             
bank with a branch in the United States and the acquired foreign bank does not meet the well-capitalized 
requirements, or its Foreign Company FHC acquires a foreign bank with a banking subsidiary in the United 
States and the banking subsidiary does not meet the well-capitalized requirements. 
844   12 C.F.R. § 225.93(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  Regulation Y does not address the question when the 
45-day period starts to run if the Foreign Bank FHC and the Foreign Company FHC receive the Board 
notice on different days.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(c) (2002) (Regulation Y) relating to U.S. FHCs.   
 
It is somewhat confusing that 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(c)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) states that the Foreign Bank 
FHC or the Foreign Company FHC must execute an agreement with the Board.  If there are several tiers of 
Foreign Company FHCs, presumably any one of them could enter into the corrective action agreement.  
The Board is protected by the requirement that the agreement “must be acceptable to the Board”.  12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.93(c)(1) & (3)(iv) (2002) (Regulation Y).  If, e.g., a Foreign Company FHC does not control the 
Foreign Bank FHC in a corporate sense, an agreement with such Foreign Company FHC relating to an 
increase of the capital of the Foreign Bank FHC would probably not be acceptable to the Board.  
Otherwise, the reference to an agreement with the Board that is acceptable to the Board is odd, because 
presumably any agreement (that is not a contract of adhesion) signed by a party is acceptable to that party. 
845   The Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 403 introduced this term. 
846   Section 4(m)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(c)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  12 C.F.R. § 225.93(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) permits in accordance with § 4(m)(2), 
BHCA an extension of the 45-day period. 
847   Section 4(m)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(c)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  Section 225.83(c)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) permits in accordance with § 4(m)(2), BHCA 
an extension of the 45-day period. 
848   12 C.F.R. § 225.93(c)(3)(i) & (ii) (2002) (Regulation Y) for Foreign Bank FHCs and Foreign Company 
FHCs; 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(c)(3)(i) & (ii) (2002) (Regulation Y) for U.S. BHCs/FHCs. 
849   See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. 
  151 affiliates,
850 and (2) the Foreign Bank FHC, the Foreign Company FHC, the U.S. BHC/FHC and 
their respective affiliates may not commence any additional activity in the United States or 
acquire control or shares of any company under Section 4(k), BHCA (financial activities, 
including investments in nonfinancial companies in the exercise of financial activity investment 
authorities)
851 without prior approval of the Board.
852  The power of the Board to impose 
limitations or conditions on the conduct of the U.S. activities of any affiliate of an FHC goes 
very far and gives, for instance, the Board the authority to prohibit a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign 
industrial company that is controlled by the Foreign Bank FHC or Foreign Company FHC to 
expand into new areas of business.  However, the authority of the Board is limited by the 
purpose of the authority:  the Board must determine that the limitation on the conduct or 
activities of the affiliate is “appropriate under the circumstances and consistent with the purposes 
of the [BHCA]”.
853  A restriction on the activities of an industrial affiliate of the Foreign Bank 
                                                 
850   Section 4(m)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(d)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) for Foreign Bank FHCs and Foreign Company FHCs; 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(d)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) for U.S. BHCs/FHCs.  The authority to impose limitations on activities is limited to 
activities in the United States in the case of Foreign Bank FHCs and Foreign Company FHCs but not in the 
case of U.S. BHCs/FHCs.  Compare 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(d)(1) with 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(d)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y). 
  Since 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(d)(2) & 225.83(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) cover additional activities, 12 
C.F.R. §§ 225.93(d)(2) & 225.83(d)(1) must refer to existing activities. 
 
12 C.F.R. § 225.93(d)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) is not clearly drafted in that it is not clear whether “its 
affiliates” refers only to the Foreign Company FHC or also to the Foreign Bank FHC.  It should refer to 
both, because § 4(m)(3), BHCA refers to activities of the FHC “or any affiliate of that company” and, both 
the Foreign Bank FHC and the Foreign Company FHC are FHCs.  It should be noted that restrictions can 
be imposed on any affiliates, not only U.S. depository institution subsidiaries.  Affiliate is defined in § 2(k), 
BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k) (1994), and in 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Gruson, supra 
note 1, § 10.03.  
851   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
852   12 C.F.R. § 225.93(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) for Foreign Bank FHCs and Foreign Company FHCs; 12 
C.F.R. § 225.83(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) for U.S. BHCs/FHCs.  The Board may determine to grant 
approval to engage in additional financial activities on a general basis or only on a transaction-by-
transaction basis as appropriate, given the circumstances that caused the FHC to fail the well-capitalized 
and well-managed requirements.  Final  FHC Release, supra note 32, at 403.  The Board gives as an 
example for a general approval the case of an FHC that controlled only well-capitalized and well-managed 
institutions, then acquired a relatively smaller troubled institution and immediately developed a plan to 
improve the conditions of the troubled institution.  Id.  The requirement of Board approval for the 
commencement of additional activities is limited to activities in the United States in the case of Foreign 
Bank FHCs and Foreign Company FHCs and their affiliates but not in the case of  U.S. BHCs/FHCs and 
their affiliates.  Compare 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(d)(2) with 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
The prohibition of 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(d)(2) & 225.83(d)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y) relates only to 
activities and investments on the basis of the authority granted by § 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), not to activities and investments made on the basis of other authorities, such as §§ 
2(h)(2), 4(c)(6), 4(c)(8), 4(c)(9), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(h)(2), 1843(c)(6), 1843(c)(8), 1843(c)(9) (1994 
Supp. V 1999).  
853   Section 4(m)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R.  
§§ 225.93(d)(1) & 225.83(d)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
  152 FHC would be consistent with the BHCA if such expansion diverts resources from improving the 
conditions of the Foreign Bank FHC or its U.S. depository institution subsidiaries.
854 
If the Foreign Bank FHC or Foreign Company FHC or the U.S. BHC/FHC fails to 
correct the condition within 180 days after receipt of the notice of noncompliance from the 
Board, the Board may order (1) the Foreign Bank FHC or the Foreign Company FHC to 
terminate the Foreign Bank FHC’s U.S. branches and agencies and divest any commercial 
lending companies owned or controlled by the Foreign Bank FHC or the Foreign Company FHC 
and (2) the U.S. BHC/FHC to divest ownership or control of any depository institution owned or 
controlled by the U.S. BHC/FHC.
855  The Foreign Bank FHC, the Foreign Company FHC and 
the U.S. BHC/FHC, however, may comply with this termination or divestiture order by retaining, 
in the case of the Foreign Bank FHC and the Foreign Company FHC, the branch, agency or 
commercial lending company and, in the case of the U.S. BHC/FHC, the depository institution, 
and, in all cases, instead thereof ceasing to engage (both directly and indirectly) in any activity 
that may be conducted only under Sections 4(k), (n) or (o), BHCA,
856 i.e., financial activities and 
grandfathered activities permitted by the BHCA.
857  The foreign bank retaining its branch, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The requirement of § 4(m)(3), BHCA that Board action must be “appropriate under the circumstances and 
consistent with the purposes of the [BHCA]” is repeated in 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(d)(1) & 225.83(d)(1) 
(imposition of limitations on existing activities) but not in 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(d)(2) & 225.83(d)(2) 
(approval of additional activities) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Board takes the position that it is appropriate 
and consistent with the purposes of the BHCA to require a noncomplying FHC and its affiliates to obtain 
the Board’s approval prior to commencing any new activities, or acquiring control or shares of any 
company, under § 4(k) BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Final FHC Release, 
supra note 32, at 403.  This power is reflected in 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(d)(2) & 225.83(d)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  Because the legal basis for these Sections is § 2(m)(3), BHCA, the statutory restriction, 
namely, that Board action “must be appropriate under the circumstances and consistent with the purposes 
of the [BHCA]” also applies to any Board action under 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(d)(2) & 225.83(d)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y), even though those restrictions are not repeated in such Sections. 
854
   Section 4(m)(4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(e)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) for Foreign Bank FHCs and Foreign Company FHCs; 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(e)(1) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) for U.S. BHCs/FHCs.  Such divestiture must be done in accordance with the terms and 
conditions established by the Board.  12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(e)(1) & 225.83(e)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  
Regulation Y does not empower the Board to terminate the U.S. branches and agencies of a Controlled 
Foreign Bank.  Section 225.93(e)(1) (2002), (Regulation Y) is based on § 4(m)(4)(A), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(m)(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), although § 4(m)(4)(A), BHCA only refers to the divestiture of 
subsidiary depository institutions. 
   In connection with U.S. BHCs the Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 403 states that the approval 
requirement prior to conducting any of the activities that are newly authorized for FHCs by the GLBA by 
companies subject to a corrective action agreement “allows the Board to assure that the FHC is not 
inappropriately diverting resources from improving the condition of its subsidiary depository institutions”. 
855
  The 180-day period may be extended by the Board.  Section 4(m)(4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(4) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(e)(1) & 225.83(e)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
856   12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), (n) & (o) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
857   Section 4(m)(4)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(e)(2) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) for Foreign Bank FHCs and Foreign Company FHCs; 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(e)(2) 
(2002) (Regulation Y) for U.S. BHCs/FHCs.  For a discussion of grandfathered activities, see supra E. 2. 
  153 agency or commercial lending company in the United States and its holding company must try to 
find another legal authority for these activities, for instance the authority under Section 2(h)(2), 
BHCA in connection with Section 211.23(f)(5)(iii), Regulation K if the foreign bank qualifies as 
a Quality Foreign Banking Organization,
858 or the investment authority under Section 4(c)(8), 
BHCA.
859 
The Board’s ability to impose limitations on the activities of,
860 or to require 
termination or divestitures
861 by, FHCs that fail to comply with the well-capitalized and well-
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Section 4(m)(4)(B), BHCA provides that the FHC could elect not to divest its subsidiary depository 
institution and instead thereof cease to engage, directly or indirectly, in any activity conducted by an FHC 
that is not an activity permissible for BHCs under § 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. 
V 1999).  This is probably a drafting error because there is no reason to assume that the GLBA intended to 
restrict an FHC that fails to comply with the FHC requirements and reverts to a regular BHC status from 
activities and investments under § 4(c)(2), (6), (9) or (13), or § 2(h)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2), (6), 
(9) & (13), and § 1841(h)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The interim regulation solved the issue by referring 
in § 225.93(e)(2) to § 2(h), BHCA and generally to § 4(c), BHCA [and not only to § 4(c)(8), BHCA] 
activities that may be continued.  65 Fed. Reg. 3,794 (Jan. 25, 2000) and 65 Fed. Reg. 15,057 (Mar. 21, 
2000).  The interim regulation in § 225.83(e)(2) permitted noncomplying U.S. FHCs only the continuation 
of § 4(c)(8), BHCA activities.  65 Fed. Reg. 3,792 (Jan. 25, 2000).  The Board recognized the problem and 
solved it by permitting an FHC to comply with a Board order to terminate or divest by ceasing to engage in 
any activity that may be conducted only under §§ 4(k), 4(n) or 4(o), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), (n) & (o) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).  12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(e)(2) & 225.83(e)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  The Board said 
that it has “changed the statutory reference in order to clarify that a company that complies with the 
divestiture order by ceasing to engage in certain activities may continue to engage in any conduct 
permissible for a [BHC] under Section 4(c), not just the conduct permitted by section 4(c)(8)”.  Final FHC 
Release, supra note 32, at 403 n.5.  The word may in 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(e)(2) & 225.83(e)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y) indicates that the right to continue activities applies also to activities which in this particular 
case were exercised under the authority of § 4(k), BHCA but could have been exercised under the authority 
of e.g., § 4(c)(8), BHCA.  
The termination of activities must be completed within 180 days of receipt of the notice of noncompliance 
from the Board or such additional time as the Board may permit.  12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(e)(1) & (2) & 
225.83(e)(1) & (2) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
The prohibition to engage indirectly in activities under § 4(k), (n) or (o), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), (n) & (o) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), does not apply to such activities conducted through a depository institution 
subsidiary or a subsidiary of a depository institution subsidiary.  Section 4(m)(4), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(m)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(e)(2) & 225.83(e)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  
Note that 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(e)(1) does not require the Foreign Bank FHC or the Foreign Company FHC 
to divest any nonbank depository institution.  Any deposit taking depository institution subsidiary of a 
Foreign Bank FHC, Foreign Company FHC or U.S. BHC/FHC would have to be divested under 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.83(e)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y).  
858   12 U.S.C. § 1841(h)(2)(1994); 12 C.F.R. § 211.23(f)(5)(iii) (2002) (Regulation K).  See supra E.1. for a 
discussion of QFBOs.  As pointed out, supra E.1., the QFBO investment authority may not be available for 
the nonbank company controlling the foreign bank. 
859   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
860   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(d), 225.83(d) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
861   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.93(e), 225.83(e) (2002) (Regulation Y).  
  154 managed requirements is in addition to, not in lieu of, the Board’s ability to take supervisory 
actions and enforce compliance under Section 8, BHCA and Section 8, FDIA.
862  In addition, the 
Board has supervisory responsibility to ensure that foreign banks and companies treated as FHCs 
engage in the expanded activities permitted by the BHCA in a safe and sound manner.
863 
2. 
                                                
CRA Maintenance Requirement 
If a Foreign Bank FHC or a U.S. FHC receives notice that an insured depository 
institution subsidiary of such Foreign Bank FHC or U.S. FHC has received, in its most recent 
examination under the CRA, a rating of less than “satisfactory”, or if a Foreign Bank FHC 
receives such notice with regard to an insured U.S. branch, such Foreign Bank FHC and any 
related Foreign Company FHC and such U.S. FHC may not commence any new (additional) 
financial activity or directly or indirectly acquire control of a company engaged in financial 
activities.
864  An FHC receives such notice at the time that the appropriate federal banking 
 
862   12 U.S.C. § 1847 (1994); 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Interim FHC Release, supra 
note 32, at 3,788.   
863   Under § 7(e), IBA, 12 U.S.C. § 3105(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), the Board has the authority to take 
supervisory action against U.S. offices of foreign banks if the Board determines that the foreign bank, or 
any affiliate of the foreign bank, has committed a violation of law or engaged in any unsafe or unsound 
banking practice in the United States.  In addition, the IBA makes foreign banks with U.S. branches, 
agencies or commercial lending companies subject to the provisions of the BHCA.  Section 8(a), IBA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1994).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 412 n.26. 
 
In taking any action in connection with a failure of an FHC to remain well capitalized and well managed, 
the Board is required to consult with the relevant federal and state regulatory authorities and the appropriate 
home country supervisor(s) of the foreign bank.  Section 4(m)(5), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(5) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.93(f) (2002) (Regulation Y) for Foreign Bank FHCs and Foreign Company 
FHCs; 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(f) (2002) (Regulation Y) for U.S. BHCs/FHCs.  See Final FHC Release, supra 
note 32, at 412–13. 
864   Section 4(l)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. § 225.84(a)(1), § 225.94 
(2002) (Regulation Y).  This is the so-called CRA maintenance requirement.  See 145 CONG. REC. S13,893 
(daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999) (Sen. Shelby).  The ratings below the rating “satisfactory record of meeting 
community credit needs” are:  “needs to improve record of meeting community credit needs” and 
“substantial noncompliance in meeting community credit needs”.  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.84(a)(2) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).   
 
Section 4(l)(2), BHCA requires the Board to apply the CRA maintenance requirement if “any insured 
depository institution subsidiary” of an FHC has received a less-than-satisfactory CRA rating.  The Board 
reads the language to apply only when an insured depository institution receives a less-than-satisfactory 
CRA rating while it is under the control of the FHC.  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 404.  It does 
not apply immediately upon acquiring a poorly rated depository institution by an FHC.  Id.  If the 
depository institution does not achieve at least a satisfactory CRA rating at its first CRA examination 
following the acquisition, the prohibitions apply to the FHC.  Id. 
 
12 C.F.R. § 225.94(b) (2002) (Regulation Y) makes the CRA maintenance requirement applicable to a 
foreign bank that operates an insured branch (12 C.F.R. § 225.94(a) (2002) (Regulation Y)) or an insured 
depository institution in the United States and to any company that owns or controls such a foreign bank, if 
such foreign bank and company have made an effective election to be FHCs.  This formulation does not 
cover a Controlled Foreign Bank with an insured branch or a Foreign Company FHC that controls an 
insured depository institution other than through the Foreign Bank FHC.  The latter entity may be covered 
  155 agency for such insured depository institution or such insured branch or the Board provides 
notice to the depository institution, the branch or the FHC regarding such performance under the 
CRA.
865  
However, new investments made in the ordinary course of engaging in the 
merchant banking investment authority
866 or in the ordinary course of the insurance company 
portfolio investment authority
867 are not prohibited, if the FHC or an affiliate of the FHC making 
such investments was already engaged in such activities prior to the time that an insured 
depository institution controlled by the FHC or insured branch received a CRA rating below 
“satisfactory”.
868  Thus, an FHC or an existing merchant banking, securities or insurance 
subsidiary of an FHC may continue to make investments under the merchant banking investment 
authority and investments under the insurance company portfolio investment authority if it was 
engaged in such investment activities prior to the less-than-satisfactory rating.
869 
                                                                                                                                                             
directly by 12 C.F.R. § 225.84 (2002) (Regulation Y).  The formulation of 12 C.F.R. § 225.94(b) is curious:  
it makes the provisions of 12 C.F.R. § 225.84 applicable to the Foreign Bank FHCs and companies 
controlling such Foreign Bank FHC that have elected FHC status “in the same manner and to the same 
extent as they apply to an [FHC]”, disregarding the fact that the entities to which 12 C.F.R. § 225.84 (2002) 
(Regulation Y) is made applicable are FHCs. 
 
Section 4(l)(2), BHCA and 12 C.F.R. § 225.84(a)(1) (2002) (Regulation Y) prohibit the commencement of 
additional activities under § 4(k), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), i.e., financial 
activities (see supra C.), and under § 4(n), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), the 
provision permitting new FHCs to retain limited nonfinancial activities and affiliations for a 10-year period 
(see supra E.2.).  There is no prohibition against continuing to hold all investments previously made on the 
basis of such authorities.  Section 4(l)(2), BHCA and 12 C.F.R. § 225.84(a)(1)(2002) (Regulation Y) also 
prohibit the acquisition of control of a company engaged in any activity under § 4(k), BHCA or § 4(n), 
BHCA.  As to the duration of the prohibition, see 12 C.F.R § 225.84(c) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
865   12 C.F.R. § 225.84(a)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See Final FHC Release, supra note 32, at 404. 
866   Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  That Section also refers to 
underwriting.  See supra D.3. 
867   Section 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
868   Section 4(l)(2)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.84(b) & 
225.94 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
869   Section 4(l)(2)(B), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), could be read to the effect 
that investments under the merchant banking investment authority, underwriting authority and insurance 
company portfolio investment authority can only be continued if an affiliate (a broker-dealer, merchant 
banking or insurance subsidiary) of the FHC was already engaged in such activities, and that the authority 
to continue such investments does not apply to an FHC that is a broker-dealer, a merchant bank or an 
insurance company.  Regulation Y, however, applies the exception of § 4(l)(2)(B), BHCA in the case in 
which the FHC was already engaged in such investment activities. 12 C.F.R. § 225.84(b) (2002) 
(Regulation Y).  Regulation Y is correctly written.  The FHC can continue to engage in such investment 
activities directly or indirectly (through a subsidiary) (§ 4(l)(2)(B), BHCA) and, as discussed above (see 
supra C.1. sub (1)), an FHC may make merchant banking investments, engage in securities activities and 
make insurance company portfolio investments only directly or through a subsidiary (not through a 
minority-owned company). 
  156 The Board in Regulation Y goes beyond the restrictions of the BHCA and 
restricts the authority of an FHC whose insured depository institution subsidiary or insured 
branch has received a less-than-“satisfactory” CRA rating to continue to make investments under 
the merchant banking investment authority or under the insurance company portfolio investment 
authority by providing that such continuation is only permitted if “[t]he Board has not, in the 
exercise of its supervisory authority, advised the [FHC] that these activities must be 
restricted”.
870  There is no basis in the GLBA for this Board authority.  The consequences of a 
failure to obtain a “satisfactory” rating were the results of a carefully negotiated political 
compromise, and the debates in the Senate and the House show that the issue received much 
attention.
 871  The Board’s authority to further restrict these activities in case of a less-than-
satisfactory CRA rating disturbs this balance and it has no legal basis. 
The prohibition that applies in case of a failure to maintain a satisfactory CRA 
rating does not prevent an FHC from commencing any additional activity or acquiring control of 
a company engaged in any activity under Section 4(c), BHCA,
872 if the FHC complies with the 
applicable notice, approval and other requirements.
873 
                                                 
870   12 C.F.R. §§ 225.84(b)(1)(ii) & 225.94 (2002) (Regulation Y). 
871   Several Representatives voted against the bill, among other reasons, because of its negative impact on 
CRA.  Rep. Waters stated, “I am absolutely surprised that the Members of this House can support a bill that 
would do what this bill is about to do to working people and poor people.”  145 CONG. REC. H11,523 (daily 
ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999).  The majority of the Representatives, however, argued in support of the bill and did not 
see any weakening of the CRA.  Rep. Bentsen stated “that this bill in many respects strengthens the 
Community Reinvestment Act.  . . .  Additionally, it protects CRA for smaller banks.”  145 CONG. REC. 
H11,521 (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 1999).  See also comments on CRA in 145 CONG. REC. (daily ed.) (Nov. 4, 
1999) by Rep. Moakley at H11,514, Rep. Frost at H11,515, Rep. Castle at H11,517, Rep. LaFalce at 
H11,519, Rep. Vento at H11,520, H11,521, Rep. Meek at H11,523, H11,524, Rep. Jackson-Lee at 
H11,525, H11,543, Rep. Leach at H11,529, Rep. Dingell at H11,530, Rep. Gutierrez at H11,536, Rep. 
Maloney at H11,537, Rep. Schakowsky at H11,537, Rep. Davis at H11,538, Rep. Frank at H11,541, Rep. 
Levin at H11,543, Rep. Capuano at H11,545, H11,546, Rep. Roybal-Allard at H11,548, Rep. Doolittle at 
H11,549, Sen. Allard at S13,878, Sen. Bunning at S13,878, Sen. Enzi at S13,880, Sen. Schumer at 
S13,880, Sen. Edwards at S13,883, Sen. Reed at S13,888, Sen. Shelby at S13,893, Sen. Lieberman at 
S13,907, S13,908, Sen. Lincoln at S13,908, Sen. Moynihan at S13,910. 
872   12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
873   12 C.F.R. § 225.84(b)(2) (2002) (Regulation Y).  See § 4(c) & (j), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) & (j) (1994 
& Supp. V 1999). 
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The Future of BHCs 
U.S. BHCs and foreign banks with a U.S. branch, agency or commercial lending 
company that do not meet the requirements to become an FHC remain subject to the provisions 
of the BHCA as they were in effect before the enactment of the GLBA.  These BHCs and foreign 
banks may not engage in financial activities but they may still apply to the Board to be permitted 
to engage in one of the “closely related to banking” activities under Section 4(c)(8), BHCA that 
are narrowly defined in Regulation Y.
874  However, the GLBA freezes the permitted activities 
under Section 4(c)(8), BHCA to those that the Board had permitted by regulation or order as of 
the day before the date of the enactment of the GLBA (November 11, 1999).
875  In other words, 
the Board no longer has the power to extend or expand the laundry list of Regulation Y, to adjust 
it to current developments or to permit certain activities on a case-by-case basis by order upon 
application.  In addition, the GLBA restricts securities transactions that banks and branches of 
foreign banks were permitted to engage in before the enactment of the GLBA.
876 
With the GLBA, Congress has created two classes of banks:  banks that are able 
to participate in the international financial markets without restrictions and banks that are 
restricted in the United States to traditional banking activities.  For the first group of banks, 
Congress has raised the capital adequacy requirements without prior coordination with the 
members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
 
874   See supra note 9. 
875   Section 4(c)(8), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Gruson, supra note 1, 
§ 10.10. 
876   See, in particular, § 3(a)(4) & (5) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) & (5) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999). 
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